India and China in the Trump Era: Competitors by Necessity, Partners by Calculation 

From August 18 to 20, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi paid an official visit to New Delhi — the first such trip in three years. This came against the backdrop of renewed tensions in U.S.–China relations following Donald Trump’s return to the White House. While Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar had earlier visited Beijing, Wang Yi’s arrival in Delhi was notable not only for its timing but also for the range of issues discussed.

During the visit, Wang Yi met with Jaishankar as well as National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, underscoring the strategic weight attached to the dialogue. The two sides focused on several key points:

 – preparation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming trip to Tianjin on August 31 – September 1 for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit;

 – discussions on border issues along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), still sensitive after the deadly clashes of 2020;

 – the resumption of direct flights between the two countries;

 – India’s reaffirmation of the One-China principle, an important symbolic gesture for Beijing.

Wang Yi had, on the eve of his trip, openly called on India to view China not as a threat but as a partner in regional and global development. The talks in Delhi suggested that both sides are at least testing a cautious rapprochement.

The broader context is crucial. India is simultaneously experiencing growing pressure from Washington, particularly after the U.S. imposed sanctions in response to New Delhi’s trade with Russia. While India continues to rely on Western markets and technology, it cannot ignore the realities of its geography, nor the weight of China in both regional and global affairs.

The two Asian giants have a complex and often contentious history — from the 1962 “border war” and territorial disputes over Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh, to competing visions of influence across South Asia. Yet they are also bound by overlapping memberships in major non-Western platforms such as BRICS and the SCO. For Beijing, BRICS is a tool to counterbalance Western-dominated institutions, while the SCO offers a regional security framework independent of U.S.-led alliances. For New Delhi, participation in these organizations is a means to diversify partnerships and prevent excessive reliance on the West.

The strategic rivalry remains undeniable, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where India is deepening ties with the United States, Japan, and Australia through the Quad. At the same time, pragmatic considerations — trade, regional stability, and multilateral diplomacy — push both sides toward selective cooperation.

Thus, Wang Yi’s visit to India should be seen less as a breakthrough and more as a symbolic opening: an attempt to find a formula for “restrained partnership” in an era defined by Trump’s return, U.S.–China confrontation, and the shifting global order. India and China will remain competitors by necessity, but partners by calculation.

 Johnny G. Melikyan is Senior Fellow at the Orbeli Center think tank, Yerevan.

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