“The challenge of the nation state in Arab Western Asia is the focus on sectarianism rather than on the nation state”
“Arabs need to develop a clear modus vivendi on how they want to deal with the non-Arab states of the Middle East – Turkey, Israel, and Iran”
Dr. Nabil Fahmy is former Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt. He is currently Distinguished Professor, The American University in Cairo. In Delhi some time back to attend a conference hosted by the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, he spoke to Aditi Bhaduri about West Asian politics and Egypt’s role in the region.
Dr. Hosni Mubarak who recently passed away was Egypt’s longest serving president. What would you define as his legacy in Egyptian and Arab politics.
I would say that the late president Mubarak left behind three different legacies.
First, there is no doubt that in his first decade in office he was able to stabilize Egypt after the assasination of Рresident Anwar Sadat. He was able to deal with security issues, he was able to bring back the opposition within the centre of Egypt, and he was able to reposition Egypt into the centre of the Arab world. So his first decade without question was a very successful one and it was a legacy of repositioning and ensuring that Egypt has best possible opportunities.
The second legacy was of transformation, of planting the seed for transformation, greater openness among the media, among the political parties, and so on. But at the same time the culture of openness was not really completely fulfilled. So we established the institutionalised openness but not the cultural openness. Therefore I see the second decade [as one] of planting but not nurturing enough.
The third decade frankly was one of trying to keep Egypt out of problems, but one where ultimately, as a result of that, one took less risk, and one where consequently the progressive nature of Egypt was less evident.
So conclusion of these three legacies is a former military officer, a longstanding politician, who had a strong commitment to Egypt – he refused to leave Egypt even after he was removed from office.
I worked with him personally when he was vice president, I was a very young army conscript and then I worked with him again as Ambassador to Japan and to the United States. On a personal level he was very humane and I would argue that his commitment to Egypt was unwavering.
So, its a mixed legacy.
What are the lessons of the Arab Spring in your view?
First, I would say what are the lessons of the Arab world, rather than the Arab spring. That would be pre-Arab spring and post-Arab spring. [It] would be [to] embrace incremental change so that you are not faced with sudden change. As you pursue change, be ambitious but wise and cautious at the same time. Thirdly, [it is that] you need to develop institutions of governance, to ensure not only open governance but also efficient governance to meet challenges. Fourthly, as you develop you develop a multi-polar pluralistic political system, you also need to develop a multi-polar pluralistic political Culture.
These are the four lessons that I draw.
What are foreign policy priorities of Egypt?
We are still living in the post-revolutionary phase because we had two revolutions in three years – in 2011 and 2013. So we are still in a rebuilding phase. We are focussing considerably on a domestic rebuilding. That being said, you cannot be a member of two continents, living on two oceans and in the Middle East without focussing on foreign policy.
We have four hot regional conflicts going on – Libya, a major problem on the west of our border.
Next, water issues with Sudan and Ethiopia, [which is] another major problem. Seventy five of our water usage comes from the Nile.
We look eastwards – we need to create peace between Arabs and Israelis, between Palestinians and Israelis. Without peace we are going to have people under occupation and this will fuel frustration and extremism.
The challenge of the nation state in Arab Western Asia is the focus on sectarianism rather than on the nation state, and [this] is very dangerous. It would be a destabilizing factor and that would be a fourth issue.
And I would finally argue that Arabs need to develop a clear modus vivendi – and Egypt can play a major role in this – on how they want to deal with the non-Arab states of the Middle East – Turkey, Israel, and Iran., because if we keep battling each other we will all ultimately suffer the price of that.
My personal reading is that the time is ripe for pan-Arabism. Would you agree?
Well, yes, but not the same one we proposed before. Рan-Arabism in the past was in the era of decolonization, in the era of trying to end occupation. So it was against removing a fault that was put on us. Pan-Arabism now should be about rebuilding and building for the future. I t shouldn’t be against anything, it should be for achieving [something]. I think the decline in pan-Arabism was the result of when the problem that was a catalyst for the work of pan-Arabsim diminished, the call for pan-Arabism seemed to lose focus.
Arabs have always had a common culture, they have always had partially a common history. It is always better to work economically together than against each other. But we don’t necessarily have to have exactly the same priorities all the time. So this absolutism in pan-Arabism is wrong, the reductivism in pan-Arabsim is wrong. But I do agree with you that pan-Arabism as a forward productive, constructive, looking tool is definitely useful.
How strong is the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt? How big is its constituency.
In every country in the world there are groups that tend to be extreme left or extreme right. So this is not something unique for Egypt. Secondly, the Muslim Brotherhood, to be candid started in Egypt so we cannot claim this is not important. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood will always be part of the landscape. Because of violence and because of acts contrary to the Constitution it is presently prohibited. But the ideology will remain in the margins. I think that it is not an exaggeration to say that post 2013 with the removal of the president [Mohammed Morsi]their support has diminished tremendously. Mostly because the Muslim Brotherhood [is] trying to change the face of Egypt for Egypt to be part of the Brotherhood rather than the Brotherhood be part of Egypt. And that was the contradiction for many.
Do they still exist? Yes. The ideologues, the advocates have diminished, but their supporters have decreased tremendously. So my sense is that they suffered from their failures very significantly.
How big a threat does Da’esh constitute?
Da’esh is just a name. If I may say so, the difference between the Eastern culture and the Western culture is that they always need a name. The Americans always need an acronym, so that they can relate to it. For me Da’esh is just one example of extremism and violence.
Before that it was Al Qaeda. Before that it was the extremists who killed president Sadat, so I don’t stop with a focus on Da’esh. But my focus and I will say so -is on extremism and violence. This leads to intolerance with different points of view and when intolerance leads to violence it is rejected. That has not decreased enough in our part of the world. We need to work more on that.
The ability of Da’esh as an organisation, to network, to establish authority has decreased. But it may re-emerge again with the first crisis, in a different name, in a different form.
You touched on Libya, it is a neighbour to Egypt. What is Egypt’s position vis-a-vis the power struggle there
Libya is a major problem for us as it is a border issue.. It is a major challenge, we have a huge long border with Libya, with no control on the other side. It is a security problem. The lack of functioning government institutions and the breakdown of government institutions in Libya make it fertile ground for extremism, fertile ground for illegitimate activities.
Thats why we have supported General Khalifa Haftar because he has provided a sense of security on the western border of LIbya. We suppot now the efforts of Ghassan Salame – the UN Emmisary because there has to be a political solution. Security is the first step and politics ultimately is the only way to solve this. So we hope they could establish a coalition government and ultimately hold elections. Because this is butting of the heads between Haftar and Fayez al Sarrag on the other side is not going to be useful to anybody in the long term.
In recent years, India has been increasing its outreach to Africa. We have seen president Sisi here as part of the India-Africa Forum Summit. How do you see relations between India and Egypt?
Let me be provocative. Egypt and India have had long standing historic relations. It was not based on the material changes; it was based on intellectual commitments as to how the world should be managed. That started with Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser. Both sides are not performing to the utmost in that angle.
We are both involved and focussing on immediate material gains, and so I think both sides need to speak more about their positions as medium sized states in the larger world. If you have that commonality that would create a better environment for greater bilateral exchanges and relations. And as your economy grows and as we stabilize more there will be more opportunities
