“India needs a tranquil and cooperative neighbourhood”: Former Foreign Secretary
Krishnan Srinivasan is India’s former Foreign Secretary, and Deputy Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. He has published several books and his columns on International Relations are well-known and popular. On the eve of India’s 18th parliamentary elections he spoke to Aditi Bhaduri on the triumphs and challenges of the incumbent Narendra Modi led NDA government and the legacy the incoming government will be inheriting, Excerpts.
With general elections beginning what would you describe as the major foreign policy triumph for the incumbent government?
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar deserve high praise for their handling of the Ukraine War, which has placed India in an enviable position in world affairs. This happened despite intense covert and overt external pressure from the West, and the Indian media with rare exceptions repeating western stories of alleged Ukrainian success while portraying Russian President Putin as a threat to both the democratic value system and world order.
The distancing of the Global South from a pro-Ukraine stance in the war has enabled India and the non-western world to act independently when western nations have been unmindful of how their actions adversely affect the rest of the world. These are among the factors that will reset the international order with a new agenda for world stability. For the Global South, condemnation of the use of illegal sanctions which have a damaging collateral effect, and action to reduce the dominance of the US dollar on the world’s financial transactions must be considered a high priority.
What would you describe as the major foreign policy challenge being left by the incumbent government for the new government that will be sworn in June 2024?
The success of Indian foreign policy beyond the sub-continent has not been matched by similar success with Indian neighbours. Leaving aside the situations with China and Pakistan, there have been difficulties and frictions with all others such as Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Maldives.
Some of the issues between India and its neighbours are in-built to the political geography of size and inequality, with India being dominant in size and economy. The Gujral Doctrine, while an advance on any other formula, has never provided the complete answer, and none of our neighbours has come up with any doctrine on dealing with India either. Each of these neighbours will require attention and sensitivity to address their perceived grievances. Unless India has a tranquil and cooperative neighbourhood, it cannot play a major role in world affairs.
Recently we heard a conciliatory stance on China by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and reciprocal statements by the Chinese Foreign ministry. How do you evaluate india’s stance?
Prime Minister Modi’s view was realistic and pragmatic, rather than conciliatory. The India-China boundary is a problem inherited from history by independent India. If both countries resolve to settle first the Line of Control in Ladakh and subsequently the delineation of the boundary in each sector including the Indian Northeast, namely the McMahon Line, this would set the scene for an upgrade in bilateral relations, and the synergy that will come from the two most populated countries, both in Asia, working together, would transform global politics for the better.
There have been many channels of communications between the Indian and Chinese governments over the past years. Not much is known in detail about discussions at the policy-making level, but it is presumed that the Chinese government has been reluctant to discuss in detail the Line of Control, let alone the delineation of the entire boundary. To this extent, it is for the Chinese to be prepared for serious discussions. The Beijing view to set the boundary issue aside in the furtherance of practical good relations is not feasible when India has concerns that China has claims on territory that is Indian.
India has received an invitation to the Ukraine peace conference that will be convened by Switzerland in June this year. Russia, which has not been invited, has dismissed the viability of the conference. What should india’s position be on the resolution of the Ukraine crisis?
India has stated that it is ready and willing to work for and contribute to peace in Ukraine. However, there are some reservations about the proposed Swiss conference. Firstly, Switzerland has not proved to be neutral but has followed the West’s sanctions on Russia. Secondly, it is not clear if Russia will attend. If it does not, any conclusions reached at the meeting will be ex parte and of little consequence for a peaceful solution.
It needs to be noted that a peace settlement negotiated with Ukraine and Russia in April 2022 by Turkey was aborted by the West. So the West’s bona fides have been in doubt ever since.
The conference will take place after the Indian elections. It would be desirable for India to attend despite the above negative factors, to show that it is willing to help towards a settlement and to represent the Global South, BRICS and G-20. The level of Indian participation should depend on the level of attendance of major powers and the Global South such as South Africa, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and a few others. As matters now stand, a junior foreign minister will be appropriate and there is no need for the prime minister to attend.
Recently, India announced its decision to place defence attaches in many of its embassies abroad, primarily in Africa, but also in Armenia and the Philippines. At the same time it is downsizing the number of defence personnel in the Indian Embassy in Moscow. How do you feel the new government, irrespective of who comes to power, take forward India-Russia ties?
The matter of ‘military diplomacy’, service to service contacts is of growing importance as India develops its own armed forces to higher levels. Accordingly the deployment of service attaches abroad in principle is a desirable matter. The actual deployment will naturally vary depending on the circumstances of the time and there cannot be any hard and fast formulae to determine this.
I am not familiar with the actual number of personnel in the defence wing of the Indian embassy in Moscow but in the past it has comprised civil and military personnel in numbers relevant to large acquisitions. It is possible that the defence wing is now over-staffed. It is also likely that the level and nature of present and future acquisitions will call for fewer personnel. These are changing situations and requirements, and the staffing has to be calibrated accordingly.
As Indian leaders have repeatedly stated, India-Russia ties have been sound, strong and time tested, and there is no doubt that will remain steady in future. While defence has been in the limelight, we should not forget serious and important bilateral ties in nuclear energy and space, as well as the growth in bilateral trade caused mainly by the illegal and unilateral sanctions imposed on Russia by the West.
