“The Chinese have lost a lot more than what they were trying to gain by capturing small tracts of territory”

The Chinese have violated every agreement signed since 1993 and reneged on the established position on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The Prople’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made a military push for the 1960 claim Line by carrying out multiple intrusions in Galwan, Goghra, Hot Springs, Fingers in the area of Pangong Tso Lake and Depsang Plateau. There have been a series of talks at the military level as well as at the level of Working Group on Consultation and Cooperation and even one interaction at the foreign ministers’ level where both sides had agreed on disengagement and deescalation. Despite these measures , the Chinese kept lingering on with intent to present India with a fait accompli. This was unacceptable to our military and political leadership. Since diplomatic options were not yielding outcomes India exercised a quid pro quo military option.

On the eventful day, our surveillance system picked up some movements of the Chinese military forces trying to move to occupy heights South of Pangong Tso Lake. This area is extremely crucial as it dominates Chushul – a very sensitive place and Spanggur Gap which open an avenue of approach to Ladakh Valley. The PLA has mobilised their troops including light Type 15 tanks in this area. Having learnt a lesson from the previous Chinese betrayal , our commanders had worked out all contingencies to thwart any PLA design and to turn the tables on them. The moment we got indications of PLA troops movement our well rehearsed rapid response forces in a preemptive move occupied a number of dominating heights South of Pangong Tso Lake upto an operationally sensitive location called Chumar. These locations are in the contested zone of the LAC.

Consequently, bold Indian military action has not only thwarted PLA designs of fresh incursions but also put us in a strong position to threaten Chinese encampments in the area . India will now be in a better position at the negotiation table.

Since President Xi Jinping came to power there have been significant shifts in China’s overall policy.  First, he has adopted an authoritative leadership model, departing from an earlier collective leadership one. He has been making very assertive statements from time to time, telling the PLA to be prepared for worst case scenarios and extolling cadres not to lose even an inch of Chinese territory. Consequent to that, their military manouvres in the South China Sea have increased and so have their ingressions at the Line of Actual Control. So, in 2013 India witnessed the Depsang incident; in 2014 we had Chumur incident, in 2017 the Doklam standoff, and now we are witnessing a full blown PLA belligerence.

The reason why Xi has picked on India is that he wants to display to the world, at a time of a worsening global Corona pandemic scenario, that China has recovered from the virus and his country can assert to achieve it’s core interests. To that end, among other things, he seeks to embarrass India – the next most powerful country in Asia.

It is, of course, another matter that China underestimated India’s political resolve and military capabilities to respond phenomenally to catch the Dragon by it’s horns and call its bluff.

Indian punitive actions are not only confined to military actions but span into other domains. Actions like boycott of Chinese investments, banning of Chinese apps, shutting the door on Huwei and 5G are unprecedented actions taken by the Indian state to unnerve Beijing .

So in the long run the Chinese have lost a lot more than what they were trying to gain by capturing small tracts of territory in the Eastern Ladakh.

India is a peace loving country; we have never waged war on any other country. But, whenever any country has challenged India, we have responded resolutely. The only exception was in 1962 [war with China] where we did not do well.

My way of looking at things is that the overall geopolitical situation does not favor China to push further for a military option. [Given] the way the rest of the world, particularly the United States, have mobilised in the South China Sea and the pushback from other countries, will make it difficult for the Chinese to fight on multiple fronts. China has also tasted the operational readiness and offensive spirit of the Indian military.

Having said this, one should not underplay China’s bloated national pride and propensity for taking risks. .Therefore, the possibility of the PLA upping the ante in Eastern Ladakh or horizontally escalating the conflict in other vulnerable areas remains. But the Indian army and rest of the forces are prepared for such an eventuality. We have to be alive to Pakistan’s misadventure at the LoC,  particularly in the Northern Ladakh region in collaboration with China.

A two-front war scenario for us is a stark reality, and India will have to deter and defeat .We have to gear ourselves up for a two front scenario. The Indian airforce is playing a stellar role and is in a high state of operational readiness to undertake combat and combat support missions against [both] the PLA and Pakistani military. The Indian Navy has ventured into the Indian Ocean region and some of our naval vessels are operating in tandem with the Americans in South China Sea. So overall there is a deterrent. We do not visualize an appetite for an all out war at this juncture but sectoral conflicts cannot be ruled out and India is well prepared. And should good sense not prevail upon the Chinese or [if] Pakistan gets active thentIndia would give them a befitting reply.

Therefore, in the next one decade there should be constant increase in the defence budget to enable fast-tracking of India’s military modernisation .