China and the Bangladesh War of Liberation
When Bangladesh came into being on 16 December, 1971, many countries recognized the new country. But China did not care to recognize Bangladesh until the later part of August, 1975.
By Anwar A. Khan
Being a frontline Freedom Fighter in 1971 to establish Bangladesh, I can’t and shall not forget the despicable role played by China against our just cause to founding our own independent homeland – Bangladesh.
In fact, during Bangladesh’s liberation war in 1971, China was our enemy number three, Pakistan stood at number one and America brooked as number two. But during our pre-liberation years, pro-Peking (now Beijing) politics had a very strong support base among the student and youth leaders, even among the political leaders in Bangladesh because of the powerful leadership of Mao-Tse-Tung and Chou Enlai for the mass-people. But once we started our liberation war in March, 1971 taking the full-fledged support from human-centered India and former Soviet Union, China stood against us with all its might and sided with Pakistan to crush our life and death bloody battle to establish our own homeland, an independent and sovereign state – Bangladesh.
Finally, Bangladesh came into being on 16 December, 1971. Thereafter, so many countries recognized the new country – Bangladesh across the world. But it is very outrageous that China even didn’t care to recognize Bangladesh until the later part of August, 1975.
Now if we turn back the pages of history, we find that since its foundation in 1949, the People’s Republic of China has made substantial moves into South Asia. Besides Pakistan, it seems that over the last years Bangladesh in particular came into the focus of Chinese strategic thinkers. There is no doubt that Beijing made far-reaching inroads into Bangladesh by taking advantage of the need for urgent development in all spheres of economic life.
With its extraordinarily large cash reserves, China created by its extensive trade surplus is best equipped to help out. Subsequently, Beijing’s approach towards the subcontinent in general and Bangladesh in particular is mostly economic and diplomatic including a strong military component- in nature. But China’s attitude to most of the South Asian states is opportunistic, and rather aggressive with coercive elements than determined by friendship.
The annexation of Tibet, the Indo-China war of 1962 and other armed skirmishes with Chinese involvement in 1967 (Chola incident) and 1987 (Sumdorong Chu Valley), the questionable takeover of Aksai Chin (Kashmir region) can be seen as a proof for that too.
Also, China’s current “overassertiveness” towards Japan and South East Asian states as well as its behaviour in the South China Sea should be interpreted as an alarming trend. However, Chinese interests in Bangladesh were only made possible through the departure of British colonial rule and the subsequent transfer of power (1947) to the newly independent states of India and Pakistan, the latter of which was divided into a Western and Eastern Wing (today known as the independent state of Bangladesh).
It is often argued that the fact that China has no real contentious issues with Bangladesh helped to bolster bilateral relations. However, such statements ignore the grievous negative role China played in the liberation struggle of the Bangladesh’s people in 1971. China strongly supported Pakistan and its policy of internal colonization and exploitation of the-then East Pakistan.
Furthermore, Beijing opposed Bangladesh’s entry into the United Nations. A major reason was to appease Pakistan (which was facilitating a rapprochement between the US and China at that time) by supporting its efforts to undermine each step towards secession or substantial autonomy of its eastern wing. Having this in mind, one can state that quite from the beginning Bangladesh was an element of a larger strategy of China in South Asia in order to realize its national interests.
It is significant to point out, that the proclaimed ‘shift’ in China’s policy towards Bangladesh in the following decades, meaning from hostility to friendship, must be seen as a misnomer. It is argued here that Beijing did not change its attitude regarding Bangladesh, at all. Hence, Bangladesh is merely seen as a platform for the realization of Beijing’s strategic goals in the Indian-Ocean and Pacific region. But what are the Chinese interests in Bangladesh?
First, building-up a strategic foothold in South Asia to undermine each non-regional influence, especially Russia and the United States. In this context, it seems obvious that China wants to establish Bangladesh (besides Pakistan) as another bridgehead for Chinese interests in South Asia. Second, countering all interests of India in the South Asian region. Therefore, to avert India’s development into a major Asian power which would be in a position to challenge China’s claim to be Asia’s leading might.
Consequently, the containment and encirclement of India is essential for Beijing’s strategy towards the region. The fact that China maintains a keen interest in doing business with India is not seen as a contradiction to the above-mentioned goals among Chinese political leadership, but rather as a logical outcome. If China manages to bring Bangladesh within its sphere of influence, it would definitely jeopardize India’s as well as the US’s ‘grand South Asian strategy’ of containing Beijing’s geostrategic ambitions.
Third, another significant element on China’s agenda, which gained increasing importance parallel to the country’s growing economy and its desperate need for energy and raw materials, is the unhindered access to and exploitation of Bangladesh’s natural resources. Fourth, for the same reason, the Chinese developed a keen interest in establishing and controlling overland trade routes (e.g., Pakistan’s Karakoram highway) as well as by sea (especially the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz).
One of the latest examples is the project to establish the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor (BCIM). Another Chinese idea is the re-establishment of a “maritime Silk Road”, which should not only help to connect South and South East Asia, but also to entrench the cooperation with peninsular South East Asia. Fifth, China also sees an opportunity to have an additional option to extend its relations with the Muslim world, which is already promoted via Pakistan.
This was made possible especially due to the increasing trend of so-called Islamisation and attempts to undermine the secular foundation of the state by the past military rulers (Major General Ziaur Rahman 1975-81 and under Lieutenant General Hussain M. Ershad 1982-90) in Bangladesh. Sixth, rebalancing China’s relations with South East Asian states is also an element of Beijing’s strategic objectives.
After a series of disputes about territory and resources in South East Asia and an increasing tensed relationship with Japan, it seems that Chinese foreign policy thinkers are trying to regain more leverage in the South Eastern sphere of Asia. Apparently, China’s objection in this direction is to win over as many of the littoral states in South and South East Asia as possible under its umbrella. This is done not only to undermine China’s claims in the Indian and Pacific Ocean, but also to support its goal to tighten control over maritime routes.
Due to its geographical location, Bangladesh could gain an important role in the Chinese attempt to establish and consolidate partnerships, especially in mainland South East Asia. Therefore, one can state that Dhaka has a less known, but eminent role in Beijing’s regional rebalancing efforts. Seventh, in order to maintain its huge trade surplus China depends heavily on trade of its export goods and resources. Therefore, it is essential for Beijing to enter and ensure Bangladesh as market for its products. And Bangladesh has become a large market for Chinese products.
Taking all these interests into account, the territory of Bangladesh fits perfectly into the puzzle of Chinese interests of its South Asian policy. However, many observers believe that Dhaka is just seen as one piece in the so called “string of pearls” helping to manifest China’s bid for regional primacy in the Southern Asian region.
In sum, Beijing’s agenda towards independent Bangladesh (as well as former East Pakistan), as in all other areas in which China is active, is strictly guided by its strategic interests. This is, of course, not an unknown phenomenon and illegitimate behaviour of states in international politics. However, Dhaka should be aware of the fact that Beijing’s priorities in South Asia are not necessarily in line with the national interests and an optimal socio-economic and political development of Bangladesh.
So, Bangladesh should give a careful forethought before taking any final decision in respect of China, the past enemy number three and a prankish player then and may be now!
The author is a freedom fighter based in Dhaka, Bangladesh who writes on politics and international issues. Views are personal and the International Affairs Review neither endorses nor are responsible for them.
