Why has the idea of a joint press conference between the presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation been abandoned?
By Valentin Yakushik
What can we infer from the decision of the American authorities to abandon the idea of a joint press conference of the presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation after their official talks in Geneva on the 16th of June? I see three main reasons for this.
The first is psychological and organizational. Joseph Biden is older than Vladimir Putin and his reaction to unexpected, spontaneous questions is certain to be less dynamic and, therefore, less effective than that of the Russian leader. Thus, it is completely logical for the American side to avoid comparing the charisma and personal qualities of the presidents of the two countries. And it is much safer and more efficient for the press service of the US president to focus on holding a separate press conference for their president, which can be quite scrupulously planned and carried out without unnecessary glitches.
The second reason is related to the prognostic aspects of the process of preparing and holding the negotiations of the presidents. At present, almost the entire world is waiting with bated breadth the results of the upcoming talks, which, in principle, may see some bifurcation point after which the main geopolitical processes may enter a qualitatively new stage, breaking with some aspects that currently characterise bilateral relations. Theoretically, such a chance is not excluded, though it is not too probable. However, since it is not yet clear how the negotiations will end up, it is, therefore, better not to take any chances with a joint press conference.
Finally, the third reason can be formulated by paraphrasing a well-known Russian humorous statement: there is much to recall, but nothing to tell younger partners, neighbors and guests. Someday, later, yes, they will tell, the negotiators themselves will write in their memoirs, and soon the official and semi-official mouthpieces of the American and Russian leadership will “explain the reality” in a somewhat “stuffed” way. Indeed, the negotiators may have to deal not only with some very delicate specific problems of various regional and geopolitical conflicts, but also work out the relevant decisions, including in the form of gentlemen’s agreements, about which it is not customary to speak much about.
The author is Professor, Department of International Relations and Social Sciences, National Universityof Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine, Kiev.
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