In Armenia Domestic Politics Hinges on Geopolitical Diktats
Within Armenia itself, Prime Minister Pashinyan’s government lost its once high ratings and credibility following the exodus of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.
By Davit Petrosyan
The past calendar year has been a challenging one for Armenia, yet it can apparently be considered a kind of prologue to the 2026 parliamentary elections.
The most significant foreign policy events of the past year was that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President Ilham Aliyev initiated a peace agreement. At the same time, the Republic of Armenia committed to working with the United States and with jointly agreed third parties to develop a framework for the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) transportation connectivity project in the Republic of Armenia. A commitment to make good-faith efforts to achieve this goal as soon as possible was reaffirmed. President Trump stated that Armenia is establishing an exclusive partnership with the United States to develop this corridor, which could be extended for up to 99 years. American companies are extremely interested in joining the infrastructure development.
Also, at the end of the calendar year, the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh, which was formed to resolve the issue, de jure ceased to exist.
All of the above documents and decisions have provoked a mixed reaction in Armenian public opinion, as an initiated peace agreement is far from peace (recall the agreement between Russia and Ukraine initialed in the spring of 2022), and the end of the Minsk Group’s work de jure means that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is removed from the international agenda.
The story of the TRIPP project, which is to be implemented in the Armenian province of Syunik, is even more puzzling. It is not entirely clear how it will be implemented. Imagine a 42-kilometer stretch of the border between Armenia and Iran, parallel to the Araks River. On one side of the border are Iranian border guards and troops (the bulk of which are IRGC units), and on the other side are Russian and Armenian border guards. Armenian troops and unarmed European Union observers are stationed on Armenia’s eastern and western borders (Syunik Marz) with Azerbaijan. Opposite them are Azerbaijani troops, and on the side of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Region, according to Armenian media, there are also Turkish troops in Azerbaijani Armed Forces uniforms.
This multi-layered “pie” raises many questions and debates in Yerevan, and there is uncertainty that it won’t explode one day.
Within Armenia itself, Prime Minister Pashinyan’s government lost its once high ratings and credibility following the exodus of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.
The Moldova Model
The low level of trust in Pashinyan’s government has led him to rely heavily on the support of foreign policy partners, primarily the United States and the European Union, to remain prime minister. Ankara and Baku are also extremely interested in Pashinyan maintaining his position following the election.
It is possible that the Armenian authorities have chosen the recent national elections in Moldova as a political and electoral model.
There, President Maia Sandu’s team won not through genuine competition, but through a simple ploy: society was divided into “pro-Western” and “pro-Russian,” and any opposition force criticizing the government’s actions was declared a “foreign agent” and excluded/pushed out of the political process. These elections were not a battle of ideas, but an exercise in the reproduction of power.
The pretext of “Russian interference” served as a universal weapon against the opposition, allowing the authorities to control the electoral field and even openly violate the law to gain support from their partners, primarily European ones.
A largely similar toolkit is being used in Armenia.
Nikol Pashinyan’s team, in addition to all other tactics, is building its strategy for maintaining power on the anti-Russian sentiment of a portion of the population. Previously, before 2022-2023, such a strategy would have been ineffective or even impossible in practice. The outline of this scenario, which could shape the 2026 parliamentary elections in Armenia, looks roughly like this:
● The government and its allies will continue to mobilize their supporters on the basis of “anti-Russian hostility.”
● They will label the opposition a “foreign agent”/”fifth column”/”agents of influence.” At the same time, statements will be made about a “hybrid war” or “hybrid actions/threats” against Armenia, and essentially, its authorities. Those waging this “hybrid war/action” are not openly identified, but the public is made to understand that it is Moscow.
● Elections will become a tool for maintaining power, rather than a forum for free competition.
Part of this scheme involves turning to another major external player for political and other support, primarily financial.
In this regard, we note the statement by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and the allocation of €12 million (out of a total €15 million package) to Armenia to combat hybrid threats in the run-up to the elections. The European Union will also allocate €5 million to finance cooperation for Eastern Partnership countries, including Armenia, to combat disinformation in the run-up to the elections.
Discrediting the Armenian Apostolic Church
In Armenian opposition circles, as well as among experts, the allocation of these funds was perceived as a kind of contribution from Brussels to the future election funds of Prime Minister Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party.
However, political and financial support from external players is turning into demands for the Armenian authorities, which, we assume, are being tacitly imposed on them by these same external players. Thus, within the framework of the above scheme, the Armenian Apostolic Church (hereinafter AAC) and Catholicos Garegin II are presented not only to the public but also to European partners as part of a “hybrid threat.”
Accordingly, the systematic attack on the Church, which has been ongoing for eight months now, and the arrest of four (!) archbishops and bishops, is part of the fight against this “hybrid threat.” It is worth noting that the last time a priest was arrested in Armenia was in 1953, i.e., under the “leader of the peoples,” Joseph Stalin.
Prime Minister Pashinyan is demanding the resignation of the Catholicos and provoking a schism within the AAC (the prime minister’s demand is supported by 10 of the 57 archbishops). All this is being done under the pretext that the “moral character” of Catholicos Garegin II does not meet the requirements of the AAC Charter. The head of government also states that he doesn’t need a Catholicos who will report to him; he needs a Catholicos who won’t report to a “senior lieutenant” of a foreign intelligence service (referring to Russia).
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presented his plan for the “renewal of the Armenian Apostolic Church,” calling it a “roadmap.” Pashinyan envisions this “roadmap” to be implemented after the departure, or rather resignation, of Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II, who, according to Pashinyan, is subordinate to “external forces.” It consists of three points: “the election of a locum tenens of the patriarchal throne in accordance with the logic of the mechanisms operating within the Armenian Apostolic Church”; “the adoption of an updated charter of the Armenian Apostolic Church”; and “the election of a Catholicos of All Armenians in accordance with the new canon.”
He also stated that the national flag should be hung in churches and the national anthem sung before the liturgy.
A number of experts qualify all these initiatives as an attempt to “change the religion” of Armenians and a direct threat to the unity of the Diaspora.
Essentially, the authorities’ actions contradict the Constitution, a number of international obligations, and some of their own legislation. Media representatives, politicians, and human rights activists have filed a complaint against Prime Minister Pashinyan with the Prosecutor General’s Office, accusing him of persecuting political opponents and interfering in the affairs of the Armenian Apostolic Church.
To better understand the situation, let us recall that Armenia was the first country in the world to adopt Christianity as a state religion, back in 301, and the cathedral in the country’s religious center, Etchmiadzin, was founded back in 303. Christianity is a significant part of Armenian identity. This explains why, according to sociological surveys, the absolute majority of the population supports the Church.
On the other hand, numerous non-governmental human rights organizations operating in the country with grants from Western countries have, until recently, apparently had no intention of intervening in the unfolding situation. International organizations such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE have also taken no action. A number of experts in Armenia believe that citizens are witnessing how domestic political processes are in fact driven by geopolitical necessity, necessity, if not orders.
The archbishops, who, while in prison but remaining spiritual leaders for hundreds and thousands of believers, are not voicing a mundane agenda, but are attempting to formulate a true charter for national and spiritual existence.
Their messages today act as a protective shield for the Church’s sovereignty, as a stance against the scenario of schism, and as an affirmation of the dignity and faith of the people.
We do not undertake to predict when and how exactly this confrontation will end, in which, according to a number of Armenian experts, external forces are also involved.
David Petrosyan, is a Yerevan-based Independent journalist.
Views are personal and IAR neither endorses nor are responsible for the same.
About The Author
