Racial Overtones of Chinese Development in Kenya
By Ria MazumdarIt is dubious that the Belt and Road Initiative is healthy for Kenya’s long-term development. People should pay close attention to the debt relation between China and Kenya, and above all should prioritize the treatment and welfare of Kenyan workers who are most directly affected by the two countries’ growing relationship.
Photo:PSCU
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, is poised to establish China as a Great Power with economic and political linkages spanning the globe. Over sixty countries have signed on to the program, with twenty being from Africa, accounting for 30 percent of the world’s GDP and together comprising roughly 1,700 infrastructure projects. There is already evidence that this initiative is more than a simple economic investment. Chinese military incursion into various ports and expanded military agreements show that soft and hard power alike are at stake in this initiative.
For years, China has set its sights on the African continent for new development opportunities and closely coordinated diplomatic relationships. Foreign Policy writes that China sponsors thousands of annual visits, trainings, and scholarships in Africa. China’s relationship with Kenya is particularly close. China’s railway project in Kenya is worth $3.2 billion. As of March 25, 2019, the two countries agreed to sign a new Memorandum of Understanding for the International Second Belt and Road Initiatives worth billions of Kenyan shillings. Aside from investment deals, this memorandum includes pacts for strategic cooperation as well as increased cultural and educational exchange.
However, widespread instances of overt racism by Chinese nationals in Kenya are immensely concerning. A journalist’s 2018 account of Kenyan railway workers found repeated instances of racism, harassment, and labor abuses by Chinese managers, going as far as a “deliberate segregation policy.” Kenyans were forced to use separate toilets, eating areas, and travel accommodation. The New York Times published an article in 2018 detailing the account of Richard Ochieng, a Kenyan whose Chinese boss called him a monkey. After Ochieng documented an instance of this and shared it on social media, provoking widespread public outrage, authorities deported this boss back to China. It remains clear, however, that this was not an isolated incident, as it sparked dialogue across the country regarding similar incidents that were occurring across the country.
China’s expanding presence in Kenya is starkly visible. When I worked in Kenya in the summer of 2018, it seemed that every single road construction project was emblazoned with Chinese characters, and Chinese workers seemed to frequent the most “posh” coffee shops in Nairobi. The tightening relationship between China and Kenya is much more than an abstract geopolitical phenomenon: it is reflected in the everyday lives of the Kenyan public, with a Chinese population of around 40,000 and growing. The segregated nature of this presence is starkly spatialized, with most Chinese employees living together and bussing to and from work, interacting little, if at all, with Kenyans. Indeed, Kenyans have to wait to board buses if Chinese workers are on board.
The apparent lack of regulation to check back for abusive labor practices is incredibly concerning. This is augmented by the power differential between the two countries: since Kenya is eager for increased Chinese investment, the government is prone to let some behavior slide or to do the bare minimum in terms of labor oversight. Incentives are currently not aligned to protect Kenyan workers. In fact, they are perfectly positioned to let Chinese companies exploit the Kenyan labor pool.
Some would argue that these experiences are largely inevitable consequences that are perhaps outweighed by economic benefits to Kenya. However, on top of maltreatment of workers, there is the undeniable fact that Kenya owes China over $5 billion, precipitating concerns about a rising debt trap. When Sri Lanka struggled to repay its debt to China, it ended up conceding a strategic port. This raises key questions about how Kenya will pay China back, and more importantly, what will happen if it cannot?
It is these background conditions that grant legitimacy to the characterization of Chinese infrastructure projects in Kenya as neocolonialism. A Kenyan newspaper, the Standard, used the phrase “neocolonialism” and faced backlash from other media outlets. Yet Chinese investment in Kenya checks several of the boxes: the nature of investment is related to cycles of debt, and the social interaction between Chinese and Kenyans is characterized by racism, explicit segregation, and a significant power dynamic.
Objectively, it is true that Chinese investment in the African continent has brought billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of jobs. However, we must ask: at what cost? The Kenyan case shows a debt trap forming at the government level and pervasive racism and labor abuses at the individual level, with no real accountability mechanism. It is unsustainable to rely on individual call-outs and social media pressures to check back for such abuses. The international community should exert more pressure in China to regulate its investments and be more transparent in its management, and the Kenyan government should provide more avenues for employees to express complaints. Kenyan economic strategy should also seek to diversify away from dependency on Chinese investment by providing opportunities to domestic entrepreneurs and other workers.
In general, it is dubious that the Belt and Road Initiative is healthy for Kenya’s long-term development. People should pay close attention to the debt relation between China and Kenya, and above all should prioritize the treatment and welfare of Kenyan workers who are most directly affected by the two countries’ growing relationship.
