In 2022 India must prioritize Asian Cooperation
For India, aspiring to become a $5 trillion economy and one of the top three global economies by 2031, with international trade contributing close to 40% of its GDP, equitable international cooperation holds the key.
By Asoke Mukerji
On New Year’s Day 2022, the ambitious Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), called “the largest free trade agreement in history”, will become functional. The 15-nation RCEP brings together the 10 countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and five partner countries (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, China, and South Korea), speeding up the process of the economic integration of Asia. India opted out of becoming a member of RCEP in November 2020 due to a perception that the benefits to India of becoming a member would not be commensurate with the required obligations.
However, India’s objective of creating what has been called an “Asian Century” has not faltered. This is shown in the ongoing engagement between India and the ASEAN, as well as significant new engagements with countries around the littoral of the Indian Ocean as well as in landlocked Central Asia. Equitable international cooperation will continue to drive India’s foreign policy engagements during 2022, particularly in asserting India’s contribution to the centrality of Asia in international relations in the 21st century.
For India, aspiring to become a $5 trillion economy and one of the top three global economies by 2031, with international trade contributing close to 40% of its GDP, equitable international cooperation holds the key. In this context, what should be some of the urgent priorities for Indian diplomacy in 2022, a year which marks the 75th anniversary of India’s independence from colonial rule, and the second year of India’s eighth innings as an elected member of the UNSC?
The Asian continent and its maritime environment (conceptualized as the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans) are becoming an arena for contestations between the major powers represented as permanent members in the UN Security Council (UNSC). This is accentuated by a growing accretion of threats to peace, security and development due to traditional and non-traditional factors.
India’s diplomatic responses to these challenges must prioritize the existence of a supportive international environment that is a pre-requisite for India’s sustained socio-economic transformation. For over three decades since India’s economic reforms were launched in 1991, Indian foreign policy has been oriented towards increasing international trade and investments, identifying, and enabling the transfer of appropriate technologies, and increasing people-to-people interaction to meet the objectives of transforming India. In the phase of a post-Covid pandemic recovery, this function has become even more relevant for India’s aspirations today.
Due to a variety of factors India’s first priority in 2022 will continue to be resolving the festering confrontation between China and India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which erupted into bloody conflict in Galwan in May 2020. Two aspects of the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship can assist such an effort. One is the informal summit mechanism, introduced into the architecture of Sino-Indian relations in April 2018 and carried forward in November 2019. Reviving it in 2022 will play a crucial role in re-creating “trust and confidence” and sensitivity “to each other’s interests,” highlighted in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s reference to Sino-Indian relations in his speech at the June 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. A second aspect is the fact that despite their bilateral confrontation, two-way trade between India and China in 2021 crossed $100 billion. India registered a 38.5% growth in its exports to China, and China’s exports to India went up by 49%, making trade relations a significant stakeholder for mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation.
In mid-November 2021, the United States and China agreed during the virtual meeting between President Biden and President Xi Jinping to “intensity” their diplomatic engagement at “multiple levels”, despite repeated concerns by the United States of an “increasingly assertive” China. Any sustainable initiative taken in 2022 to resolve the confrontation along the Sino-Indian LAC will require a similar approach of multiple stakeholder engagement in a holistic framework, with participants from the security, trade, and diplomatic institutions.
Recognizing the critical role that connectivity plays in sustaining effective international cooperation in Asia, a second priority for India in 2022 will be to implement her vision for international maritime security based on the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) policy for the Indian Ocean. This was the bedrock of India’s call for an inclusive and holistic framework for maritime security at the meeting of the UNSC chaired by Prime Minister Modi in August 2021.
India’s efforts to implement SAGAR through specific building blocks of maritime security and confidence building measures will be facilitated by the arrival of a newly elected UAE in the UNSC from January 2022. The UAE is a highly visible strategic partner of India in Asia, with stakes in the ensuring the security of sea lanes of communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean which are critical for its own energy exports.
A joint India-UAE initiative on Yemen in the UNSC, in partnership with countries in the region like Saudi Arabia, Oman and Iran, can stabilize one of the major humanitarian crisis situations in the world today. It canensure keeping open the SLOC between Europe and Asia through the Red Sea, which transports a significant flow of India’s international trade and digital traffic.
Similarly, in partnership with Iran, Oman and Qatar, India and the UAE can initiate a cooperative framework to secure the SLOC through the Straits of Hormuz, which is vital for India’s energy security, and the predictable exports of oil and gas from the Gulf states and Iran. The positive impact of such a diplomatic initiative on the continued participation of over 8 million Indian nationals currently employed in the energy-dominated economies of the Gulf region, who contribute significantly to both the growth of the Gulf region and, through their remittances and skills, to the transformation of India, is self-evident.
Related to these two SLOCs is the major multi-modal connectivity project proposed by India, Iran, and Russia since 2002, the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC). A combination of factors primarily related to the imposition of unilateral sanctions on Iran and Russia by the West have delayed the coming on stream of this project. However, the relevance of the INSTC for Asian integration cannot be ignored, as it is the only major north-south connectivity alignment for the Eurasian landmass, especially for the land-locked states of Central Asia seeking access to the Indian Ocean. India’s outreach to Central Asia beginning with Prime Minister Modi’s visit to all five Central Asian states in July 2015, and the proposed India-Central Asia Summit in New Delhi in January 2022, make the INSTC a priority for India’s diplomacy in cooperation with the Central Asian states, Iran, and Russia during the coming year, and integrating it with Chabahar Project in Iran.
The continuing relevance of India’s Act East and Act Far East policies for economic integration in Asia make the implementation of both these policies the third major priority for India during 2022. In this area, partnership with ASEAN, including working together to ensure the “centrality of ASEAN” in the Indo-Pacific and the security of the SLOCs through the Straits of Malacca, including the newly announced Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, holds the key for India’s objectives.
The challenges to connectivity projects under India’s Act East policy are significant due to the volatility since February 2021 in Myanmar. However, India is well placed in the UNSC and as the incoming chair of the G20 from 1 December 2022,to play a more assertive role for pursing a holistic, Asia-focused approach on Myanmar
On the landmass of Asia, India’s diplomatic challenge will be to restore international cooperation for peace, security, and development in the volatile region from West Asia to Afghanistan. The priority for India will have to be the situation in Afghanistan due to both security (counter terrorism) and socio-economic considerations. An intensification of India’s diplomatic response to the current situation in Afghanistan needs to become a visible priority in 2022.
The core issues related to Afghanistan are contained in the UNSC resolution 2593 adopted during India’s Presidency of the Council on 31 August 2021. Of these, an “inclusive” government is the most significant, as it will contribute to stability in Afghanistan and ensure its integration with the broader region including India.
The UNSC is to take a final decision on the character of the existing UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) in March 2022, when the UAE will preside over the Security Council. India’s priority must be to persuade the UNSC to transform UNAMA into an empowered UN Political Transition Mission, so that the elected UNSC members from Asia such as India and the UAE can play a significant role in facilitating an “inclusive” political structure to emerge in Afghanistan during 2022.
Such political transition missions are the norm of the international community in responding to political transitions within member-states, and India must ensure that Afghanistan does not become an exception. Active political transition missions today under the UNSC in Asia include the UNAMI (Iraq), while in Africa active UN political transition missions includeLibya (UNSMIL) and UNSOM (Somalia). In all these Missions, supporting democratic change and countering terrorism play an important role.
Asia’s imprint on international affairs this century will be influenced by developments taking place at the international level, including in the maritime and digital domains. India’s active participation in the UN Oceans Conference scheduled for end-June 2022 in Portugal can ensure that the salient objectives of her SAGAR Indian Ocean policy are integrated into the global framework for international cooperation. Similarly, India’s proactive diplomatic engagement at the UN on digital cooperation issues based on the UN Secretary-General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation will bring India’s unique “developmental human-centric perspective” into global and Asian initiatives to create a supportive architecture for an interconnected digital world.
The author is Former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations
