Decoding the Cataclysmic Events in Bangladesh
Supporters of the regime change, who are now in a celebratory mood for their victory calling it a ‘Second Revolution,’ might soon find their euphoria for change disappearing and their jubilation overtaken by uncertainty, as pressures from different stake holders, political and religious groups begin to mount on the interim government
By Baladas Ghoshal
Bangladesh is in the midst of a cataclysmic upheaval that ended Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s 15 years of authoritarian rule. She has fled the country after the chief of army, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, refused to fire at a massive crowd of, reportedly, students on the verge of attacking her official residence while breaking a curfew on 5 August. Hasina was given only 45 minutes by the army to leave the country and was not allowed to broadcast a message, as it was concerned about her personal safety and wanted her to resign honourably. The night before Hasina resigned, Bangladesh’s army chief told her that he would no longer implement her lockdown orders. Soon afterward, Hasina’s son convinced her to step down. She vowed to use a heavy hand, undeterred by the officials who insisted it was no longer tenable for police to use force against protesters after a day in which nearly 100 people had died in civil unrest. “It is not that easy to overthrow me through a democratic system,” she prophetically said before the January election when she came to power for the fifth consecutive time, “The only option is just to eliminate me. And I am ready to die for my people.” Probably that fate would have befallen on her had she dug her heels in, but the loyalist army prevented that from happening.
Reasons for Hasina’s Fall
What caused this upheaval? How did she transform herself from an icon of democracy into an authoritarian ruler loathed by a large section of Bangladeshis now braying for her blood?
The immediate trigger for the violent change was mobilization by students from schools, colleges and universities ostensibly against a quota system that reserved government jobs for children of freedom fighters involved in Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in 1971. Ironically, Hasina’s own government in 2018 abolished the quota system after an agitation against its alleged misuse, arguing that if the freedom fighters were not getting quota even after their sacrifice in the freedom struggle, no one else would get it. Judicial intervention revived the quota again.
Protests had continued despite the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court dismissing the order of the High Court, which had precipitated the crisis. It announced the allocation of 93 per cent of the seats in government services based on merit, reserving a mere 5 per cent jobs for freedom fighters and their descendants. A one per cent each has been reserved for tribes, differentially abled individuals and sexual minorities.
By this time, however, the situation went of control because of Hasina’s high-handedness in dealing with the issue and an alleged snide remark equating the young students and agitators with the ‘Razakars’ a pejorative term for collaborators with the Pakistani Army during the period of 1971 war of independence. Tensions were building up against her government even otherwise for her unconstitutional and autocratic ways to silence all opposition and dissent. These became even more critical after the January elections this year that brought her to power nevertheless, but voters turnout was quite low with the opposition parties totally boycotting it and calling it ‘sham’ election.
While Hasina’s methods of silencing the opposition were same in 2018 as in 2024, she could at least legitimize her victory then through her spectacular success in the economic front. Hasina’s economic achievements are impressive.
Bangladesh has gone from struggling to feed its people to becoming a food exporter with a GDP rising from $71 billion in 2006 to $460 billion in 2022, making it South Asia’s second largest economy after India. Social indicators have also improved, with 98% of girls today receiving primary education. Bangladesh is moving into high-tech manufacturing, allowing international firms like Samsung to extricate supply chains from China. “We need to improve, of course, when it comes to democracy, human rights, free speech,” says Professor Mohammad Ali Arafat, an Awami League lawmaker from central Dhaka. “But we have come a long way.”
Bangladesh witnessed a steady 6 per cent growth during 2011-19, even the retail inflation dropped below 6 per cent post 2016. Bangladesh’s GDP per capita doubled from $ 1032 in 2011 to $2154 in 2019. Then Covid-19 happened.
The Covid-19 pandemic hit the textile powerhouse badly. Together with the Ukraine war, which increased the oil prices imposing a heavy burden without the advantage of discounted Russian oil like India, it served a heavy blow to the Bangladesh economy. Inflation surpassed 9 per cent compounded by a devalued currency, the taka. The devaluation has reduced per capita income in dollar terms and contributed to dwindling foreign reserves, forcing her to seek an IMF loan of $4.7 billion last year. Reports also highlight significant unemployment, particularly among the educated youth. Massive corruption by the people in the levers of power and businesses closer to the regime led to the emergence of an unequal society, all of which contributed to youth unrest, the seeds of which were already discernible.
Fault lines of a Developmental State
The fall of Hasina and the developments in Bangladesh again proves the fault lines of the model of a ‘developmental state,’- high on economic growth and low on democratic credentials, reminiscent of ‘Asian Tigers’ of 1970s and ‘80s, claiming political legitimacy on the basis of their economic achievements at the expense of human rights and media freedom. As far back as 2018, immediately before the parliamentary elections that year, a leading Dhaka paper put it very poignantly the choice before the voters: “Bangladeshi voters will decide in parliamentary elections on Sunday whether to punish the governing party for worsening human rights conditions or reward it for overseeing a booming economy.
During Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s two terms, the economy and social development have improved, according to most measures. But as she has tightened her grip on power, fundamental rights have been eroded.”
The voters then did return the ruling party, the Awami League, with overwhelming majority in the midst of allegations of vote rigging and misuse of state machinery to silence the opposition. It was a wake-up call for Hasina, but she did not pay any attention to it. On the other hand, a few days before the December elections, in an interview with The New York Times, Hasina defended her record and questioned the very definition of human rights; “If I can provide food, jobs and health care, that is human rights.”
She did provide those things, but failed to gauge the discontent amongst the younger people who were first time voters, whose numbers were quite large. As the elections were rigged again in 2024, these large mass of younger people could not find a place within the constitutional boundaries of the state. Naturally, they chose to express themselves through protests and agitation in the street. She could not also gauge the discontent against her that were building up within a large section of the civil society members as well and having sympathies and support for the cause of the students. She could have dealt with the matter if she were conciliatory and, through dialogue with them, satisfied some of their genuine demands, but she chose to use force to supress the movement. This angered them further.
What began as student-led protests that originated as opposition to a quota system for government jobs, therefore, soon expanded and morphed into a broader rebellion against the government of Hasina. The two opposition parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jammat-e-Islami (unregistered since August 2013 and officially banned on 1 August 2024) took advantage of the unrest, infiltrated into the movement and played a critical role in the ouster of Hasina. Clashes between protesters, police and pro-government groups resulted in hundreds of deaths. While the Co-ordinator of the student movement and many Bangladeshi civil society members, essentially supporters of the movement against Hasina, claim that, its participation and leadership were limited entirely within the students, focussing on reform and restoration of democracy. The visuals and the violence shown in different television channels of the world seemed to belie that claim.
Political Vacuum after Hasina?
Hasina’s resignation created a massive political vacuum, which is for now filled by Bangladesh’s president (a ceremonial post) and army chief, followed by the creation of an interim government headed by Dr. Yunus with other civil society members including two students, who took leading role in the current movement. Party representation was avoided in order to give the impression that the members of the interim administration had no particular preference for any political party, at the same time ensuring that Hasina’s party finds no place in the new dispensation. Even the institutions of judiciary, banking, bureaucracy and other levers of administration were purged of people having any links with the Awami League with the seal of approval from Md. Yunus, who termed them as ‘legal’.
Khaleda Zia, Hasina’s bete noire has been freed from house arrest, a major symbolic victory for the weak and divided BNP, although her poor health may limit her ability to play a major role. Her son Tarique Rahman, the acting Chairman of the BNP has already landed in Dhaka. Tarique has been the prime mover of BNP’s alliance with the right-wing Jammat, which many freedom fighters and left wing elements in the BNP have opposed, because Jammat is accused of backing the Pakistan army’s repression campaign against the Bengalis during the 1971 Liberation war. Some even accuse Tarique of plotting the current regime change.
In addition, more than a thousand opponents of Hasina are released from jail on the same day.e past altogether. of vernment changes the date of indepence of the country from 26th ent parliamentary sea
Md. Yunus, was a harsh critic of Hasina and was saddled with legal charges that his supporters dismiss as politically motivated.
Nation Re-building Under the Interim Government?
Meanwhile, Yunus, as the country’s new ruler, goes about a nation re-building exercise with his scrapping of national holiday on August 15, death anniversary of Mujibur Rahman, the Father of the Nation, whose statue was already vandalized by the protesters against her government, showing initial signs of the state of things that are coming under the new dispensation.
On August 13, following Hasina’s call for supporters to demonstrate their strength two days later, the anniversary of the slaying of her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, during the country’s 1975 military coup, hundreds of protesters gathered in Dhaka, where opposition-affiliated protesters attacked them, ending the demonstration Incidentally, in a shocking and brutal act, mobs in Bangladesh have also defiled the memory of Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore, smashing his statue and sending shockwaves not only through India, but through the global community.
One would not be surprised if the current government changes the date of independence of the country from 26t March to 5 August to commemorate what they call “Second Revolution,” or for that matter the national anthem of Bangladesh to erase the past altogether.
What after Sheikh Hasina?
Revenge, reprisals, witch-hunting and violence, though on a reduced scale, continue in different parts of the country, as the news reports from different sources suggest. The biggest challenge the interim government faces is restoration of political and social stability together with the revival of an economy weakened by Covid-19 and Ukraine war, further damaged by the current turmoil. Administrative, institutional and financial decision-making is at a flux with witch-hunting and purging of people who were at the helm of affairs during the earlier regime.
So is the state of business and economic activities in the country due to flight of capital and some businessmen associated with the earlier regime have either fled the country or lying low for the time being watching how things shape under the new dispensation. Law and order will also pose a serious challenge, as the police were suspected to be close to Hasina government and many of them faced the wrath of the protesters. Even while many of them have come back to dutiy after calling for a strike, their morale is quite low as witch-hunting continues also against some of them. Students are reported to be controlling traffic and acting as night watchmen to fill the place of police officers in some areas, but they are not trained to perform these jobs.
Bangladesh is currently grappling with significant economic challenges including high inflation, which according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will rise from 5.6% in 2020 to 9.3% in 2024. The IMF also forecasts that Bangladesh’s foreign exchange reserves will decline from $24.8 billion today to $19 billion by 2025. This reduction in reserves could pressure the local currency, the taka, potentially leading to its devaluation and exacerbating inflation. Supporters of the regime change, who are now in a celebratory mood for their victory calling it a ‘Second Revolution,’ might soon find their euphoria for change disappearing and their jubilation overtaken by uncertainty, as pressures from different stake holders, political and religious groups begin to mount on the interim government for power and influence in the new dispensation.
How will the Interim Government cope with the New Challenges?
Will it be possible for the interim government to undertake major reforms in the political and economic system to lend meaning and substance to the regime change or will democracy be restored in the country in the near future?
Dr. Yunus has broad acceptance amongst the civil society and the students, but he has neither a political party of his own nor any base amongst the masses. Even if he is able to give the right prescription for the cure of the disease, will he be able to invigorate institutions through reform and restore democracy in the country.
Looking at the tumultuous past of Bangladesh and current uncertainty, together with the daunting task before the interim government, it may be a difficult job and, perhaps, a tall order. One regime after another have been toppled either through elections, violence, or by coups bringing fresh hope and optimism, but at the end it things remained the same, characterized by tyranny, oppression, purging and killings of political opposition, who are in the wrong side of the regimes in power. As the French saying goes: plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose “– the more things change, the more they stay the same. One also should not forget the common saying during the French revolution, most famously uttered by Danton during his trial, “The revolution devours its own children”.
The BNP, which will likely play a prominent role in the future, has a poor record of accomplishment on rights and democracy. Jammat, whose student wing, Chhatro Shibir, played a prominent role in the student movement against the Hasina government, is also likely to press for a leading role for itself in the emerging political system. It already has a strong presence at the societal level.
The Bangladeshi Constitution requires elections within 90 days of parliament’s dissolution, which happened on August 6. BNP, as the most organized party in the current situation, after the Awami League of Hasina, went into disrepute, and will, in all likelihood, press for the elections to be held at the earliest as per the constitution. If elections are held within 90 days without bringing systemic reforms that eliminates possibilities of rigging and manipulation, the BNP will inevitably gain most from it, which may not be palatable to those seeking aggressive reforms. BNP has gained some support for its anti-establishment stance, but its frequent use of unrest to protest Awami League rule, combined with its lack of a clear governing agenda beyond merely opposing the league, has led to growing public frustration and increasing criticism of its approach.Thus, if the BNP or a coalition of parties win, it may still face the country’s swelling public frustration and criticism of the government. This may necessitate the army’s continued involvement in political affairs to maintain stability.
The Jammat, an Islamist party, which was banned by Hasina on August 1 before her ouster, is now a legal party with the ban lifted by the interim government, and whose members also participated in the current agitation, will scramble for a place in the new environment. Jammat, which was banned by ers ates possibilities of rigging and manipulation mmic e elections to be held at the earlist.
Moreover, radical Islamists working under Hefazat-e-Islam secured a window of opportunity for countrywide Islamic radicalization even under Hasina government. Abul Fayyaz Khalid Hussain’s appointment as an Advisor on Religious Affairs in the interim government, despite being known as a prominent extremist in Bangladesh, signals a possible leaning towards Islamism. Khalid is a Deobandi scholar associated with the group Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh, which has a history of adopting an anti-Hindu and anti-India stance. The organization aims to transform Bangladesh into a state similar to Afghanistan and has actively advocated for the implementation of extremist Islam in the country. Hussain has served as the vice president of this organization.
However, in a statement on 15 August he called India Bangladesh’s “best neighbour” which had helped the country “immensely” in gaining independence. He also claimed that Bangladesh is a country for all religious groups and minorities and admitted the violence that have happened against the Hindu minorities and assured strict action against the culprits by saying “work has begun” to initiate strict action against the criminals involved in several incidents of violence and vandalism against the minority communities.
Attack on the Minorities: Collateral Damage of Regime Change
One of the main issues of concern following Hasina’s resignation is the status of the Hindu minority in Bangladesh, which makes up nearly 8% of Bangladesh’s population, according to a 2022 census. Emboldened Islamist extremists, exploiting the unrest, staged attacks against the Hindu community immediately after Hasina’s ouster.
There have been numerous reports of attacks targeting Hindu households, temples and businesses. On Tuesday, India’s foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said: “What was particularly worrying was that minorities, their businesses and temples also came under attack at multiple locations,” he said. “The full extent of this is still not clear. “The interim cabinet said in its first official statement on Sunday that attacks “have been noted with grave concern”. It said it would “immediately sit with the representative bodies and other concerned groups to find ways to resolve such heinous attacks”.
Finding no other ways to express their grievances, Hindu and other minority students had also taken to the streets. Ahead of the weekend, thousands of minority Hindu community members staged massive protest rallies in Dhaka and in the northeastern port city of Chattogram on Friday and Saturday demanding protection amid nationwide vandalism that saw attacks on temples and their households and businesses. Demanding special tribunals to expedite trials of those who persecute the minorities, allocation of 10 per cent parliamentary seats for the minorities, and enactment of a minority protection law among others, the Hindu demonstrators’ rally blocked traffic for over three hours at Shabagh in the central part of Dhaka on Saturday.
Members of the minority communities in Bangladesh faced at least 205 incidents of attacks in 52 districts since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina-led government on August 5 until the weekend, according to two Hindu organizations – Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council and the Bangladesh Puja Udjapan Parishad – in the country.
Reaching out to the distressed Hindu community members at the famous Dhakeswari temple, Mohammad Yunus on August 13 urged the people to “exercise patience” before judging his government”. He said each one’s rights would be ensured and blamed “institutional decay” for the predicament that his country has fallen into. He also called Prime Minister Modi, who wrote on social media X: “Exchanged views on the prevailing situation. Reiterated India’s support for a democratic, stable, peaceful and progressive Bangladesh. He assured protection, safety and security of Hindus and all minorities in Bangladesh.”
Only time will tell whether such assurances will be translated into action in a timebound manner.
Emerging Role of Military?
The most critical factor in the emerging political scenario of Bangladesh is the role of its army, which has largely stayed out of politics since 2008. It is now overseeing the political transition.
The Bangladesh army’s past history, however, is replete with instances of coups and direct interventions, notably during the 2006-08 political crisis when it cracked down on opposition figures and limited political freedoms, something particularly evident under the country’s caretaker government appointed in 2006.
The concept of a caretaker government arose from severe political instability and violence ahead of the 2006 general elections between the governing Bangladesh Nationalist Party, led by then-Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, and the opposition Awami League, led by Hasina. Responding to the political crisis that arose from it, the then President Tajuddin Ahmed suspended the election and established an interim government, which lasted two years and was heavily influenced by the military.
The army played a central role in political affairs and managed the 2008 election process supposedly to ensure stability. In reality, the military carried out widespread arrests of political leaders from all parties, curfews and restrictions on political activity. The period ended with the 2008 elections, where Hasina’s Awami League emerged victorious, leading to a restoration of civilian rule and a significant reduction in the army’s direct political involvement. Since then the army has largely remained in barracks, but played an important role in sustaining Hasina’s strong government.
The military is likely to assume a more assertive yet still covert role, particularly if economic challenges and unrest continue to fuel instability and dissatisfaction with the interim government. While Bangladeshi Army Chief Waker-uz-Zaman has publicly supported holding elections and assured the military’s backing to ensure they are fair and free, the longer the interim government remains in power, the more likely it becomes that the military will adopt a more active role in politics, albeit not necessarily all out in the open. This involvement could manifest in the army steering major decisions and overseeing critical governmental functions, such as maintaining law and order, overseeing elections, and managing key ministries, to prevent further instability.
If Bangladesh’s economic troubles persist and social unrest escalates, it could lead to animosity towards the interim government for failing to adequately improve the situation. As the army is overseeing the transition, the blame for the failure might even fall on it. It is therefore, keen on facilitating elections and guiding the political process to prevent the country from descending into chaos while avoiding the appearance of overt military intervention in civilian governance. Even after the elections, the army may continue to play a significant political role depending on the composition of the next government.
Holding elections in the near future without the participation of the Awami League may cause some problems of fairness of the process and the legitimacy of the interim government. The Awami League might be down for the time being due to the repression by other parties and by the absence of viable leadership, as most of its top leaders are either arrested or have fled the country, but its revival and regrouping cannot be ruled out, particularly at a time when the elections are held. Legally, the party cannot be banned, for that would paint the interim government in the same colour as Hasina’s.
Taking advantage of the tension that might arise from the future of Awami League, the army may extend the tenure of the interim government with General Waker-Uz-Zaman holding the actual power. Whichever way it goes, Bangladesh faces uncertainty in the coming days.
Setback for India?
The ouster of Hasina and the developments in Bangladesh is undoubtedly, a major setback for India, which shared strong diplomatic and trade relations with Dhaka under her, and in whom India found a reliable ally in its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy that helped both the countries in establishing a stable region.
India’s relations with Dhaka had witnessed difficulties since its establishment. Its worst period was during the rules of BNP under Khaleda Zia when anti-Indian forces had a free run to use Bangladesh as a staging post for terrorism and other subversive activities. Pakistan’s ISI maintained a strong presence in Dhaka during her last years of power between 2001 and 2006 and was instrumental in a series of attacks in India through terror groups during that period. The insurgent groups from India’s Northeast operated out of bases in Bangladesh, allegedly under ISI’s patronage, during the BNP rule.
After Hasina returned to power, she ordered a crackdown and handed over the insurgent leaders to India. Naturally, it was a great relief to India when in 2009 Hasina and her Awami League party, which represented a secular democracy where minorities like Hindus, Bangladesh’s largest minority faith, felt protected, came to power.
In the last 15 years, Hasina rebuilt roads linking Dhaka with Kolkata and Agartala in India that were severed after 1947. She built bridges, re-established railway links and facilitated easy access of cargo ships on the Brahmaputra River and its tributaries, bringing the two countries closer, She cultivated deep ties with India, as she oversaw an economic boom and drew the two countries closer on business, energy and defense.
Bangladesh is India’s biggest trade partner in South Asia, with bilateral trade of just under $16 billion. Security cooperation increased between India and Bangladesh and Hasina helped India quell rebellion in the northeastern Indian state of Assam by refusing to provide safe havens to rebels from across the border.
Hasina has fought against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the country, and was seen as someone under whose rule the minorities in the country felt relatively more secure. With zero tolerance for terrorism, she tamed rising threats of Islamic militancy and kept the military in their barracks in a country with a history of army takeovers.
The China Factor
Even though Hasina bolstered ties with New Delhi, she also struck a balance by maintaining strong relations with Beijing, which has bankrolled a slew of projects in Bangladesh. China has been Bangladesh’s largest trading partner for over a decade, and the second largest investor with $ 3.2 billion, while the US remains the largest source of investment.
China has provided military personnel training and military hardware, emerging over the years as the number one provider of such material to Bangladesh. The Bangladesh army has been equipped with Chinese tanks, its navy has Chinese frigates and missile boats and the Bangladesh Air Force flies Chinese fighter jets. Last year, Sheikh Hasina inaugurated a $ 1.21 billion China-built submarine base in Cox Bazar off the Bay of Bengal coast, which can base six submarines and eight warships simultaneously. China is likely to continue to be a critical financial supporter of Bangladesh, especially amid growing economic distress.
India sees China’s involvement in Dhaka’s infrastructure projects as a threat. In 2016, New Delhi convinced Dhaka to abandon the Sonadia deep-water port project China intended to build. New Delhi also fears for the future of trans-shipment arrangements between Bangladesh and India’s northeast, which the new government in Dhaka may be tempted to revise. nd stability in the country
New Delhi would be concerned if the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the main opposition to Hasina, were to gain power, given its history of supporting insurgent groups in India’s northeastern states and ties with Pakistan.
With Hasina and the Awami League out of the political picture for now, India will need to carefully cultivate ties with political stakeholders—including the BNP, with which it had tried to reach out in the past, but got a rebuff and somehow did not succeed.
New Delhi has likely engaged with the army and president to ensure that its interests are taken into account, but its leverage in Dhaka has decreased.
Prime Minister Modi has already reached out to Dr Yunus and the army leader and wished them success in their attempt to restore peace and stability in the country. India will also worry about security risks, including threats against Hindus and anti-India sentiment, as well as border stability. New Delhi may be concerned that continued unrest in Bangladesh could increase refugee flows across a frontier that has been a tension point even in the best of circumstances.
The author is former Professor and Chair in South and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University
.
