US-China Rivalry: What Response Should India Forge? – II
Maj Gen B.K. SharmaThe US- China strategic brinkmanship presents India with a host of opportunities. India can emerge as a major manufacturing hub and a trading partner of choice for the US; broaden and deepen strategic relations bilaterally with the US as well as under a multi-lateral framework nudge China on the border issue and utilize China’s distraction to build capacity to bridge the power asymmetry
Photo: The Geopolitics
This is the final and concluding part of a two-part series on US-China Rivalry and Indo-Pacific Region
China – US rivalry is exacerbating due to a zero sum geopolitics, deep-rooted strategic trust deficit, and hyper nationalism. This trend does not bode well for the global economy, global supply chain, and digital inter-connectedness, and for overall regional and global peace. How this competition pans out is difficult to prognosticate. Will China stumble and yield to US pressure or will the US accommodate China’s rise and the two will find some modus vivendi? The moot point, however, is whether the rest of the world should remain a bystander, allow the conflict to proliferate, and then face consequences of negative outcomes. It is incumbent for major powers like India to build a concert of middle level powers, like Australia, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea to balance emergence of a hegemonic world order.
The US-China relations pose a host of challenges and offer opportunities to vibrant India. The US considers India the lynchpin of its ‘Asia’s Rebalancing Strategy’ and as a key defense partner in the 21st century. However, all is not hunky dory in this sound but ironically asymmetrical relation. India itself is facing the heat of a US initiated trade war. At $140 billion, US is India’s largest trading partner and a recipient of the bulk of our information technology services export. India has about a $ 25 billion surplus with US. That notwithstanding, Trump has announced his intention to terminate India’s designation as a beneficiary of the GSP programme. These trade barriers are likely to impact the export of $ 5.6 billion Indian goods to US. India will be constrained to retaliate. India as a digitally dependent country will also come in the cross–hairs of the digital war as US and China may develop their own digital eco-systems.
China, on the other hand, is seeking a thaw in bilateral relations with India under the aegis of the Wuhan dialogue. Nevertheless, the fundamentals of our bilateral relations are weak. Border issues, water tensions, the Dalai Lama factor, trade imbalance, Pakistan–China strategic nexus, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China’s growing influence in India’s neighborhood will keep bilateral relations on a weak wicket. How India navigates through these contrasting expectations merits a careful thought. Nonetheless, the US- China strategic brinkmanship presents India with a host of opportunities. India can emerge as a major manufacturing hub and a trading partner of choice for the US. Geopolitical developments are well suited for India and US to broaden and deepen their strategic relations bilaterally as well as under a multi-lateral framework, such as the QUAD, alternate economic growth corridors and joint military exercises, like MALABAR and RIMPAC. Likewise, China’s Western Pacific dilemma affords India opportunities to nudge China on the border issue and utilize China’s distraction to build capacity to bridge the power asymmetry in order to restore balance of power in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region. In the evolving geopolitical milieu, India’s policy of strategic autonomy and multi-vector engagement is undoubtedly the best approach to promote Indian interests. India is bestowed with a strong government with a full five years tenure. New Delhi must have a de-novo look at the geopolitical environment and expeditiously recalibrate its strategic direction and foreign policy to promote its expanding strategic interests. A buoyant India together with other middle level states should prepare and position itself as a balancer and contribute constructively to prevent the world from plunging into another Cold War .
(The author is AVSM. SM & Bar (Retd)., and currently heads the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Services of India, New Delhi. He specialises in Strategic Assessments, Scenario Building and Gaming, and is an expert on Central Asia and China.)
Incisive, precise and thought-provoking assessment by Maj Gen BK Sharma (Retd). The two parts of the article US-China Rivalry: What Response Should India Forge? cover the subject in all its dimensions. What comes out in reading between the lines is that a nuanced approach maintaining strategic autonomy is the way to shape our response to the situation. The US-China tensions which are Cold War 2.0 cannot be seen in light of Cold War 1.0 between the US-USSR. In the latter case of all the alliances that US forged the most effective and enduring was NATO because of the shared threats and values of the countries constituting it. The same cannot be said of the alliances the US has in the Indo-Pacific. The former had greater military heft, in the latter case partners like Australia and Japan cannot in any way be compared to, say, the UK and France in the case of NATO.
Incisive, precise and thought-provoking assessment by Maj Gen BK Sharma (Retd). The two parts of the article US-China Rivalry: What Response Should India Forge? cover the subject in all its dimensions. What comes out in reading between the lines is that a nuanced approach maintaining strategic autonomy is the way to shape our response to the situation. The US-China tensions which are Cold War 2.0 cannot be seen in light of Cold War 1.0 between the US-USSR. In the latter case of all the alliances that US forged the most effective and enduring was NATO because of the shared threats and values of the countries constituting it. The same cannot be said of the alliances the US has in the Indo-Pacific. The former had greater military heft, in the latter case partners like Australia and Japan cannot in any way be compared to, say, the UK and France in the case of NATO.