Turkey: Caucasian priorities within and beyond the UN
4 years ago
By Markedenov Sergei
At the end of September politicians, experts and journalists have been discussing the addresses by different heads of states at the anniversary of the 75th UN General Assembly. An added angle to the dynamics of these discussions have been added by the unusual format of the forum. In 2020 it took place in a virtual format because of the Coronavirus pandemic. Of all the world leaders it was only American president Donald Trump who is soon to face elections, who addressed the forum in person. Nevertheless this kind of virtual manner of participation by the heads of state have not made this a casual event. Against the background of other important polemical addresses – the President of Turkey Reccep Tayip Erdogan stood apart from the other’s. The Turkish leader raised the issues of regional and International security, in the face of ethno-political and inter-religious conflicts to the prospects for reforming the UN Security Council.Speaking on the situation in the region of the Caucases, Erdogan harshly criticised the actions of Yerevan: “Armenia, by attacking the territory of Azerbaijan in July once again showed that it presents the greatest impediment to any long term peace and stability in the Southern Caucases”. Later he stated that Ankara supports the “speedy resolution of the conflict, especially the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh, keeping in mind the territorial integrity and sovereivnty of Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the resolutions of the UN and OSCE.How important was the opening rhetoric in the context of the current situation in the South Caucases? Does it mean that Turkey now views the Caucases as being as significant as that of the Eastern Mediterranean? How does the criticism of Armenia by the Turkish President relate to his grief directed at India on the Kashmir issue? This also resonated in Erdogan’s speech at the UN’s General Assembly and was immediately rebuffed by official representatives of New Delhi for attempts of “interference in internal affairs”. Can we say that claims to be a leader of the Muslim world is now once again seeking to be played outoin the Caucases?The Armenian factor for Turkey: history and the presenceMany observers have paid attention to the symbolism. The Turkish president made his address a day after Armenia’s main national event – the Independence day of the republic. On 21 September 1991 a referandum was held there in which the overwhelming majority of citizens voted for leaving the Soviet Union and to for the Armenian Soviet Republic to become a sovereign republic. But a year earlier on 23 August 1990 the Declaration of the Independence of Armenia had been adopted, some points of which till now are strongly rejected by Turkey. But then when the initially promising “football diplomacy” (as the process of Armenian-Turkish normalization was called) began slowly but surely to give way to a phase of stagnation, Ankara’s appeals to the above-mentioned document we’re used as arguments against forced reconciliation.First, the Declaration of thirty years ago (which no one has ever revised or disavowed since then) stated that”the Republic of Armenia stands for international recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia” (paragraph 11), in which Turkish politicians saw a hint of territorial claims. But this is not all. In these demands Ankara sees a danger of setting precedence, which can pave the way for similar demands from Greece (the bilateral relations between these two countries, especially in recent times, is a cause for concern), Kurdish and Assyrian organizations, who have patrons and allies in the USA and in the countries of the European Union. As soon as Turkey faces difficulties on these fronts the theme of “historical politics” will be activated in full force. Suffice it to mention that the resolution of the American Congress on the Armenian issue in the autumn off last year or a similar document adopted in June 2016 by the German Bundestag.iIn September 2020 not only were academic discussions activated but also conversations about the freedom of religion in Turkey, as well as Greek-Turkish and Greek-Cypriot relations, which included those like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.Secondly, the preamble of the Declaration of 1990 also has a point on the “reunification” of Armenian Soviet Republic with Nagorny Karabakh. But after the dissolution of the USSR Ankara has consistently supported Baku in it’s fight for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. And if Russia and USA, who also follow this formula, refer to the “basic principles”, which contain such important details as a juridically obligated referandum on the status of Nagorny Karabakh (and not true that the results would satisfy Azerbaijan), Turkey will support it’s ally unconditionally, something seen in April 2016, and then in July 2020.The joint Azerbaijani-Turkish military exercises that followed the recent escalation, and criticism of the OSCE Minsk Group representatives of Ankara for it’s insufficient peacekeeping effectiveness, suggest that Turkish involvement in the Karabakh issue is not simply one more of routine speeches that will demonstrate rhetorical solidarity of the Turkish peoples. This is part of the broader context of transformations in Turkish foreign policy positioning.Azerbaijan: not simply ethnic bonding
According to Turkish expert Kerim Has, “in the political aspect among all post-Soviet republics Azerbaijan (both the people and the ruling clique) has always been Turkey’s closest partner.” However, there is an interesting phenomenon. Both in Azerbaijan and Armenian expert circles there is a perception that Ankara’s activities in the Caucases is determined, first of all, by the factor of ethnic kinship of the two Turkic people’s. As an example, the history of Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation in the period after the collapse of the Russian Empire and the formation of the first national state of Azerbaijani-Turkish, the ADR, is again cited and cultural affinity are made use of. There is no doubt that factors of linguistic and cultural affinities is used in the official narratives of both countries. But to link up everything to it will be inaccurate.
Alongside Azerbaijan Turkey is also actively pursuing relations with Georgia. The need to preserve Georgia’s territorial integrity was also pronounced by Erdoğan in his speech of 22 September at the UN General Assembly. At the same time Ankara has always tried to preserve an open “Abkhazia window”, by supporting certain economic contacts with the partially recognized republic and it’s representatives, by formally outsourcing it to the diaspora activists. Not only to the Abkhazia diaspora but also to the Adygyz. But all these efforts in the Caucases are not being made in a vacuum. Turkey has significantly strengthened it’s position in the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea over the past two decades. It is impossible to imagine iraqi, Syrian, Libyan, Cypriot or Bosnian puzzles without it. Ankara closely monitors the situation of the Turkish and Pomak minorities in Bulgaria, the rights of Muslims in Greece and the Serbian region of Sandzak. Representatives of the Ukraine also appeal to Turkey when it comes to the status of Crimea. From 2014 Ankara consistently considers it to be Ukrainian as if it has not noticed the transfer of the peninsula to Russian control.If, till before the “Justice and Development Party” came to power, Turkish foreign policy, on the whole, was built around the idea of Euro-Atlantic solidarity and Turkey carefully refrained from any involvement in the affairs of it’s “near abroad”, then with the onset of the “Erdoğan era” much has changed. Priorities regarding the neighborhood have come to the forr, Ankara is trying to move away from the role of being a junior partner of Washington in NATO, something that was customary in the past. It claims to be the leading Eurasian power. And, therefore it consistently positions itself as a country that can be a kind of magnet for attraction for others. And first of all for Azerbaijan itself. As a result, there is a noticeable movement on the Nagorny Karabakh front where Baku directly clashes with Yerevan. It is important for Ankara to demonstrate that it is a reliable ally and promoter of security for those who have chosen to enter into a strategic partnership with it. It should be noted here that these two Muslim countries follow different sects. If Turkey’s Muslims are prefominpredo Sunnis, then in Azerbaijan the population is mostly Shi’ites (in a ratio of 65:35%), though the process of Sunnization in recent times has been gaining g momentum.
International ambitions and regional projections
In his “virtual” address to the UN General Assembly, Reccep Erdoğan announced the need to reform the UN Security Council. In his words in the current situation the destiny of the world has been handed over to five countries – the permanent members of the council.This was not the first time that he has tried his rhetorical prowess for the transformation of UN structures. In December 2018 he spoke on behalf of the Muslim world, which given the current form of the UN does not receive any support or protection of it’s rights. This theme again rang through the Turkish President’s speech at the 75th General Assembly. The target was India, whose policies in the state of Jammu and Kashmir received harsh condemnation from Erdoğan. In actual fact, he was in solidarity with Pakistan’s evaluation of the dynamics of the Kashmir issue.Here is an interesting detail. Pakistan, from the moment of the dissolution of the USSR and the establishment of independent Armenia still does not recognize it as a state while Yerevan sees Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India. Alongside Islamabad, Armenia also does not have diplomatic relations with a number of Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Yemen), who have demonstrated their religion and political solidarity with Azerbaijan. This is yet another example of reactive conduct in the process of recognition-non-recognition of the Independence of states.
Be that as it may, Turkey is trying to play on this. Moreover, Erdogan, constantly revising secularism as one of the foundational principles of the Turkish state, has been trying to act as one of the leaders of the entire Muslim world. And the fetters of the UN in the form of the “big five” contrain him both in the Caucases and in other regions. Perhaps, without these checks and balances, Turkey would be much more active in the Caucases region.
Today, in addition to the Russia factor, as Russia has a military presence in Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ankara keeps in mind the it’s complex relations with NATO partners (the US and EU countries). For the United States, the escalation in Karabakh is a risk for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in which not only financial resources, but much political resources have also been invested. It is a potential threat to what Washington defines as the “energy Independence” of Europe and Eurasia (in other words it means minimizing Russian dominance in the energy sector).
Paradoxically, the interests of Russia and United States in maintaining a fragile balance of power in a turbulent region, converges. And their voluntary or involuntary destruction by activating third parties puts them in an uncomfortable situation. Perhaps, today the most powerful”third party” is Turkey. And with all it’s actions Ankara says: it has to be taken seriously and not as just a passing actor. (The author is the Head Researcher of the Institute of International Research, MSIIR (MGIMO) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Editor in Chief of the journal “International Analytics”)Translated from the original RussianViews are personal and International Affairs Review neither endorses nor is responsible for them.
