Case for separate Ladakh and rethinking India-China relations
The Union Territory (UT) status for Ladakh is a masterstroke in India’s long-term home and foreign policy. A counter strategy that India should be thinking now is to offer China an alternative transport, energy, trade and communication corridor originating from a port in Gujarat running across Northern India to connect Kashgar through Indus valley in Ladakh.
By P. Stobdan
The case of Ladakh’s separation from Kashmir has antecedents predating the reorganization of other States. This issue could have been ignored forever under the pretext of Kashmir problem. The reordering of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) state was not a choice but a necessity for the Indian nation, for there were far bigger imperatives for India to advance its interest beyond the Himalayan frontiers.
The domestic imperatives apart, India needs to seriously think about Ladakh on the following key strategic considerations:
First, India’s strategic thinking thus far had failed on two accounts. For example, the vast swathes of Ladakh territory and its political history was never factored in India’s geostrategic calculus especially defining equation with China. Had India pursued a strong Ladakh policy rather than a Tibet policy, the current equation with China would have been quite different. It is evidently clear that India’s priority has been to neutralize Tibet from China rather than securing vast track of Eastern Ladakh extending up to Purang covering Rudok, Guge and Kailash that were once captured by the troops of the 5th Dalai Lama in the 17th Century. But for Aurangzeb’s military assistance to Ladakh King in 1679-1684, the entire Ladakh would have been a part of Tibet, thereby of China today. In fact, who controls Lhasa should not have been India’s concerns; its priority should have been to retrieve Eastern Ladakh now called Western Tibet from Tibet. India needs to start thinking about retrieving Eastern Ladakh up to Kailash Mansarovar from China. The Dalai Lama while he is still alive should be pressed to make a statement that his previous incarnation did commit atrocities on Ladakh and the grabbing of Eastern Ladakh to incorporate it into Tibet was a gross mistake.
Secondly, Ladakh and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) constituted over 82 per cent of J&K’s territory. Yet this critical point never factored in India’s strategic calculus in dealing with Pakistan. Had India imagined a smart policy for Ladakh, the Kashmir issue would not have gained the traction that it has acquired currently. Our political bankruptcy if not hypocrisy comes out openly when we talk about the fate of GB and their exploitation by Pakistan. At least, Pakistan has, for whatever reasons, separated GB from ‘Azad Kashmir’ to call it Northern Areas. In contrast, India continued to tag Ladakh with J&K without understanding the long term consequences.
Thirdly and most importantly, the geopolitical environment across India’s immediate vicinity is undergoing changes. China’s new economic and connectivity policies under the One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) idea could bring about unprecedented changes in Xinjiang and Tibet this time through much aggressive economic and connectivity pursuit. Neighbouring Pakistan has already endorsed China’s OBOR’s, besides China’s $62 billion infrastructure spending plan in Pakistan known as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to link Kashgar with Gwadar would challenge India’s role in the region. China sees it as a historic opportunity to redraw the geopolitical map by succeeding where India has largely failed. The project is viewed as a game-changer that will transform the economic landscape around India’s northern borders.
Fourthly, Chinese activities in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), including GB, are growing albeit on an economic pretext, but in reality it is not without the historical backdrop of Chinese influence and control of this region since the Tang Dynasty to Manchu period. While this historical aspect does not hold the ground today, China is deeply aware about the threat that instability in neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan is posing to China’s Xinjiang and that could grow worse with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. As a result, China’s interests in PoK will inevitably grow and Indian can do little to forestall it. But, once China strengthens its hold over PoK it would inevitably have implications for Ladakh as well. India is faced with a difficult option to either accept China’s presence in PoK or let it remain as a stranglehold of terrorists.
Fifthly, the threat of extremism emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan could grow to engulf others areas including Western Ladakh. Besides, the new emerging Islamic region extending from Chechnya, Ferghana to Xinjiang will be in close vicinity of Ladakh. Against this backdrop, India’s engagement with Eurasian region has become critical. With India becoming a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), its stakes in Central Asia – the next emerging Muslim region in close proximity to Afghanistan – well increased. A reason why, combating terrorism and extremism including the threat from the Islamic State (ISIS) in Central Asia has been a major theme of Prime Minister Modi’s discussion with Central Asian leaders. India is unlikely to succeed in achieving its goal in Eurasia with the current mess in Kashmir.
Sixthly and therefore, India needs to untie several difficult knots on the internal front that the nation is fixated with. The most complicated one was the J&K knot that had become unsolvable despite diplomatic, military, and economic efforts. The only way out left was to unknot the distortions borne out of history. This seemed only possible if India was to take a bold political step to separate Ladakh from J&K and make it a separate administrative unit on the lines of Arunachal Pradesh. This is the only way India could finally overcome the internal contradictions as well as external challenges.
The Union Territory (UT) status for Ladakh is a masterstroke in India’s long-term home and foreign policy. It would be a coups de maître for India to deal with multiple challenges that the country is confronted with, especially those relating to its economic and security concerns. Internally, if the idea behind tagging Ladakh with J&K was to counterbalance it, it could be done more competently with Ladakh enjoying a stronger political weight and leverage vis-à-vis Kashmir. The arrangement till now was one-sided; balancing did not work.
The UT status for Ladakh should draw on a newly expansive Chinese foreign policy, aggressive Pakistani design for sponsoring terrorism, emerging new Islamic region north of Ladakh and growing opportunities for connectivity and engagement for India in the Eurasian region.
Looking at Ladakh only from a defence prism needs to end. The region offers far bigger strategic perspective for India to be a key player in High Asia. The political and economic strengthening of Ladakh could unfold a historic opportunity for the country to physically connect with markets in China, Eurasia, and Europe and beyond. In the past, Kashmir and Ladakh traditionally served more as bridges than barriers for India’s international engagement. The region could once again seek to restore the lost trade linkages with the Silk Route that could be the kernel not only for broader change and but also beneficial to India’s strategic outreach to the north. Revival of this status goes as an essential element for better internal governance and growth prospects, considering what is being witnessed in other States in India.
Importantly, a counter strategy that India should be thinking now is to offer China an alternative transport, energy, trade and communication corridor originating from a port in Gujarat running across Northern India to connect Kashgar through Indus valley in Ladakh. Such a proposal will serve as an Indian equivalent of China’s Silk Road between East and West. The proposal will have multiple advantage for India: a) it does not harm India in any way; Chinese investment for building infrastructure will boost Indian economy, and employment opportunities, b) India could earn billion as fee from pipeline transit, c) China would be nudged to depend on India for energy corridor thereby buying guarantee against any Chinese misadventure across the border, d) India can bargain with China for getting long-distance roads, rail links and energy pipelines from Russia and Central Asia across Western China to India, e) and finally a corridor to China through Ladakh will offset and blunt the China Pakistan Economic Corridor project. For China, an energy corridor through India would be more reliable than risking investments in terrorism-plagued Pakistan. Besides, a corridor through India would be less hazardous. India could also offer several other outlets for China through Northeast or Sikkim that are nearer to Chinese growth centres.
If the idea is pushed forward, it could become a grand splurge by India for its economic engagement with China and be something akin to how the engagement between Russia and China started two decades ago. This could pave the way for strengthening trust between the two countries and eventually towards the solution of the boundary problem.
(The author is a prominent citizen of Ladakh and a former Indian ambassador)
