Dissecting the significance of China’s quinquennial two sessions
In the backdrop of sharpening brinkmanship in China-US relations this increasingly assertive tone of China is bound to become only even more pronounced in coming times. Backing such an assertion has seen China continued focus on its military modernisation.
By Swaran Singh
Hosting of its annual, and especially the quinquennial, Two Sessions（五年一次两会）— of National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference — provides a unique opportunity for China’s leaders to present their vision to their citizens as also to the rest of the world. For the rest of the world, it provides a chance get a better peek into the minds of China’s leaders, make sense of their mutual equations, their plans and projects as also their global implications. And, this was especially true of this year’s two sessions of China. These were expected to reveal the collective vision of China’s next generation of leaders as they gear up — under the unprecedented third term of President Xi Jinping — to begin working for China’s post-pandemic economic redemption. Given that China is the engine of global growth, these two sessions were, therefore, bound to become worth watching for the rest of the world as well.
Lately of course, the two sessions have alsobecome a major platform for China’s leaders showcasing of their electoral and consultative democracy at work. Recent times have seen Western nations raising serious questions about China’s democratic credentials. Chinese experts and officials, of course, debunk such western insinuations that call two sessions as mere orchestration or rubber stamp that simply sits pretty to endorse all big decisions made during the preceding Party Congress, in this case it was the 20th Party Congress of last October. They point to the overwhelming attendance at these two sessions as also in scores of small group meetings during these two sessions where deputies deliberate on various work reports, draft plans, structural reforms as also on various nominations to top positions in China’s leadership. This, according to them, constitutes what China calls its whole-process people’s democracy, the one, that it claims, has delivered better.
Two sessions during March 4 to 13, saw, once again, large number of motions presented by various deputies. Many of these are already vetted at lower rungs of provincial legislatures and other local bodies or forums. These legislators are also known for having much higher levels of education and training, representing a whole range of professional sectors including providing due representation to China’s minorities. Communist Party also claims to regularly consult with all other nine political parties, howsoever minuscule be their presence or influence in Chinese politics. President Xi himself has been vocal about China’s democratic credentials. In his words, “Whether a country is democratic or not depends on whether its people are truly the masters of the country. It depends on whether the people have the right to vote, or more importantly, the right to participate.”
China’s strategic focus
To begin with, setting the tone for these two sessions’ deliberations, President Xi Jinping had called upon the delegates to deliberate on the bolstering China’s “national strategic capabilities” to “systematically upgrade the country’s overall strength to cope with strategic risks, safeguard strategic interest and realise strategic objectives.” The backdrop of recent weeks of Biden administration’s overreaction — in shooting the so-called weather balloons over North American skies and Secretary of State Antony Blinken cancelling his China visit at very last minute — was not lost on anyone among his audience. Echoing this popular sentiment of Chinese netizens, Qin Gang — former Party Secretary of Shanghai and now China’s new foreign minister — spoke last week of the “wolf warrior discourse trap” and urged Chinese diplomats to stay ready to “dance with the wolves.”
In the backdrop of sharpening brinkmanship in China-US relations this increasingly assertive tone of China is bound to become only even more pronounced in coming times. Backing such an assertion has seen China continued focus on its military modernisation. This saw two sessions deliberating and raising China’s military spending by 7.2 per cent; taking it to $230 billion for 2023. This is understandable in view of President Xi’s aim of making Chinese armed forced reach “world class standards” by 2030. But at the same time this budget still remains little above one-fourth of the US defence budget for this year. Plus, the US also enjoys defence alliance with about three dozen other advanced industrialised nations including those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and its Asian allies like Japan and South Korea.
There have also been questions about China becoming world’s largest economy by 2030 if not before and the US believes it can not afford to allow this to happen. Already, for nearly two decades, China has been world’s largest trading nation and therefore largest trading partner for most nations as also rapidly growing investor under its Belt and Road Initiative. This makes the world sit up and take note of various economic decision made at these two sessions. The Government Work Report, presented by the outgoing Premier Li Keqiang, for example, sought to set the target for economic growth for this year at a ambitious 5 per cent — a figure already vetted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund projections. Premier Li Keqiang also set the target of keeping the budget deficit below 3 per cent which again is ambitious. Taking China’s $18 trillion economy fast forward remains now the responsibility of his successor, Li Qiang.
Most important, the two sessions were also to unanimously re-elect Xi Jinping as President of PRC and Chairman of its Central Military Commission as also announce his new generation of leaders and their respective responsibilities. They are now expected to hit the ground running with their focus on realising President Xi’s China Dream of national rejuvenation and his new vision of modernisation. Structural reforms remain central to that imagination about China’s next stage of development which focuses on better regulation and distribution of wealth, closer connect of man and nature, and prosperity for all. Accordingly, the proceedings of these quinquennial two sessions of 2023 were seen introducing structural reforms in a whole range of social and economic sectors. Some the more visible examples included deliberations on building a well-off society in an all-round way, strengthening China’s national defence, addressing challenges of unemployment and corruption and protecting China’s ageing population as also other disadvantaged and marginalised groups negatively affected during the pandemic period.
China’s structural reforms
Showcasing commitment towards Xi’s drive for structural reforms and starting from the very apex, these two session also approved recasting the State Council which will be implemented sooner than later. This, in some ways, is customary at the beginning of each of the quinquennial two sessions. However, this year’s two sessions marked a shift to China’s next generation of leaders under President Xi Jinping who enters his unprecedented third term in office. Reflecting, more accurately, on Party’s focus for at least the next five years, these State Council reforms involve setting up of new ministries, recalibrating their hierarchy, powers and responsibilities, regulatory oversight and recasting their social and financial systems. Some of these structural reforms have attracted greater media attention.
Second, if the last such institutional reset in 2018 was any example to go by, the two sessions of that year had then cut down the total number of ministerial level entities by eight and vice-ministerial-level entities by seven while creating seven new ministers and a number of new agencies. Some of similar restructuring also took place during these two sessions. These have already triggered speculations and details of these changes and their impact will be debated in coming times. The same will also be the case with the final fine-tuning and adjustments about their distribution of work among top leaders which will happened over following weeks and months. One novel experiment proposed by these two session was to cut the personnel of all central departments by 5 percent and these relieved officials are to be relocated elsewhere to “strengthen key areas and important tasks.”
What was also reflected as the top priority for this year’s two sessions’ was outlined in its State Council Institutional Reform Plan that explicated how the “scientific and technological innovation occupies a core position in the overall situation of China’s modernisation drive”. Accordingly, the work of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) was reorganised by transferring some of its responsibilities to other ministries and by creating the Central Science and Technology Committee (CSTC or 中央科技委员会). This is expected to allow the MOST to focus on the macro-management of strategy, planning, system reforms, resource planning, policy regulation and oversight of CSTC and others related entities.
Along with China’s increased focus on science and technology, digital transformation in specific has been a major goal of President Xi’s modernisation. As the State Council Institutional Reform Plan underlined, “digital resources and the digital economy play a fundamental role in economic and social development.” This clearly conforms to global trends of digitisation of all sectors. Accordingly, a new National Data Bureau (NDB) is being created to coordinate the utilisation of digital resources and promote digital economy. Among other responsibilities in promoting a digital society, the NDB is expected to subsume the work of Communist Party’s Central Cybersecurity Commission as also some of the data-related functions of the powerful National Development and Reform Commission.
Likewise, in banking and financial regulation reforms as well, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission is expected to be replaced by the new National Financial Regulatory Administration which will have oversight of all financial sectors except for securities which are regulated by the newly created China Securities Regulatory Commission. This consolidation seems timely as China, and the rest of the world, is expected to very soon face the onset of global inflationary and recessionary forces. Innovation remains another major priority and here disputes about intellectual property has been at the centre of China-US tensions. Accordingly, the State Intellectual Property Office will be upgraded and will report directly to the State Council instead of its current reporting to State Administration for Market Regulation.
From growth to rejuvenation
As President Xi’s new team moves forward with these social and economic reforms the focus of China has shifted from limited goals of economic growth driven materials transformation to prosperity-for-all driven cultural, ethical and spiritual rejuvenations of the entire nations. This wider vision of Xi’s China Dream saw two sessions becoming receptive to paying more attention to public criticism. This saw two sessions upgrading National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration to the rank of affiliated institutions putting it at par with taxation office.
China has also lately become sensitive towards its elders. In addressing China’s elders or ageing population, most of ageing-related institutions — like Office of the National Working Committ on Ageing or China Association for the Elderly — that were transferred in 2018 to National Health Commission may be reverted to the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA). This will allow MCA to develop a comprehensive inter-ministerial coordination, guidance and supervision of ageing related plans and initiatives.
The list of reforms that began at this year’s two session is exhaustive and some of them promise to become game changing for China’s future. But with the two sessions of 2023 putting their stamp of support on President Xi’s third term in office as also to his being at the center of Party’s absolute leadership of the Chinese nation implies China will be continuing on the path that Xi has already crafted. Only Xi’s unprecedented third term in office has understandably raised expectations from his new team that they must work for which, to say the least, appears to be an uphill task.
The author is professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India) and is currently visiting professor with University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).
