“We may see India facing a one and half front war”
Probal DasGupta is the author of Watershed 1967: India’s Forgotten Victory Over China. Probal is a historian, strategic expert and a business leader with a multinational consulting firm.
He served as a commissioned officer in the Indian army earlier. He spoke to Aditi Bhaduri about the China-India clashes in Galwan Valley and future of Sino-India relations:
Please walk us through what happened on the night of June 15th. With the passage of time there is greater clarity now in the order of events.
There is no demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China. Chinese started the buildup on their side by mobilising troops, heavy artillery and armour in eastern Ladakh to put pressure on Indian deployments and infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control.
Typically Indian troops have held posts at Finger 2 but used to patrol till Finger 8 and the Chinese were at Finger 8 but would patrol till Finger 4. Now they want Indian patrolling to be restricted to finger 4. China blocked all Indian patrols beyond Finger 4 by building fortifications and occupying the space between Finger 4 and Finger 8.
The skirmish happened near a Patrolling Point (PP). Let’s understand what are are PPs? PPs are points on LAC visited by patrols on both sides. PPs are thus not manned physically by troops all the time but serve as indicators on ground and helps to let the other side know the area of control. There is patrol point 14 which is close to the Galwan river confluence. India claims LAC at PP 14 and patrols till the last point, but does not have posts there, according to the agreement. The Chinese would patrol on their side till PP 14.
However, in this case, in May this year, the Chinese built infrastructure and plonked in defensive positions at the junction where the Galwan river takes a turn to meet the Shyok river. The Chinese occupation of the positions also resulted in denying Indian patrols access to PP14. The Indian forces challenged this changed Chinese position which violated the agreement.
So on June 6th the Corps Commanders of both sides met to resolve the issue. On the Chinese side, it was General Liu Lin, commander of Xinjiang province. On the Indian side it was Lt Gen Harinder Singh, the 14 Corps Commander. Local military level meetings have taken place periodically along LAC and have proved successful earlier. So the commanders agreed that the Chinese troops would move back from their positions and both sides would disengage and go back.
But then again the Chinese troops did not stick to their side of the agreement, refused to dismantle their tents. Instead, they had gathered around 300 of their troops in the area. The Indians on the night of 15 June dismantled the tents and pushed the Chinese back. A struggle ensued. We know now the weapons that the Chinese had amassed. They did not use firearms but used clubs and sticks studded with nails to attack the Indian patrol, which also tells us that they were actually planning to inflict this barbarity on the Indian soldiers. This was in violation of the agreed norms of exchange between the two countries. When scores of PLA soldiers attacked Col. Babu and his troops, they radioed for assistance. Twenty of our soldiers died. Many Chinese soldiers are said to have perished too, though unsurprisingly so, the PLA never acknowledged the deaths of its soldiers who defended their country.
So, it was a planned move by the Chinese?
By all given accounts it was a planned move by the Chinese. The Chinese never give out numbers but they have acknowledged the commanding officer and two other soldiers were killed on their side. Through my sources I have gathered the number of Chinese soldiers killed was between 40 and 45.
Major General Zhou Zongqi Is the Western theater commander and is a personal favorite of President Xi. After Doklam, Xi had accumulated greater powers on both the political and military Gen. Zhou, who has overseen all the operations was in charge this time as also during Doklam. So the Western theater which combines Xinjiang and Tibet – the two were merged in 2018 – completes the entire border with India and that is why we witnessed multiple thrusts – there was an incident at Naku La few days before that, then all that is going on in Nepal all were required to coordinate the strikes. So that is the strategic side of the engagement. Its also important to remember that Gen Zhou headed the Doklam military build-up in 2017 and thus earned his stripes with his boss XI.
We keep seeing confrontation with China on a periodic basis now. What causes this?
This is also a function of the elevation of President Xi Jinping and the coming to the fore of his aggressive thinking. The stand-offs started from 2013 – Depsang, Chumar, Doklam, Ladakh, Sikkim – all have happened in the last 6-7 years. Xi came to power in 2013. There have been more standoffs in this decade than in the combined few decades before this one.
We have had agreements in 2005 under Hu Jintao, and earlier under Deng Xaopin and Rajeev Gandhi. However, though the LAC has not been demarcated for decades we have not seen such incidents prior to 2013.
Xi has kept a position vacant in the Central Military Commission and Gen. Zhao Qon Xai who heads the Western theater is supposed to be eyeing the post and so would seek to impress Xi.
Now with Coronavirus there has been a lot of pressure on Xi Jinping. Then you have the Ying Pais – the equivalent of hawks in Chinese political thought – and from what I hear there were actually plans to seek the removal of Xi Jinping. So a good distraction was external power projection of internal strife using the border incursions.
So we need to factor in the political system inside China as well as the external factors like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and perceived threats to it.
So since 2013 year on year the number of incursions have increased. Similarly, you will observe such intrusions and aggression by China in the South China Sea from 2013.
What emboldens China to keep making these incursions?
I think this is something [to ensure] that at a tactical level the People’s Liberation Army is kept under control. Also, during times of any internal weakness they project strength externally. The Doklam stand-off occurred just before President Xi Jinping was elected for life and there was opposition from the party. This time there was the pandemic. And Xi is very similar to Chairman Mao Tsetung because when in 1962 the India China war happened Mao was facing a lot of pressure internally and his advisors advised him to go to war with India. They are doing, if I may say so, similar salami slicing in the South China Sea. Claiming territory has always been part of the Chinese government’s strategy.
Now that relative calm has been restored with both sides meeting regularly to diffuse tensions and a disengagement is taking place, do you still see prospects for a short sharp war between India and China in the near future?
I would hold my thoughts on how this thing unfolds. Remember that the escalation happened after a de-escalation meeting had taken place on June 6th.
Lets understand that the Karakoram range branches off into two spurs – Saltoro and Sasser ridges. The Sasser Ridge and the Sub Sector North (SSN) are to the east. India’s link to Sub Sector North is through the recently completed Darbuk Shyok Daulet Beg Oldie Road (DSDBO) road. The DSDBO road goes from Durbuk and along the Shyok river and links to Daulet Beg Oldie where India maintains an airstrip. This is the farthest airstrip maintained by India in this SSN.
I think Chinese action would be a temporary pull back because their strategic objective is to disrupt India’s connect to the farthest post of Daulet Beg Oldie through the Darbuk Shyok Daulet Beg Oldie Road. If Chinese troops can occupy the various locations the overlook the DSDBO road, it can potentially cut off Indian access in SSN and to DBO and thus weaken India’s ability to interfere with China’s CPEC or project any ability to defend itself in the sub sector North
An extreme objective could be to cut off DBO completely if they feel threatened too much. They are unlikely to withdraw to positions in which they were during complete peace. They will continue to observe what we are doing and will continue to strengthen their position in the rear. They are likely to impose costs on India of holding the positions, maintaining logistics supplies and troop deployment – which is going to be costly and difficult in the coming winter months. Given China’s better infrastructure, they would like to keep the pressure on India.
There will always be a simmering of tensions of escalation between the two sides.
Some opinion makers in Pakistan have talked of opening a second front with India. Is India prepared for a two-front war?
Well, a two-front war didn’t happen earlier when India was not as strong as it is now and the Chinese were much stronger. When the 1965 India Pakistan war happened China was trying to pressure India to commit to another front but it didn’t get to becoming a two-front war.
In 1971 when India was actually fighting a two-front war – with East and West Pakistan – the Chinese could have opened a third front and Bangladesh was on close proximity to the Chinese, but they opted not to.
So historically a two-front war has never happened and the reason is that if they do open up two fronts India will not just sit and fight on the two fronts. India would open up other fronts.
For instance, in 1971 India signed the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviets. Lots of Chinese troops were committed to the Sino- Soviet border and they could not move their troops from there. Today the situation is different. In 1971 India was isolated because Pakistan was part of CENTO and SEATO, yet no third front was opened up. Today it is China that is isolated and India can open up a front in the Indo-Pacific, which China will never want. What China may do is more actively encourage Pakistan to infiltrate terrorists into india. I call this a one and a half front war. We may see this happen.
India technically is not in a position to fight a two front war today. However, it would then be important for India to use its allies and take the engagement with China into the Oceans. We are seeing the movement of US navy in the waters but it would need more cohesion on the part of allied constructs such as QUAD etc to be able to be effective. Also, it would need the other nations to see China as an immediate threat as much as India for such a cohesive allied formation to succeed.
