Armenia-Russia Relations: Paving The Way for a Dialogue
By David Petrosyan
At the beginning of April 2025, a very “non-round” date was celebrated – the 33rd anniversary of the establishment of Armenian-Russian diplomatic relations. Unexpectedly for many, both in Yerevan and Moscow, the foreign ministries of the two countries exchanged such a volume of pleasantries that would have been enough for several years of joint work. Here are memories of centuries-old friendship, words about partnership and alliance. Words that the countries are focused on long-term mutually beneficial cooperation in the political, socio-economic, humanitarian and other spheres and are aimed at continuing and expanding a meaningful dialogue that fully meets the interests of Armenia and Russia.
What actually happened, because not so long ago, nothing good was said about allied Armenia from the screens of Russian federal channels? From the Armenian side, there were very similar messages. Let me remind you that the “splitting” between the countries began in the fall of 2022, when the Azerbaijani Armed Forces attacked the borders of Armenia (this coincided with the offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions) and the military-political bloc of the CSTO, which includes Yerevan, refused to give a political assessment of the seizure of Armenian territory. Then there was more: a 9-month blockade of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces and, ultimately, its ethnic cleansing in the presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the fall of 2023. Finally, the “freezing” of Armenia’s membership in the CSTO, including the refusal to pay membership fees.
Subsequently, the expansion of Armenia’s interaction in the military-political and military-technical spheres with India and France, as well as the appearance of unarmed observers of the European Union on the border with Azerbaijan. Finally, on January 14, Armenia signed a charter on strategic partnership with the United States and, at the same time, maintained good-neighborly relations with Iran.
The day after the signing of the Armenian-American Charter, the Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an alarming editorial entitled “Russia is losing the South Caucasus.” It seems to us that this was essentially a signal that bilateral relations are, if not at an impasse, then at least in a serious crisis.
On January 21, the head of the Armenian Foreign Ministry visited Moscow, where Ararat Mirzoyan had a tete-a-tete meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, which lasted 3 hours (!). There was also a meeting of the Armenian and Russian delegations in an expanded format. Let us recall that: – the last meeting in an expanded format of the delegations of the Foreign Ministries of the two countries took place in July 2023, – the last tete-a-tete meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the two countries took place in December 2023.
In our opinion, in general, Moscow and Yerevan remain “with their” or their previous positions on a number of key issues, but it should be noted that the tone and vocabulary of the dialogue have changed. It seemed that Lavrov was the epitome of courtesy. This was confirmed during the 33rd anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.
What is the reason for this?
In fact, all the sharp statements by the parties against each other were made in the last year and a half, perhaps that is why the tone of the dialogue, at least in its open part, is changing and has become somewhat different. It is possible that this is the result of changed/changing realities not only in the South Caucasus region, but also in the world. It seems that the stage of denying these realities has passed, and now the stage of accepting them is coming, perhaps a painful stage. Thus, recently, the speaker of the Armenian parliament Alen Simonyan stated that Yerevan cannot and should not maintain constantly tense relations with Moscow. There is a clear trend of Armenia moving towards the EU/France, the USA and India, but Yerevan has not taken or has not yet taken any political and legal steps to destroy relations with Moscow. The same Lavrov is well aware that statements, declarative documents and even laws have not yet led to Armenia’s final withdrawal from the CSTO, Yerevan remains an active member of the EAEU, and few are willing to look into the foreseeable political future, including Moscow. In addition, it is obvious that both sides do not intend to curtail mutually beneficial economic cooperation. The volume of economic cooperation between the countries has increased several times, and small Armenia has entered the top 10 trading partners of Russia. Moreover, these trade channels are not static, they change (for example, trade in precious metals and stones).
We also note the following – i) one of the main differences between Yerevan and Moscow remains the issue of land transport communication linking the western regions of Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan autonomy. Moscow continues to insist that, according to paragraph 9 of the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020, the security of this communication (the “Meghri route” is a term used by the Russian Foreign Ministry) should be ensured by Russian border guards. Azerbaijan and Turkey insist on the extraterritoriality of this communication, calling it the “Zangezur corridor”. Armenia believes that most of the points of the trilateral statement were not implemented through no fault of its own and, in this context, it sees no need to implement this point. In return, Armenia proposes the “Crossroads of Peace” project, in which the security of this communication will be ensured by Armenia itself, carrying out all customs and border procedures. Armenia does not trust Moscow here, because after the ethnic cleansing of the Armenians of Karabakh, it fears collusion between Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Thus, the issue of control over the communication/communications passing through the Armenian marz (region) of Syunik in the East-West-East direction remains open,
ii) despite the discrepancy in the issue of land transport communication linking the western regions of Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan autonomy, Yerevan agreed to open the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in the marz of Syunik (center Kapan). Although, negotiations on this issue have not yet been completed. Almost certainly, the Russian diplomats who will work in this consulate will be “people with shoulder straps”. Even Russian experts speak about this quite openly. We do not rule out that if the Russian Consulate General begins working in Kapan, diplomatic missions of other countries may be opened in Syunik. In particular, we are talking about France, which is preparing to open a consular office in Goris. The Consulate General of Iran has been working in Kapan for over a year,
iii) Yerevan is not inclined to believe that Moscow, within the framework of the trilateral documents signed in 2020-2022, can effectively and impartially perform mediation functions, although it constantly offers them. After the events of autumn 2022 and the exodus of Armenians from Karabakh in autumn 2023, Yerevan believes that Moscow is on the side of Azerbaijan, despite numerous statements by Russian leaders about its equidistance (“Russia is not on anyone’s side,” said Lavrov) from Yerevan and Baku. Another thing is that Russia would like to be neutral, but the events of 2022-2023 call this desire into question in Yerevan,
iv) the story of the AZAL plane crash showed many high-ranking Russian officials in the Kremlin and on the Smolensk embankment that constant appeasement of Baku will not do anything good for Russia. Azerbaijan, de facto, continues to be an ally of Turkey, not Russia, although, purely formally, it is also an ally of Moscow. In this context, Moscow may have decided to seek clarification of relations with Armenia, which is actually happening,
v) a number of Russian critical publications increasingly often feature theses that Moscow’s policy regarding transport communications through the Syunik region poses serious problems and threats to the security of Russia itself, especially in light of Ankara’s pan-Turkic plans for Central Asia and Azerbaijan. In this context, systemic pressure on Armenia is counterproductive and leads to it being forced to look toward the West. It is possible that these concerns have begun to reach the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
So the above-mentioned rhetoric on the 33rd anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries should be considered positive. It can be stated that, judging by this rhetoric, Russia wants to maintain relations with Armenia, and Armenia with Russia.
It also follows that the high level of trade turnover between the countries plays an important role in the dialogue (the volume of trade turnover by the end of 2024 is $ 12.4 billion). Moreover, the trade turnover is balanced. In the conditions of sanctions pressure, Russia does not want to lose this trade channel. Despite the propaganda hype on both sides (in Yerevan and Moscow), apparently, Russia is not yet inclined to exaggerate the importance of the declarative Charter on strategic partnership between Armenia and the United States. Moscow would very much like to regain its role as a mediator in the issue of settling relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but now this is a very difficult and overwhelming task for it, which is aggravated by a series of its previous mistakes in political planning.
The crisis in Armenian-Russian relations remains, but the latest meetings and contacts at various levels, both in Moscow and Yerevan, suggest that the peak of the crisis may have passed, as both sides are committed to dialogue, which will most likely continue during the visits of Lavrov and Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko to Yerevan.
The author is a Yerevan-based political commentator.
Views are personal and IAR neither endorses nor is responsible for them.
