In spite of chequered past, Bangladesh Turkey ties continue to deepen
In 1983, a year after assuming power in a coup as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and later becoming president, Hussain Muhammad Ershad invited Turkey to establish an airbase in Bangladesh
By Anwar A. Khan
Relations between the Turkish people and Bengadeshis have strong historical and cultural roots, dating back to the late Ottoman period and decades before the founding of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh in 1971. The Muslims of South Asia, including the Bengalis, supported Turkey during the First World War (1914-1918) and the Turkish War of Liberation (1919-1922).
The respect for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Republic of Turkey, is reflected in the epic poem “Kamal Pasha,” written by Kazi Nazrul Islam, national poet of Bangladesh, in 1921. The father of the nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was greatly inspired by Atatürk when he led the Bengali nation to statehood in 1971 through a war of independence.
Establishment of diplomatic relations
However, Turkey diplomatically and even militarily supported Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. Following the war, relations remained complicated due to Turkey’s continued support for Pakistan. Turkey officially recognized Bangladesh on February 22, 1974 at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit, which was held in Lahore.
Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established after an official visit by Bangladesh’s President Ziaur Rahman to Turkey in 1976. The Turkish Embassy in Dhaka was opened that same year, while the Embassy of Bangladesh in Ankara became operational in 1981.
After establishing diplomatic ties, Ankara-Dhaka relations flourished; and Bangladesh became a diplomatic ally of Turkey in international affairs. Dhaka was a staunch supporter of Turkish claims on the Cyprus issue during the 1970s and 1980s, and Turkey provided technical and financial assistance to Bangladesh during its state-building process and creation of a stable and sustainable national economic system.
In 1983, a year after assuming power in a coup as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and later becoming president, Hussain Muhammad Ershad invited Turkey to establish an airbase in Bangladesh to provide more security to the country. However, Ankara quietly declined. Yet, even though the project did not materialize, the offer indicated how the partnership between Ankara and Dhaka had become deep-rooted in a very short period.
The visits to Dhaka by then-President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2010, which were reciprocated by Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina the next year, resulted in the establishment of the Turkey-Bangladesh Business Council and the development of a broad agenda for diversifying cooperation. Bilateral relations progressed gradually in all fields and without incident until 2012.
The shadow of Islamism on bilateral relations
From 2012 to 2016, Turkey-Bangladesh relations were strained as a result of Turkey’s strong condemnation of the Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal’s indictment, conviction and execution of leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami mass-murderers of 1971. Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which adopted a political Islamist ideology in 2011, forsaking its liberal democratic stance, has provided support to the Muslim Brotherhood network across the world, including the Jamaat-e-Islami Party in Bangladesh.
Therefore, AKP leaders’ reactions to this tribunal were likely a function of their solidarity with the Muslim Brotherhood, and not consistent with Turkey’s established Kemalist foreign policy tradition. In December 2012, President Abdullah Gül wrote a letter to his Bangladesh counterpart Zillur Rahman, urging Bangladeshi courts to grant 1971 war criminals’ clemency.
A 14-member Turkish-Islamist NGO team that had arrived in Dhaka in December 2012 to monitor the International Crimes Tribunal was detained and subsequently deported by the Bangladesh authorities.
On May 12, 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued a scathing condemnation of the Bangladesh government’s use of capital punishment against Motiur Rahman Nizami, head of the Jamaat-e-Islami Party. The Anatolia Youth Association, an NGO of Islamist Saadet Party in Turkey, expressed similar outrage. Shortly after Erdoğan’s statement, Turkey recalled its ambassador to Bangladesh, precipitating a diplomatic standoff. Three months later, however, Turkey’s ambassador returned to Dhaka.
Past Turkish governments had lodged protests in similar circumstances, as when Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit did all within his power though without harming the overall bilateral relationship with Pakistan to save Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from eventual execution in 1979. In sharp contrast, the AKP government’s censure of the Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal not only diverged from Turkey’s established diplomatic norms, but also offended Bangladesh government and public sensibilities.
A second source of friction in the bilateral relationship was the Gülen Movement’s activities in Bangladesh. After declaring the Gülen Movement a terrorist organization in May 2016, the ruling AKP put pressure on the Bangladesh government to ban it, close its businesses and institutions, and deport its activists.
The Turkish Embassy in Dhaka designated Turkish-Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TBCCI) and the International Turkish Hope School (ITHS) — the latter having been established in Dhaka in 1996 and grown to six branches with 2,000 students, 33 Turkish and 210 local teachers as Gülenist institutions. TBCCI closed in late 2016. Turkish Ambassador Devrim Öztürk asked the Bangladesh government to hand-over ITHS to the Turkey-backed Maarif Foundation. However, the Bangladeshi Foreign Ministry demurred, having regarded the request as a violation of diplomatic norms.
Yet, despite the political setbacks experienced during the period 2012-2016, Bangladesh’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs Shahriar Alam left the door open for normalization. The reciprocal visits of Bangladeshi President Md. Abdul Hamid and his Turkish counterpart Binali Yıldırım in 2017 are indicative of the healing of the relationship. Bangladesh Ambassador to Turkey Allama Siddiki described the current state of the relationship as the best it has ever been.
The Rohingya factor
Turkey’s response to the Rohingya refugee emergency has served as a vehicle to put the relationship back on a stable and productive footing. The October 2016 violence against Rohingya residents of Rakhine State in Myanmar triggered a mass influx of more than one million refugees into Bangladesh, in addition to an estimated 250,000 undocumented Myanmar nationals already present in the country. Myanmar’s denial of citizenship and basic rights of the Muslim minority Rohingya of Rakhine State is the root cause of the problem.
The Turkish government has mounted an active diplomatic campaign on behalf of the Rohingya and in support of Bangladesh in the United Nations, the G20, MIKTA (a middle power grouping consisted by Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia), the OIC, and other multilateral fora. In September 2017, Emine Erdoğan, the president’s spouse, along with Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavusoğlu and Family and Social Policy Minister Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya visited the Cox’s Bazaar refugee camps.
The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), the Turkish Red Crescent, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), and Turkish NGOs have constructed camps, hospitals, schools, orphanages, and facilities for refugees and the poor across Bangladesh.
Growth in trade ties
Turkey-Bangladesh economic relations, though promising, present a mixed picture. Turkey’s trade linkages with Bangladesh have grown rapidly in recent years, and annual bilateral trade volume has hovered at about US$1.00 billion over the past decade. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, two-way trade reached US$858 million in 2018. The textile industry has been a lucrative source of bilateral trade, as the Turkish carpet industry relies extensively on Bangladesh’s jute.
Turkey has aimed to increase bilateral trade with Bangladesh to more than US$2 billion by the end of 2021. However, this target seems unrealistic, given the slowdown of the Turkish economy and the fact that the bilateral trade volume has been stuck at around US$1 billion since 2010. Ankara and Dhaka attempted to forge a free trade agreement (FTA) in 2012 to augment the economic partnership, though ratification was suspended indefinitely due to disapproval from the European Union (EU), which sought to protect its Customs Union with Turkey.
Turkey’s development assistance to Bangladesh during 2004-2014 totalled about US$13 million. In 2012, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Turkey’s flagship development agency opened a programme coordination office in Dhaka, which laid the groundwork for the initiation of projects in the health, education, and vocational training sectors.
However, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in both directions are unremarkable. According to the Central Bank of Bangladesh, net FDI inflows in the fiscal year 2015-2016 from Turkey to Bangladesh was US$1.41 million (i.e., 11.8% of the country’s total FDI stock as of June 2016). Shipbuilding and pharmaceuticals are two sectors where the two countries could pool their investment capital.
Defence cooperation between Bangladesh and Turkey
Since the signing of a military training agreement in 2004, Bangladesh-Turkey defense cooperation has progressed. In recent years, Bangladesh has purchased military equipment and arms from public and private Turkish defense companies. Defense links between the two countries have been further strengthened through training programmess and military exercises.
In 2013, Turkey supplied Otokar Cobra light armored vehicles to the Bangladesh Army. In 2015, Turkey offered Bangladesh guided missile frigates in a major government-to-government deal. Two years later, the Turkish firm Delta Defence was awarded a US$1 billion contract for 680 light armored vehicles. In March 2019, Turkish ROKETSAN secured a contract to supply a regiment of medium-range guided multiple rocket launchers to Bangladesh.
More than 3,000 Bangladesh’s military officers have received training in Turkey. Bangladesh’s navy has developed particularly close ties with its Turkish counterpart. Turkey, along with South Korea and the United States, provides military training to the SWADS, Bangladesh’s most sophisticated naval unit.
With the exception of the years 2012-2016, Turkey-Bangladesh relations have been cordial and cooperative. Now, these two newly emerging economies are seeking to develop more intensive cooperation with each other. This will require that Turkey and Bangladesh find ways to boost people-to-people contacts and invigorate FDI.
Even in the area of trade, there seem to be stumbling blocks to realizing the ambitious targets the two sides have set. However, if Ankara and Dhaka approach the bilateral relationship with an eye toward developing a comprehensive partnership, they might be able to leverage their increasing cooperation in the defense sector to stimulate economic activity in other areas.
“Asia Anew” policy
In 2019, Turkey launched its Asia Anew initiative. The main goal of “Asia Anew” is to boost the country’s cooperation with Asian countries.
The initiative includes diverse areas, including defense, trade, investment and culture. Apparently Turkey has renewed its activity in Asia, this renewed activism results from structural changes at the global level and the ideological drives behind AKP‟s foreign policy.
The increasing complications between Turkey and the West, particularly with the United States and the European Union, and the ongoing clash for primacy within the Muslim world has moved Turkey away from its traditional ally, the West and the neighboring Islamic countries.
In this case, Turkey has become more interested to extend influence to regions with less historical issues such as Asia. In this regard, Turkey is keen to foster its relations with Bangladesh due to its strategic importance and booming economy. Turkey’s economy is growing based on a sustainable development model; Bangladesh seems to have a special place in Turkeys outreach to Asia.
Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, for instance, noted, “Bangladesh is one of Turkey’s key partners in the Asia Anew initiative, with its vibrant economy and young population”.
Bangladesh’s foreign minister recently said the country could be an excellent economic market for Turkey because of its large population and strategically important location between two emerging Asian powers, China and India.
Certainly, Bangladesh would be prioritized to attract economic cooperation and foreign direct investment from Turkey. Their bilateral trade volume reached US$936 million in 2018, with the ready-made garment sector taking the lead.
The visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu in the inauguration of the new embassy compound in Dhaka has been marked successful and aspiring. The visit also shed light to the increasing interests of expanding its foreign policy towards South Asia, particularly Bangladesh.
Despite the complications during 2012-2016, Turkey-Bangladesh relations have become considerably warm and friendly. Now, these two newly emerging economies are into developing more and more cooperation with each other.
This will require that Turkey and Bangladesh find ways to boost people-to-people contacts and invigorate FDI. Even in the area of trade, there seem to be obstacles to reaching the desired targets the two sides have set. However, if Ankara and Dhaka go to the bilateral relations with a view to developing a comprehensive partnership, they might be able to leverage their increasing cooperation in the defense sector to stimulate economic activity in other areas.
The next five years seem to be very crucial in determining whether this is likely, or even possible. From Bangladesh perspective, it is a great opportunity to strengthen relations between two countries at on three specific grounds: diversification of Bangladesh’s defense and foreign policies for geopolitical and economic opportunities; South-South cooperation framework; and sharing experiences of Turkish development and strategic achievements.
The author is a political analyst based in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
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