First overseas bilateral visits by PM Modi 2.0: Optics and strategic content

By Achal Malhotra

Both Sri Lanka and Maldives are the classical example of how small nations with limited resources can be victims of China’s “debt-trap policy” in their zeal to develop infrastructure in their respective countries

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first overseas visits to two island nations in the neighbourhood – Maldives and Sri Lanka (8th-9th June) -within weeks of the beginnings of his second tenure had optics, symbolism, as well as strategic content.

First and foremost, the choice of destinations was a reiteration of the continued emphasis on ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy of India, unveiled immediately after Mr Modi was elected Prime Minister in May 2104. Further both Sri Lanka and Maldives are the classical example of how small nations with limited resources can be victims of China’s “debt-trap policy” in their zeal to develop infrastructure in their respective countries. In the given case, these two countries did so at the cost of their traditional relations with India. Realizing the pitfalls of over-dependence on China and therefore driven by the push from within, both these countries witnessed a change of Government whose first acts were to review their China-policy and reset relations with India. In Sri Lanka it happened in January, 2015, and in Maldives as recently as September, 2018.

In order to fully appreciate the significance of the visit to Maldives, it must be recalled that Maldives was the only country left out of PM Modi’s outreach to neighbours during his first term. The Political instability in Maldives and strained relations between India and Maldives due to then Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen’s drift towards China and discriminatory measures against Indians forced the Indian government to exclude Maldives from PM Modi’s itineraries. The situation, however, changed in September 2018, when President Yameen was surprisingly defeated in Presidential elections By Ibrahim Solis – a candidate of unified Opposition. In order to pre-empt any attempt by President Yameen to prolong his stay in power, India (and USA) were quick in welcoming the provisional outcome of elections and thus endorsing the election of Ibrahim Solis and expressing support for the consolidation of democracy in Maldives. In order to demonstrate India’s support to the newly elected President, PM Modi also attended the swearing in ceremony of President Solis in November 2018. Soon thereafter, President Solih paid a State visit to India when he declared India as “closest neighbour” of Maldives.

In the last eight months the new dispensation in Maldives walked an extra mile in its outreach to India and in demonstrating its determination to reverse its China policy and to increasingly engage India. On its part India was quick in its endeavours to regain the lost strategic space in Maldives. Some of the initiatives by India included for instance: budgetary support to Maldives of close to US$ 200 million; identification of three projects to be covered under the Indian Line of Credit of about $US 800 million; grant of Indian Rs 500 million for high impact community development projects in Maldives; signing of a visa facilitation agreement which would address the issues faced by the Indian as well as Maldivian nationals.

PM Modi’s visit to Maldives in June was treated by the host Government as a State visit. In other words he was given the welcome and treatment reserved for a Head of State; President Solih conferred Maldives’ highest civilian award – the Order of the Distinguished Rule of Izzudeen – on the PM, who was also invited to address the People’s Majlis (Parliament), considered as a rare privilege; all together this was an expression of the importance being attached by Maldives to its relations with India.

Meanwhile, India’s relations with Sri Lanka saw a downward trend under President Rajapakse’s second term (2010-15). India had extended tacit support to Rajapakse while he led a war against the LTTE which resulted in the latter’s elimination in 2009 after remaining in virtual control of large territories in North and East of Tamil-majority Sri Lanka. However Rajapakse became upset over India’s decision to support the US-sponsored Resolutions in 2012 and 2013, which criticised his Government for not taking enough steps to ensure accountability for the alleged violations of human rights, particularly during the last phase of the war against the armed separatist LTTE. Further, during his tenure, President Rajapakse went too far in engaging China and allowing it to undertake high-cost infra-projects in Sri Lanka, ignoring India’s sensitivities. In the process Sri Lanka fell under unsustainable debts. Rajapakse was defeated and replaced as President by Maithripala Sirisena in January 2015, who was quick in reviewing Sri Lanka’s China policy but it was too late in the day. Unable to pay off heavy loans, the Sri Lankan Government was ultimately forced to hand over the strategically located Hambantota Port in the backyard of India to China on a ninety nine year lease in 2018. Meanwhile, India under Modi, and Sri Lanka, under Sirisena, worked together to consolidate relations in diverse areas. The emphasis has been on development assistance and cooperation by India and Sri Lanka’s sensitivities towards India’s security concerns.

The officially stated objectives of PM Modi’s visit to Maldives and Sri Lanka were manifold: to maintain contacts at the high-levels in the immediate neighbourhood; discuss ways to enhance India’s (benign and non-prescriptive) development assistance and cooperation; promote people to people contacts, and reiterate its commitment to build a strong relationship, and to highlight the dangers posed by global terrorism. In the case of Sri Lanka, the visit was also meant to express solidarity with the people and the government in the wake of the terrorist attacks on churches in Sri Lanka in April this year.

The unstated but obvious objectives are to engage the strategically located countries in the Indian Ocean to ensure that they remain immune to the extent possible from undue China influence, and act as reliable partners in the overall context of maritime security in the region.

(The writer is a former Indian diplomat who has served in both Maldives and Sri Lanka)

1 thought on “First overseas bilateral visits by PM Modi 2.0: Optics and strategic content

  1. Excellent summary of ups and downs in our bilateral relations with the two countries in the past decade. Their strategic importance can not be over emphasised. But the aids and projects announced now to re-engage them are similar to steps taken earlier in the past decades, which evidently did not prevent them from going China way on change of govts there. How do we ensure that it does not happen again? China has already secured some irreversible gains like the ports and the debt handle. What do we have? Should not we now review our policy of benign and non prescriptive aid & assistance and link the substantial aid flowing out of scarce public money to some tangible gains for the nation?

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