Whither peace and democracy in Myanmar?
Whether the military leadership sticks to its one-year schedule of emergency or extends its control for an indefinite period, will depend on an array of domestic factors
Part – II
By Baladas Ghoshal
Peoples’ response to the Coup: Formation of National Unity Government (NUG)
Faced with the brutal repression of the Tatmadaw, and the loss of newly enjoyed freedom under a hybrid democracy over the last two decades, people of Myanmar rose up to the occasion and demonstrated an unprecedented sense of unity, determination, and sense of purpose to fight the autocratic regime and restore their much-cherished freedom. Deposed members of Parliament, leaders of anti-coup protests and ethnic minority organizations announced on April 16 a National Unity Government (NUG), which now claims to be the country’s legitimate interim authority and has requested international recognition and had even sought, though unsuccessfully, an invitation to the ASEAN meeting that took place on 24 June to find a peaceful resolution of the current imbroglio in place of the junta leader. In a direct challenge to the generals The Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a body of elected lawmakers from the ousted civilian government, even announced the cabinet line-up of their new National Unity Government, including members of ethnic minorities and protest leaders, underlining the unity of purpose between the pro-democracy movement and autonomy-seeking minority communities. They had earlier agreed to abolish the military-drafted 2008 constitution, replacing it with a federal democratic system. The NUG is already operating with some international legitimacy when one of its representative attended an informal gathering of United Nations Security Council members in early April, and even expecting an invitation to observe the Group of Seven summit to be held in the U.K. in June, if the reports of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson considering it, is true.
Also read: Myanmar: Drifting towards Chaos and Civil War?
The presence of the ethnic groups in the NUG have undoubtedly strengthened the hands of the anti-coup protest groups, but it has also increased the prospect of a civil war in Myanmar in view of the army generals self-perception as the guardian of the state and their hostility towards the ethnic rebels, who might have signed a National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government in Nay Pyi Taw but not with the generals. An open confrontation between the two, therefore, has the likelihood of a protracted civil war in the country, also evident from the UN’s special envoy in Myanmar, Christine Schraner-Burgener’, warning that the situation in the country was dire and heading for an imminent “bloodbath and civil war”.
International and Regional response to the Myanmar turmoil
The coup and the brutal repression of the CDM have attracted strong condemnation and actions against the junta government from the international community and some regional powers, including the United States and Australia. Australia has suspended military cooperation with the Myanmar military, and US has implemented a broad range of targeted sanctions against the junta and many of its businesses. It was President Obama who with robust diplomacy and personal visits backed by his promise of lifting the sanctions against military rulers was able to nudge the Thien Sein-led government to initiate reforms towards democracy but soon his interests on Myanmar began to diminish with US’ concern with Iran and Middle East and by a systematic campaign of repression against Muslim minorities in the Rakhine. Strong condemnation of the government in Nay Pyi Tau by the US government on the Rohingya issue had also alienated the former from the latter. The Trump administration was somewhat indifferent to Myanmar, adopted a largely hands-off policy, except looking primarily on Myanmar’s strategic importance in the competition between the United States and China for influence in the region. After taking over on Jan. 20, the Biden administration was similarly silent until Jan. 29 when the stirrings of the crisis was already looming, the U.S. Embassy in Yangon signed onto a joint statement with several other embassies to support democracy in the country and to oppose “any attempt to alter the outcome of the elections or impede Myanmar’s democratic transition.” The warning went obviously unheeded by the military. It also demonstrated Washington’s limited leverage with Nay Pyi Tau and its ability to shape political developments in another country quite far away. Had Washington developed a stronger stake in Myanmar’s success of democracy and supported Suu Kyi government’s attempt to improve the economy of the country through much larger investments, broadening its scope and increase the size of the cake to be shared by all stake holders, perhaps the coup could have been averted.
As opposed to West’s condemnation of the coup, China’s initial response was driven by its proclaimed principle of non-interference in the internal politics of a country, and thus blocked – together with Russia – any attempt within the United Nations Security Council to publicly condemn the coup, let alone call for international intervention to restore the elected government and parliament. At the same time, being conscious of the suspicion of some international observers of Beijing deriving benefit from the coup and its role in it because of its strong support for Tatmadaw, China has called on all parties to the current crisis to practice restraint and dialogue., On the one hand, It has warned the international community against “one-sided pressure and calling for sanctions or other coercive measures, on the other it kept contact with both the junta and the NUG through quiet diplomacy to persuade them to exercise restraint and prevent exacerbation of the crisis. Beijing is fully aware that neither Tatmadaw, nor the international community have complete trust in its role in Myanmar and therefore avoided so far not openly facilitated any dialogue among the opposing parties. Rather, as revealed by its ambassador to the UN, it preferred the ASEAN to play that role and supported the initiatives undertaken by the grouping.
Also read: ASEAN key to ending Myanmar crisis: Guterres
Japan, the leading investor in Myanmar, however, has taken a more cautious and passive approach, calling on the Myanmar junta to restore democracy and having its defence head join a call rejecting the coup but so far not taking stronger moves, except the decision by a private company named Kirin Brewery on 4 February, to end its partnership with Myanmar Economic Holdings – one of the two biggest military-controlled conglomerates in Myanmar. Nippon Foundation, a civil society organization, however, was engaged with Myanmar’s Tatmadaw during the country’s democratic transition, and tried with the military’s own ‘democratic transition’ and on persuading them to find their right role in a democratic system, though with less success as is evident now. However, the economic links, japan had established over the last decade gives Tokyo some room to engage the regime in power in Nay Pyi Tau to continue its quiet diplomacy with them. Tokyo, having geopolitical interest in Myanmar, to see Beijing not getting a foothold there, is likely to use its soft persuasive powers in whatever way it is possible.
Taiwan, another major investors in Myanmar, has passed a parliamentary motion condemning the situation in Myanmar and calling on the junta to restore democracy.
The EU in March agreed a first set of sanctions on 11 individuals linked to the coup, including the commander-in-chief of the military, is now preparing fresh sanctions on individuals and companies owned by the Myanmar military. While EU economic leverage in the country is relatively small, its foreign policy head Borrell said the EU could offer to increase its economic ties with Myanmar if democracy is restored. .EU foreign direct investment in Myanmar totalled $700 million in 2019, compared with $19 billion from China. Human rights groups and the Myanmar diaspora, however, have criticized the group for not taking tougher actions and the junta, and not recognizing the NUG. A strong and united international response is handicapped by the attitudes of Russia and China, who according to Borrel, “blocking all attempts of the UN Security Council, for example, to impose an arms embargo. . . . Geopolitical competition in Myanmar will make it very difficult to find common ground. . . .But we have a duty to try.” Realizing their own constraints in influencing developments in Myanmar, the European Union issued a statement on 30 April referring to the ASEAN leaders’ meeting on April 24 in Jakarta, saying: “The five-point consensus” from the leaders’ meeting — to which Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing was invited — is “a positive and important first step to begin a process of de-escalation and the return to the democratic transition in Myanmar/Burma.”
China and Russia both have ties to Myanmar’s armed forces, as the first and second largest suppliers of weapons to the country, respectively.
ASEAN’s Critical Role
Myanmar is not only one of theirs, but its chaos and instability are more likely to affect them more than other countries in the region, causing alarm amongst some members of the grouping. They were aware that they wouldn’t be able to get the support of all their members, a few taking taking refuge in ASEAN principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country, yet the situation was urgent enough to take some initiatives, failing which they might to face the prospect of irrelevance of the organization and its much touted principle of ‘ASEAN centrality, already under stress. This was rightly expressed in an article in Bangkok Post, two days before the ASEAN special summit meeting in Jakarta on 24 April. “In the face of such dire circumstances, the Asean special summit in Jakarta, comes at a very crucial juncture. After much toing and froing, Asean has finally come to realise that the crisis in Myanmar has become Asean’s conundrum, challenging many of the old assumptions that the regional organisation had operated on, namely the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a member state, which has been one of the cardinal principles at the heart of the so-called ‘Asean way’. Ignoring the principle of consensus, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo had taken the first initiative, condemned the violence and pushed for an emergency ASEAN summit. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, most vocal within the grouping, had worked with current ASEAN chair Brunei in the days before the meeting to draft a statement that included a call for Suu Kyi’s release. The draft was shown to Myanmar’s military. The leaders of the three countries, in fact, pressed for immediate release of detainees and the start of dialogue to resolve the crisis. The junta leader, Min Hlaing had assured them that he would give careful consideration to constructive suggestions from ASEAN leaders, but added that this would happen only once stability was restored, hinting that the cessation of violence and the beginning of dialogue could happen only on his terms.
Also read: UN Special Rapporteur calls for emergency summit on Myanmar as situation deteriorates
ASEAN leaders did not want all the efforts and behind the scene diplomacy to go waste by pushing Min Hlaing to a position which he would reject, and therefore agreed for a compromise and issued a diluted statement. The ASEAN’s chair, the Sultan of Brunei and the leaders from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in their five-point consensus called for 1) the immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar; 2) constructive dialogue among all parties concerned to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people; 3) mediation to be facilitated by an envoy of Asean’s chair, with the assistance of the secretary-general; 4) humanitarian assistance provided by ASEAN’s AHA Centre and 5) a visit by the special envoy and delegation to Myanmar to meet all parties concerned. Conspicuous by its absence from that five-point consensus is any reference to the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political detainees.
Even while the talks were held primarily to seek de-escalation and establish conditions for dialogue between Myanmar’s military and the ousted civilian government, the likelihood of a negotiated settlement looks quite bleak, as neither side appears so far to accept a compromise or return to the status quo ante. Despite appeals from its ASEAN neighbours supported by the United Nations Security Council neither the Tatmadaw is prepared to refrain from violence, nor the protesters and the NUG are ready for a compromise with the coup leaders.
In the meantime, ASEAN has begun negotiations to hold a foreign ministers’ meeting with the U.S. as well as with China, as the bloc seeks support for its efforts to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. Preparations for the meeting with .China are moving ahead, and the two sides could possibly meet soon provided ASEAN and the U.S. can iron out the details, including the format of the meeting should Myanmar send a member of its junta as its representative.
The United States urged ASEAN to press Myanmar to implement actions agreed at their emergency summit last month, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with the foreign minister of Brunei, the bloc’s current chair, in London in early May. Both the U.S. and China won’t want to see further violence and instability in Myanmar, said Scot Marciel, U.S. ambassador to Myanmar from 2016 to 2020.
China’s response has been more muted with Beijing emphasizing the importance of stability. China is a major investor in Myanmar and shares border with Myanmar. One way for the US and China to be on the same page on Myanmar is to support the ASEAN consensus plan, which again can only attain limited success given both coup leaders and the NUG is amenable to some flexibility in each other’s so far rigid stand.
Even while the UNSC has been asking the special envoy and delegation to visit Myanmar and meet with both sides in person,the special envoy of the ASEAN Chair which is to facilitate mediation of the entire dialogue process with the assistance of the Secretary-General of ASEAN, could not be appointed as yet, as the junta would not agree to a visit by a Southeast Asian envoy until it could establish stability, prompting concerns that it would carry out more deadly violence against demonstrators and ethnic minorities. “Right now, we are prioritising the security and stability of the country,” Major Kaung Htet San, a spokesman for the military council, told a televised briefing on 7 May. “Only after we achieve a certain level of security and stability, we will cooperate regarding that envoy,” declared Htet San. The only option left for ASEAN is to provide humanitarian aid through ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management. The prospect of stability anytime soon in Myanmar appears bleak, with a reigniting of conflict between the military and ethnic minority groups in the borderlands and minor bombings and explosions now taking place regularly in its main cities.
India’s stand on Myanmar Coup
India’s response to the Myanmar coup has been balanced and carefully calibrated one – “noted the developments in Myanmar with deep concern,” as a statement by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said, on the one hand, and avoiding any condemnation, on the other. It further said: “India has always been steadfast in its support to the process of democratic transition in Myanmar. We believe that the rule of law and the democratic process must be upheld. We are monitoring the situation closely.” Notwithstanding its concern for the overthrow of an elected government and arrests of Suu Kyi and other leading politicians, India continued to maintain contact with new government led by the junta. The foreign office spokesperson stated that India would continue to supply COVID-19 assistance, including vaccines, to Myanmar, had supplied 3.7 million doses of vaccine to Myanmar – out of which two million are on a commercial basis and the rest delivered as a grant from the Indian government, as part of its vaccine diplomacy in South and Southeast Asia.
Also read: Scores of schools ‘reportedly occupied’ by security forces in Myanmar: UNICEF
While India joined in the consensus with the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council’s special resolution on 12 February that “strongly deplored” the removal of the elected government in Myanmar, and also called for the unconditional release of the political leaders, lifting the state of emergency and underlined the need for restraint from using violence against the protestors, but also made it clear that it will not support coercive steps against Myanmar. “Restoring democratic order should be the priority of all stakeholders in Myanmar. The international community must lend its constructive support to the people of Myanmar at this critical juncture,” said India’s permanent representative to Geneva, Indra Mani Pandey. India declared that even while Myanmar’s progress towards democracy had been “impressive”, it was unfortunate that “hopes and aspirations of the people of Myanmar have been dealt a blow by the latest developments”. It added further: “We strongly believe that the rule of law and democratic processes must be upheld and the detained political leaders released. The right to protest peacefully is an integral part of the democratic ethos”. Since Aung San Suu Kyi came into power, India had built up an excellent rapport with her and continued to support and stand by her when the international community was critical over her inaction on the Rohingya issue.
India did not condemn Myanmar’s military over coup, but when it found Myanmar’s crossing over to the Indian side for shelter it also stepped up efforts to seal the border and push back fleeing dissidents. On March 18, the Union home ministry wrote to the state governments of Mizoram, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur asking them to take appropriate measures in stemming inflow of refugees. This, however, did not go well with the Mizoram government which not only welcomed the fleeing dissidents but also called for giving them refugee status. It was quite natural for Mizoram to welcome them, not just for humanitarian reasons but also for ethnic bonding with the people in the adjoining Chin state in Myanmar. But India had valid reasons for denying the dissidents the refugee status as it is already home to another batch of refugees from Myanmar – the Rohingyas.
According to the United Nations, there are over 16,000 Rohingyas living in India after they fled the Rakhine province following military crackdown a few years ago. India’s own estimate is that there are over 40,000 Rohingya refugees living in the country. They are illegal immigrants as India has not granted refugee status to them. In the current situation, while the Mizoram government has asked its security forces to assist people fleeing from Myanmar to enter India, the Centre has asked the Assam Rifles of the Army to block their influx. India plans to deport those entering India illegally, though had not executed the plan.
Also read: Myanmar stands at confluence of India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East policy’
As Myanmar army’s violence intensified against the protesters and the number of deaths increased, India’s position witnessed a little shift. “Let me be very clear. We condemn any use of violence. We believe that the rule of law should prevail. We stand for the restoration of democracy in Myanmar,” Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said during the weekly press conference in early April “We have urged the release of political prisoners and supported any attempts at resolving the current situation, including through the efforts of ASEAN. We remain engaged on this issue with our international interlocutors and at the UN Security Council in an effort to play a balanced and constructive role,” he said. Stating that the “hopes and aspirations” of the people must be met, Tirumurti noted that the situation had to be resolved peacefully, which required “greater engagement” with Myanmar.
As the most probable option India has welcomed the ASEAN five-point consensus, expounded when the 15-nation UN Security Council held the private meeting in relation to Myanmar, and pledged to elevate ASEAN’s efforts to end violence there.
India’s stakes in Myanmar
India has learnt from its earlier mistakes of democratic activism in late 1980s and early 1990s and have become more pragmatic in its approach to Myanmar keeping in mind its national and security interests. Myanmar is too important to New Delhi to ignore as it sits at the intersection of India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East Policy’ policies, being the land bridge to connect South Asia and Southeast Asia, and thus demands a special place in India’s diplomacy in the broader region of Indo-Pacific.
In the midst of geopolitical turmoil caused by Beijing’s unprecedented assertiveness and bellicosity in the Indo-Pacific region, including our own ongoing confrontation in Eastern Ladakh, New Delhi’s decision on October 15 to handover INS Sindhuvir, a Kilo-class submarine in service with the Indian Navy since 1988, to Myanmar, is a strong indication of the latter assuming urgent attention in India’s AEP. India’s bilateral interactions with Myanmar is generally based on six major planks or what can be called the 6Cs – Commerce; Connectivity; Capacity-building; Civilizational links; Community – the Indian Diaspora forging a strong people to people relations, which in turn will enhance India’s cultural and civilizational linkages; and finally China, the Dragon in the room. The amalgamation of perspectives and values of both the countries have helped broaden the horizons of the bilateral relationship.
Security cooperation is most prominent among them, getting stronger in recent years in the fight to end insurgency in India’s northeast. In May last year, 22 Indian insurgents were handed over for the first time by Myanmar, a huge success for back-door diplomacy bringing Naypyidaw in sync with New Delhi on dealing with insurgents. India-Myanmar Bilateral Army Exercise (IMBAX) builds and promotes closer relations with armies. India has built personal relationship with the army commander Min Hlaing, who has openly criticised Beijing’s clandestine support to ethnic rebel Arakan Army active in the country’s Chin and Rakhine states bordering Mizoram. The Arakan Army is also acting as a proxy of China by posing a threat to the completion of India’s KMMTTP (Kaladan Multi Modal Transport Transit Project).
Also read: Myanmar’s army seized power, popular leader Aung San Suu Kyi detained
Apart from strategic necessity to maintain links with whichever dispensation is in power, New Delhi does not want all windows closed by keeping use its access to military leadership at least to impress upon them the need for peaceful transfer of power back to the civilian elected representatives through back-room channel. From that perspective, Indian response to the coup has been mature, though it may not satisfy the democracy warriors in our country who find ideology more important than actual ground realities in a country like Myanmar.
Whither peace and democracy in Myanmar?
Whether the military leadership sticks to its one-year schedule of emergency or extends its control for an indefinite period, will depend on domestic factors like how Min Hlaing renegotiates emerging military-civilian relations, perhaps weakening partially the concept of civilian authority vis-à-vis military supremacy and final arbiter on all issues concerning inter-ethnic relations.
Western support and the ethnic rebel armies like the KIA and KNA making common cause with the democracy supporters to build a Federal Myanmar might have emboldened the protesters to challenge the junta and may have raised the hope of gaining recognition from the international community for the NUG, it is highly unlikely that the Tatmadaw will cave in, as the means of violence is still overwhelmingly in their favour to be pressurized to surrender. Even if the battle-hardened rebel Kachin and Karen armies provide guerrilla training to the opposition groups, for one, it will require a long time to garner enough strength to match Tatmadaw and win victory over it; for another, will the Myanmar society at large be able to maintain unity in the event of a civil war consuming the country.
The international community also may not have the stomach for another Syria-like situation distracting their attention and energy from more serious global issues. More importantly, ASEAN, likely to be most affected by a civil war in Myanmar, will not allow such a situation to develop. Even if the ASEAN Five point consensus lacks much teeth and appears to be too weak, that is the only path through which peace and normalcy can be restored in Myanmar.
For that to happen, both the junta and the democracy supporters would have to be flexible and move away from their rigid stance. Since the balance of power currently is in favour of the military, the civilians would have to continue to accept some form of political role for the former, and also give an assurance that they would not attempt to change the Constitution of 2008, not at least for another five years. In return, the Junta would have to transfer power to the elected parliament as per the elections of November 2020. Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political detainees need to be freed immediately. For all this to happen, first and foremost, the junta must declare a ceasefire, stop all manifestations of violence and repression to be reciprocated by the protesters not to indulge in any kind of provocation.
Such an arrangement can be worked out under the auspices of an ASEAN envoy, a requirement for its Five point plan, supported by the Secretary General of the organization, and underwritten by the Western powers on the one hand, Russia and China, on the other.
International responses will matter only if stakeholders treat the coup leaders as partners in the progress towards democracy, not an adversary. Whatever might be the outcome, one thing is certain, democratic transformation will experience an indefinite delay.
The author is Former Professor and Chair in South & Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University; Secretary General Society for Indian Ocean Studies.
This is the second and concluding part of a two-part series on Myanmar.
You can read the first part here
