Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict: core issue remains unresolved
The international community has some important lessons to lean from the Armenia-Azerbaijan war over Nagorno-Karabakh
By Achal Malhotra
The Russia-brokered tripartite agreement of 10th November 2020 between Armenia-Azerbaijan and Russia paved the way for putting an end to the 44-days long war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). The core issue however remains unresolved while the geo-political consequences of the agreement unfold gradually and several humanitarian aspects cry for attention.
To recapitulate briefly, the genesis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict lies in the flawed creation in July 1921 of an Armenian-populated autonomous region namely Nagorno-Karabakh as an enclave within the territory of the Muslim-dominated Azerbaijan during the incorporation of the South Caucasus in the evolving USSR; this was done in a manner that NK came geographically close to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic but did not share borders with Armenia. Seventy years later, in the backdrop of rising nationalism in the region and imminent fall of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed its independence, which resulted in a full scale war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis (1991-94) as a result of which not only Nagorno-Karabakh but Azerbaijan’s seven adjoining districts also came under the control of Armenians. The de-facto elected government in NK remained unrecognised by the international community. The 11-Member OSCE Minsk Group co-chaired by the USA, France and Russia made several futile efforts to resolve the conflict for over 25 years before Azerbaijan decided to settle the matter through military means in September 2020.
The war and the terms on which it ended has implications not only for Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan but also for geo-political equations of the region.
For Armenians of Republic of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, the war has meant a humiliating defeat, leaving them bruised for ever. The Armenians were forced into not only vacating the occupied territories of Azerbaijan but also to accept the control of Azerbaijan over some parts of Nagorno-Karabakh. Further the Lachin corridor which the Armenians had created to link the Republic of Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh is now under the Russian peacekeeping forces. Armenia has also agreed to provide through its territory a transportation link between Azerbaijan and its Autonomous region Nakhichevan which at the moment is geographically separated from mainland Azerbaijan by the Armenian territory and is accessible through Iran.
The defeat has cast dark shadow over the political fortunes of the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan who enjoyed high popularity rating before the onset of the war. He is now under tremendous pressure to resign but has managed so far to hold on to power despite protests from the civilians and pressure from the Armed Forces. Both Russia and Azerbaijan should like him to stay in power to take the agreement of November 2020 to its logical conclusions as there are demands within Armenia to walk-out of the agreement.
Russia was associated with the resolution of the conflict from the very beginning both in its capacity as one of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group and also through a parallel three-Party negotiations with Armenian and Azeri leadership. In fact the 1994 ceasefire was brokered by Russia and thereafter Russia had often used its influence to control the emotions.It was thanks to Russia’s intervention that the “Four –Days War” between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April 2016 was not allowed to assume the kind of proportions it acquired in September 2020. Even in 2020, eventually Russia succeeded where others failed, though serious damage in terms of human and material loss could not be prevented. The Americans and Europeans either made no tangible efforts or were unable to influence the course of events. Through the November 2020 Agreement Russia has secured additional military presence in the region through the deployment of nearly 2000 Peacekeeping Forces on the Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh territory. Under a bilateral agreement, Russia already has a military base in Armenia, besides a 4500-strong contingent of Russian soldiers guarding Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran. Russia has established its military presence also in the breakaway regions of Georgia namely Abkhazia and South Ossetia since its war with Georgia in August 2008. Russia has thus further consolidated its presence in South Caucasus.
Turkey, despite being a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, could not play any meaningful role in the past due to strong reservations by Armenia in view of Turkey’s proximity with Azerbaijan and enmity with Armenia. However, Turkey played an important role in motivating Azerbaijan to take the military route to resolve the conflict and extended considerable moral and material support to Azerbaijan during the 2020 war. Turkey would thus naturally expect to be allowed some foothold in the region. But would Russia allow beyond a point? The November 2020 agreement provides for the presence only of Russian
Peacekeeping Forces in conflict affected areas. However, under a separate MoU between Russia and Turkey, a joint Russia- Turkey Centre was established( 30th January, 2021) to monitor the implementation of the November 2020 agreement. In October 2020, in the midst of war, President Aliyev of Azerbaijan was earlier reported to have advocated in October 2020 in favour of appointing Turkey as one of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, though the Russian Foreign Minister said around the same time that no change in the format of peace process was being envisaged. Under the present circumstances this issue is more or less irrelevant as there is no clarity about the role the Minsk Group is likely to play in future.
In the course of over 25 years of conflict resolution, the Minsk Group could barely manage the conflict and at times it failed even in this role. It did develop a set of Basic Principles (also known as Madrid Principles) for resolving the conflict; these included for instance the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, international security guarantees, an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh and the determination of its final legal status through legally binding Referendum, and the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes in Azerbaijan etc. No agreement could be reached due to the maximalist positions adopted by the Parties to the conflict. Much of these Basic Principles stands superseded by the war and the tripartite agreement of 10th November, 2020.
Technically the Minsk Group remains in place; in fact it has continued its engagement with Armenia and Azerbaijan post-war in search for a tangible role in addressing the residual issues.
While the war has ended and guns are silent, the root cause of the conflict namely the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved. There is absolutely no reference to it in the agreement of November 2020. If one is to believe the President of Azerbaijan, the conflict stands resolved and NK is part of Azerbaijan where the Karabakh Armenians could live amidst Azeris. Azerbaijan also appears determined to isolate NK from the outside world. The ground position is that the de-facto elected leaders in NK continue to function though some important heads have expectedly rolled. Further Azerbaijan has initiated criminal proceedings against some of them for the war crimes committed in recent war as well as during the previous war in 1992.
Besides the issue of the political status of NK, there are numerous other issues which require urgent attention; these include for instance the exchange of dead bodies, prisoners of war, demining and reconstruction of badly damaged towns and villages, return and rehabilitation of nearly half a million IDPs and refugees. Azerbaijan alone may find it extremely difficult to absorb the costs involved in the reconstruction and re-habitation activities. International organisations such as Red Cross, UNHCR, IMF, World Bank ,individual countries etc. have an important role to play.
The war has altered the balance of power hugely in favour of Azerbaijan. Armenians are hardly in a position to negotiate with a position of strength to secure even an autonomous status for Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan.
The international community has some important lessons to lean from the Armenia-Azerbaijan war over Nagorno-Karabakh: if the resolution of ethno-territorial disputes through peaceful negotiations is prolonged beyond a point, the aggrieved parties – either on their own or on provocation from a third party with vested interests- can resort to military means. Further, there must be a clarity as to how the conflict between the principles of “territorial integrity” and the “right to self-determination” is to be handled. If in the wake of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo was promptly recognised by major global players, why Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination after the collapse of the USSR was not recognised in 1991, particularly when it is well-known that the creation of NK in 1921was a result of a flawed decision taken by the Central Authorities in Moscow.
Regrettably, the destiny of around 150,000 metaphorically orphaned Karabak Armenians is likely to hang in limbo in foreseeable future.
The author is a former Indian Ambassador to Armenia.
Views are personal and International Affairs Review neither endorses nor is responsible for them.
