Myanmar: Drifting towards Chaos and Civil War?
Despite some minor differences, the pathology, the ideological outlook, and the experiences of the Myanmar army is quite similar to Indonesian military, and was likely to follow the same trajectory in its movement towards democracy
Part – I
By Baladas Ghoshal
On the morning of February 1, Myanmar’s all-powerful Tatmadaw detained the country’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint on flimsy grounds and other senior figures from the governing party, National League for Democracy (NLD) seizing power in a coup less than 10 years after it handed over power to a civilian government. Hours after the detention of Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s army declared a yearlong state of emergency and said power had been handed to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Min Aung Hlaing, who in the following day established the State Administration Council (SAC) as the country’s interim ruling body and became its Chairman.
The coup has not only served a severe blow to its fledgling democratic experiment, but the junta’s excessive brutality towards the unarmed peoples’ civil disobedience movement (CDM), resulting in. the death of more than 750 people at the time of writing, including children, indiscriminate arrests of people participating in the CDM, thousands fleeing to neighbouring states like India and Thailand, is also turning the country into a possible failed state and a major source of regional instability. These may include the exodus once again of Burmese refugees, political asylum seekers, illegal migrants, and the Rohingya to neighbouring countries like Thailand, India, Bangladesh, and Malaysia to say the least; putting a considerable strain on the governments of these countries.
Myanmar drifting into Chaos and Instability
Lacking legitimacy, the military has resorted to increasing levels of violence to maintain its grip on power. Large number of Myanmar refugees, that includes government officials, policemen and ordinary citizens who are protesting against the coup, are coming over to Mizoram in India and in the bordering areas of Thailand, to take shelter.
Peoples’ non-cooperation with the brutal regime has put the essential services come to a standstill affecting daily life in the country. Since the coup, thousands of civil servants, railway workers, doctors, nurses, teachers and others have joined or supported the protests, with many arrested. Banks, private healthcare and other services have shuttered offices or slowed operations to comply with restrictions on crowds.
The pro-democracy and civil disobedience movements are gradually widening their base of support by bringing on board the various armed ethnic groups, who had been fighting against the Tatmadaw for many years for greater autonomy for themselves. Inflexible repression by the Tatmadaw, has pushed segments of the urban-based protest movement into using low-level guerrilla warfare tactics, while escalating hostilities with ethnic armed forces in the north and east threaten a wider war on multiple fronts in the country’s borderlands.
Also read: Renewed clashes displace thousands in Myanmar: UN
The economic crisis triggered by COVID-19 and the coup could plunge “up to 12 million people into poverty” in Myanmar, driving the poverty rate to 48.2% by early 2022 and pushing the country back to where it was in 2005, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) says in a report released on 30 April. The projection is based on a scenario in which the disruption of banking, logistics and trade cuts wages and business income in half. The report says women and children are set to bear the heaviest burden of the crises. “Half of all children in Myanmar could be living in poverty within a year,” said Wignaraja, U.N. Assistant Secretary-General and UNDP Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific, adding already vulnerable internally displaced people also faced more pressure. In 2017, a survey conducted by UNDP, the World Bank and the Myanmar government showed that 24.8% of the population was living under the poverty line.
The deteriorating political situation in Myanmar has implications for the neighbouring countries, more importantly for India and ASEAN, demanding a response that should be driven by their commitment to the restoration of democracy and normalcy in the country, peace and stability in the region and the imperatives of geo-politics calling for a more nuanced and pragmatic approach. An army take-over was not unexpected, as open talk of which were going around for some time after the elections in November last year, Even while protests, demonstrations and open defiance of the military take-over are taking place in major cities of Myanmar with arrests and deaths increasing every day, together with strongest condemnation by the international community and sanctions against military leaders and business interests hanging like Damocles sword, given the pathology of Myanmar military, its past records, socio-political orientation, particularly its world view as the guardian of the state, it will not cut much ice with Senior General Min Hlaing, who, along with the corporate interests of the military, had his own motivation to stay in power. Min Hlaing was to retire in a couple of months with the prospect of going into oblivion as a general without the command of the army is a non-entity. In the new dispensation, he remains the most powerful man for an indefinite period.
What triggered the Coup?
It is no coincidence that coup d’état occurred the day before the Parliament of Myanmar was due to swear in the members elected at the 2020 election, and the prevention of this from occurring is very significant, indicating a sense of insecurity on the part of the Tatmadaw and a lingering fear that, notwithstanding the privileges it secured under the 2008 Constitution of 25 percent reserved seats and control over internal security, defence and border affairs.
The military feared that Suu Kyi with her landslide victory securing 396 of the 476 seats in the combined houses of the national parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) and her reaching out to ethnic parties to join it to form a unity government and build a democratic federal union, might achieve the miracle to change the army-engineered 2008 constitution of the country that had barred Aung Suu Kyi becoming the head of the state. Despite serious misgivings in the international press that demoted Suu Kyi from an icon of democracy to a perpetrator of ethnic cleansing of the Rohingyas, she and her NLD had proved that Myanmar people, not just the Bamar majority but also some from the ethnic minorities had faith in her leadership preferring continuity and stability to uncertainty in the country.
Also read: U.N. Security Council wrestles with threat of action over Myanmar coup
To be sure, elections were not held for 22 seats in the Rakhine, Shan and a few other states ostensibly for ethnic unrest; and, of course, 166 seats are reserved for the military. Even if they were held the NLD would have still won, as the performances of ethnic parties with all their mergers and of the main opposition party, Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), controlled by retired Generals, were quite poor.
Suu Kyi, aged 75, herself perhaps might have got impatient too early under international pressure to improve her fallen image and perhaps wanted to go down in history as someone, who not only fought against military oppression and suffered incarceration, but who also completed the process of transformation from military authoritarianism to full-fledged democracy. That might have given the impression she was in a hurry to push the army back to the barracks. In the process she might have provoked the military, which acted to preserve its privileged position in the political system of Myanmar.
The very success of Suu Kyi and her party alarmed the military and contributed to her undoing. This is not to justify the military takeover, which was undoubtedly devastating for the country, but only to point out the trigger for the coup.
Constraints in the Democratization process
Those who have followed transition from a military authoritarian government to a civilian one in other countries of the world, know quite well, the inherent constraints in that transformation. This is more so in a country wracked by ethnic fragmentation and rebellion with external involvements, and where all civilian institutions were systematically emasculated and replaced with military organizations and institutions, and its economy controlled by an inefficient and corrupt military clique. Unlike in other countries where the military got involved in businesses as they consolidated their political control in course of time, in Burma the take-over was simultaneous.
Also read: Why a military coup cannot be the solution in Myanmar
Almost all private property was confiscated and handed over to a number of military-run state corporations. The old mercantile elite, which to a large extent were of ethnic Indian and Chinese origin, left the country, and so did many of Burma’s intellectuals. To restore all that were lost, was a stupendous task for any government and needed flexibility on the part of all the political actors in the country and full cooperation of all the stakeholders in that process, including the international community and foreign investors.to create an enabling environment for the same.
Role of Rohingya issue and international community’s response
While the response of the Myanmar military was brutal and disproportionate to the attack by the Rohingya insurgents in 2017, the international community’s response, particularly the Western and Muslim countries and their intense criticisms of Aung San Suu Kyi for her failure to stand up against the army crackdown and to protect the human rights of the Rohingyas, was also disproportionate.
Undoubtedly, the Myanmar government bears the responsibility for mass exodus and dislocation of almost a million Rohingyas and they would have to do their utmost to rehabilitate them. Critics, however, fail to understand the military-civilian relations and other complexities of Myanmar politics where issues like ethnicity, history, and cultural identity are key ingredients of legitimacy. Myanmar authorities are loathe to recognize the Rohingyas as a separate ethnic group which would automatically entitle them for a separate state, as the Myanmar states are formed on the basis of ethnicity. More importantly, given the concentration of the Rohingyas next to Bangladesh, where Islam is becoming increasingly radical, Myanmar – being a Buddhist majority country – will never accept them as an ethnic entity. Added to that is the fact that in 1948 at the time of independence of Burma, the Rohingyas unsuccessfully wanted to join Pakistan.
If the Rohingyas self-identify as just a religious group, they could enjoy citizenship rights like other Muslims in the rest of Myanmar.
Also read: Consensual Political Transition in Myanmar and the Rohingya Conundrum
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s recommendations in August 2017, just before the crackdown provoked by ARSA (Arakan Revolutionary Salvation Army) attack on police posts, were on those lines. ARSA derailed the UN attempt to find some solution to the Rohingya issue and gave a handle to the country’s armed forces to find an alibi and undertake the disproportionate military measures against the Rohingyas. By condemning Suu Kyi, her critics have inadvertently not only provided a shield to the Army chief, Min Aung Hlaing, from responsibility for perpetrating atrocities against the Rohingyas, but also practically weakened her position vis-à-vis the powerful military of the country.
Trajectories of change
Despite some minor differences, the pathology, the ideological outlook, and the experiences of the Myanmar army is quite similar to Indonesian military, and was likely to follow the same trajectory in its movement towards democracy — a guided political system with a certain role for the armed forces till the economy grows to accommodate both the security and economic interests of the armed forces through an expanded defence budget, opportunities in corporate sectors for children of military officers, and an eventual creation of a middle class demanding greater transparency and accountability from the government. This was how the Indonesian military was eased out of its political role and hold over the economy.
Abdurrahan Wahid, who became the first elected Indonesian President after Suharto’s downfall, wanted to rush through the process a bit too soon, but was outmanoeuvred by the military so much so that he had to suffer the ignominy of being impeached. Even though his impeachment and removal from the Presidency was more due to his erratic behaviour and decision-making and his inability to take his colleagues along with him, the Indonesian military, having had a bad relationship with Wahid through his tenure as president, stationed 40,000 troops in Jakarta and placed tanks with their turrets pointing at the Presidential Palace in a show of force, when the country’s Supreme Legislative Council was discussing against his liking about his impeachment and eventual removal. It was left to his two successors Presidents Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) to see through the process of transformation to democracy progressively without any confrontation between the military and the civilians.
Also read: Aung San Syu Kyi defends Myanmar in top UN Court
In the case of Myanmar, tensions between Suu Kyi and the army chief, Min Hlaing was building up for quite some time for the latter’s attempt to side-line the former and to see the victory of USDP in November elections. When the army could not achieve its goal, it raised the bogey of electoral anomalies and unfair elections.
Under such strained circumstances and knowing the balance of power tilting in favour of the army, Suu Kyi should have been a little more careful as well as flexible in managing and tiding over the crisis. As the content of the meetings that took place between Min Hlaing and Suu Kyi in the intervening period are not made public, one does not know what transpired between the two, but as per some reports, Min Hlaing had requested Suu Kyi and President Win Myint not to rush the swearing in ceremony and meeting of newly elected parliament which, it seems, was flatly rejected legitimately, but was imprudent, knowing the balance of power tilting in favour of the military possessing the means of violence.
Chances of a peaceful democratic transformation in Myanmar had better prospects under Suu Kyi if the international community had given her a long rope so that she could get some room for balancing various conflicting interests within the country to begin a gradual shift towards a process of reconciliation amongst them. The military would not have easily agreed to give her that leverage, not immediately at least, but could have been tried through persuasion, gentle nudging, and providing some form of incentives and stakes in it for stepping out of the political and economic scene.
By branding Suu Kyi and the military as perpetrators of ‘genocide’ on the Rohingya issue, the international community had actually pushed the Myanmar government, particularly Suu Kyi into a defensive position and to prove she was not a pawn in the hands of the military. The international community should have been a little more understanding of the complexities of Myanmar politics and not been so harsh with Suu Kyi, as they would never achieve their desired goal through sanctions and isolation of the regime. It has to be done through engagement with the regime in power, as the ASEAN has done now, through persuasion and gentle nudging. On the contrary, they will make the situation in Myanmar even worse and force the country into the lap of China, despite Yangon’s inherent dislike of Beijing.
China has already made major strategic and economic inroads into Myanmar, and this is only going to be accelerated further as per the indications of the present trend. Now, the military regime has another benefactor in Russia not only to rescue it from the UN vote, but also to sell arms and other equipment’s for the military.
Improvement of the economy should have been the path towards strengthening Suu Kyi’s hands
While Suu Kyi could not go very far in terms of constitutional amendments and reconciliation process in the immediate future given their complexities, the economy was one area she could have used to push forward the country’s fledgling democracy. She needed to swiftly implement economic reforms and potentially win even greater support. Average GDP growth under her leadership had failed to reach even 7%.when the need was for much higher rate for the challenging task of eradication of poverty of large sections of the population, and improving the quality of life for others.
To sustain the experiment in democracy and development, the twin goal for which the people of Myanmar had fought and sacrificed under a crippling military dictatorship for more than five decades, success in the economic arena was the only weapon she could have used in the absence of enabling political conditions during her first term.
However, Suu Kyi was handicapped not so much by lack of vision and policies but more by executions, together with large-scale vested interests afraid of losing their grip on power and control over the economy; lack of proper infrastructures, electricity, and above all civilian bureaucracy’s lack of experience in dealing with critical economic issues. It was here the West could have given Suu Kyi a bigger helping hand.in building capacities of Suu Kyi’s government.
The West and the neighbouring countries’ support to Indonesia’s civilian government in improving the economy of the country through large investments helped it to diversify the economy, create better job opportunities in the corporate sectors to attract children of military bigwigs away from their traditional jobs in the military, the only source of upward mobility until that time, and finally enabled it to increase military’s budget and provide other incentives to distract it from economic activities and eventually go back to the barracks.
Also read: Myanmar’s military must answer charges: UN body
Even while the investment environment in Myanmar had improved with the implementation of the Company Law in 2018 and the Investment Law in 2017, Myanmar had not been able to attract much-needed large-scale foreign investment from foreign manufacturing companies from the Western countries to create jobs, some for economic reasons, but more for extra-economic factors like lack of progress on human rights issues. Suu Kyi’s government was drafting economic recovery and reform plans, which were expected to include initiatives and measures to attract increased levels of FDI into the country.
Although Myanmar’s democratization was expected to increase investment from Europe and the U.S., large amounts have come mainly from Asian countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea.Over the last decade considerable Japanese private investments have poured into Myanmar. For instance, Japan’s “corporations – Marubeni, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo – have actively developed energy and infrastructural projects” in Myanmar. In the 2017-2018 fiscal year, “Japan topped the list of foreign investors, accounting for more than 36% of the overall investment, followed by Singapore and Thailand.
The West should have increased their investments in companies establishing reliable supply chains. At the same time, Suu Kyi’s NLD government should have been a little more sensitive to the Rohingya issue and address it in a manner that could bring greater peace to the Rakhine state. Even while accepting her limitations, Suu Kyi’s failure to address the Rohingya issue humanely cannot be condoned.
The author is former Professor and Chair in South & Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University; Secretary General Society for Indian Ocean Studies
This is the first of a two-part series on Myanmar
