Belt and Road Forum: the legitimate concerns in various countries along the BRI routes have finally found their way to the Chinese
China is gradually becoming a “European” power; apart from Washington and Moscow now Europe has another big foreign player in the region.
Dr. Bruno Surdel, is a political scientist and historian at the Centre for International Relations in Warsaw. He has been a visiting professor several times at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing – National Institute of International Strategy, and in Shanghai: Shanghai International Studies University. His field is international security and China – Russia – Middle East, Turkey strategic relations, as well as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Arctic. He spoke to IAR on the ongoing Belt and Road Forum in Beijing and it’s strategic significance for Eurasia, the countries of Central Europe and NATO.
This is the second Belt and Road Forum. How do you see China’s position evolving regarding the BRI since the first forum?
DEfinitely, the legitimate concerns in various countries along the BRI routes have finally found their way to the Chinese leadership. Apparently, they decided to reflect on some critical and problematic features of that mammoth project. I mean transparency, sustainability, best business practices, intellectual property rights, debt issues which President Xi Jinping tried to ,address during the Forum.However, the Belt and Road Initiative is an experiment. This time [it’s] not a merely local stand-alone [project] as in the past when China’s openingup and reforms started, but on a global scale. For the Chinese themselves it has been a leap into the unknown with unexpected ramifications. Intended or not, it has also strategic dimensions which are looked at with a growing concern in America and Europe. In fact, the Belt and Road Initiative has become a milestone on the departure way from Deng Xiaoping’s “hide your strength and bide your time”guideline. But now we are witnessing a softening of the message coming from Beijing. There are two basic reasons for the evolution of narrative: the economic slowdown with the growth rate shitting 27 years low, and the trade war with the United States. To me it seems that the second factor was decisive.
The UN Chief has said that the BRI could contribute to a more equitable, prosperous world, and to reversing the negative impact of climate change. Do you agree with his assessment?
The UN’s Secretary General Antonio Guterres tries to be impartial and for good reasons: this is precisely his job. Another question is, can sustainable development goals (SDGs) be aligned with the Belt and Road Initiative? No doubt that Eurasia needs tremendous investments in infrastructure. China’s grand infrastructure and connectivity initiative is an opportunity to fill the gap where no other options and funding are available in Asia, Africa or even southern Europe. The issue, however, is of best business practises and anti-corruption procedures are implemented as declared at the Second BRI Forum atat lea to a certain (even limited) extent. There is a chance, and (as I mentioned before) it paradoxically comes from the trade war with the USA. I mean the pressure exerted on Beijing by Washington. This is a big opportunity for China to improve the whole BRI project to employ more financial sustainability, quality and transparency.
When it comes to the climate change issues, China is committed to change its unsustainable growth model to make it more “green”. For purely domestic reasons: the environmental and socialcosts of a “wild” growth have become too high to continue. This is why China subscribed easily to the Paris climate accord. Another issue is exporting coal-fired powerplants overseas (to take just one example). It must be stopped or limited. But I do not believe it’s a realistic expectation. For a large part of the world still “development” at all costs is much more critical than a “sustainable” one.
How would you evaluate Russia’s response to the BRI? Especially given that the Central Asian countries, which Russia considers it’s strategic backyard are demonstrating such enthusiasm about the BRI?
What alternative does Moscow have to a tactical alliance with Beijing? Not one – since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and intervention in the Syrian war in 2015. Comprehensive sanctions regularly imposed by the collective West on the Kremlin have been pushing it into Beijing’s arms. On the other hand,also the US – China trade war is strengthening the Putin – Xi bromance. From Yamal LNG projects in Arctic to Power of Siberia pipelines, Russia needs Chinese funds and technology. Beijing provides both and – what is most important – buys Russian oil and gas on an epic scale, with Russia seasonally even surpassing Saudi Arabia in this respect. And Beijing still needs Russian military technology. But this is tactics – both countries have a common “problem”. For Russia its name is the collective West; forr Beijing, it’s the US. In Central Asia Moscow still has a military and security leverage but Beijing provides money and civilian technology. And has very many issues too – related to the local corruption culture. Moscow is perfectly aware of the strategic perspective so it has not subscribed to the Belt and Road as such. President Putin offered to interconnect Moscow’s own initiative: Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with China’s BRI. Which is a smart move.
What does Italy’s signing on to the BRI mean for NATO?
Italy’s economy is in poor health, being in recession for the third time in a decade, so the ruling anti-establishment, eurosceptic 5 Stars Movement is looking for every and each opportunity to revive trade and attract overseas investments. On the other hand, there is no unity in the coalition government as to the participation in the Chinese one trillion dollar project. Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s coalition partner – Matteo Salvini from the rightwing The League party is rather sceptical. For him the BRI is a sort of economic “colonialism”. Anyway, the Italians signed almost three dozens of deals with Beijing worth some 2.8 bn US dollars and invited the Chinese to invest in three ports, including [in] Trieste. Prime Minister Conte attended the Belt and Road Forum. Rome did it against the clear warning from the USA. The port in Trieste is particularly important as it will secure the Chinese access to the very heart of Europe with all the economic ans strategic consequences. China’s COSCO has already majority stakes in Greece’s Pireaus and shares in many other ports in Europe. But Pireaus has grown tremendously thanks to the Chinese investment.
What we can observe is that China is gradually becoming a “European” power so apart from Washington and Moscow now we have got another big foreign player in the region. Just in March, the European Union leaders called China its “systemic rival”. Well, the Chinese could easily call the EU a “paper tiger” in terms of political unity or strategy. Italy’s participation in the BRI may not be an issue for NATO for now but the pace and scale of Chinese investment and how they become established in Europe might bring security problems in the future.
Already Greece and Hungary are those EU member states which would love to block all the statements and declarations critical of China’s conduct in the South China Sea or relating to human rights. Outside of the EU this is Serbia which has similar policy as Beijing is for Belgrade not only a source of investments and loans but also an “Iron Friend”. Of course, the question here is Kosovo: China –a permanent member of the UN Security Council – has not recognised Kosovo’s independence. The EU as such is experiencing a tectonic shift away from the mainstream ‘elites’ which are increasingly out of touch with the people and have become rather undemocratic and arrogant contrary to what they preach publicly. Beijing can play on that situation as Moscow does. But Beijing is more subtle and smarter in that exercise.
What about Central European countries like Poland and Hungary and their response to the BRI?
Poland is a disillusioned member of the 16+1 format of cooperation between China and Central and Eastern Europe (now after Greece was invited it has become “17+1”). The 16+1 club was launched one year ahead of the BRI – in 2012 in Warsaw to strengthen the ties between Beijing and former communist states but it has not brought any dramatic growth of greenfield investments in Poland. Between 2000 and 2018 the Chinese invested some three billion USD in the country. In UK it is more than 40 billion, in Germany much more than 20 billion.
Actually, 16+1 as such is more a platform for bilateral talks and negotiations than a multilateral mechanism for cooperation. Poland has huge trade imbalance with China – some 1:12, and like USA it is fed-up with access barriers to the Chinese market. However, many experts say that Polish companies which are mostly small ones are not prepared for business with China.
On the other hand, however, Warsaw has not produced any coherent strategy for its economic relations with Beijing. Some say that the only strategy [that]Warsaw has in this respect is Washington’s strategy. In fact, there are geopolitical limitations: [the] Polish rightwing government is working hard to have a permanent American military presencein the country. They call it “Fort Trump”. Interestingly, in January this year Polish security services arrested a Chinese Huawei executive, and a Polish citizen – former intelligence officer and lecturer at a prestigious Academy of War Studies – on espionage charges. It happened a month ahead of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit to Warsaw, Bratislava and Budapest.
Pompeo camewith a clear message to exclude Huawei from building 5G networks in those countries. The issue however is time, price, and quality. So Huawei will see its participation limited but not eliminated. When it comes to Belt and Road Initiative, Poland is not interested in mergers and acquisitions but in high quality greenfield investments, jobs, and technology. There are opportunities for a better cooperation as Warsaw is planning to build a huge transportation hub in central Poland, combining big airport, highways, and railways. Apparently, the Chinese are interested but nothing is sure for now.
Hungary is a special case on Central Europe’s map as Victor Orban has worked out a specific strategy of diversification in foreign relations which includes not only close ties with Beijing but also with Ankara and Moscow (to some extent). He wants to get some leverage in his ‘grand’ geopolitical game in the European Union. So even if biggest Chinese investments came to Hungary before 2010, Budapest is officially rather enthusiastic as regards the Belt and Road Initiative. The total volume of Chinese investment in Hungary is – according to Orban himself – 4.5 bn US dollars. At the Second Belt and Road Forum Prime Minister Orban praised the BRI as a tool to protect “freedom and openness” in the world’seconomy. And this is preciselyBudapest where an institution directly related to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was established. In Hungary’s PrimeMinister’s view, the BRI is “in full accordance” with the national interests of his country and is “based on mutual respect”.
