India’s Foreign Policy Priorities in 2020 and Beyond
India’s global stature has risen in recent years on account of political stability, sound economic growth, large market for trade and investments, and its endeavours to enhance its military muscles.
By Achal Malhotra
As India enters the Year 2020, its foreign policy priorities will no doubt be determined by the dynamics of the fast moving global scenario. Nevertheless, at this point of time one can make some intelligent assessment to visualise that the immediate neighbourhood in South Asia, extended neighbourhood in South East Asia, and Indo-Pacific (as an extension of its Look East/Act East policy) would be high on the agenda of India’s foreign policy makers. In addition, India’s Look West policy in the Middle East focussing on Arab Gulf States, Iran and Israel, is also likely to get additional momentum. It would be business as usual with other regions such as Africa, Central Asia and Latin America which would also remain on the radar. In the bilateral context, China, USA, and Russia are likely to engage India’s focused attention as big powers. Global issues such as terrorism and reforms of institutions of global governance will also be high on the agenda.
In the context of its “Neighbourhood First Policy” announced in 2014, India, learning from the experience of the past five years, is likely to be more pragmatic, realising that it may not always be possible to attain equally stable and cordial relations with each of the six neighbouring countries in South Asia. The increasing Chinese footprint in most of these countries and the desire of the leaderships there to engage both India and China and occasionally play the China card is a ground reality India would have to live with but India would also endeavour for sure to ensure that China’s “presence” does not lead to “influence” resulting in a threat to India’s strategic and security interests in the region.
While remaining committed to the integration of South Asia within the framework of the now more-or-less dormant SAARC at Heads of State/Government level, India’s real focus will be on giving a further push to inter-regional cooperation through BIMSTEC between selected countries of South and South East Asia.
In November, 2019 India announced its decision to opt out of the mega free trade agreement Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership( RCEP) involving 10 ASEAN Countries + India, China, Japan, North Korea, Australia and New Zealand for a variety of reasons which included India’s fears that RCEP in its present form may lead to surge in imports of manufactured goods from China and dairy products from New Zealand thus causing an adverse impact on India’s manufacturing industries and agriculture. India’s demand for inclusion of “an automatic trigger safeguard mechanism (ATSM) for tackling import surges,” was apparently not incorporated in the Agreement. While China would like the remaining fifteen partner countries to move ahead, Japan has hinted it would not sign the agreement unless India is on board. The issue is likely to figure on the agenda of forthcoming India-Japan Summit (which had to be postponed due to law and order situation in Assam), whenever it is eventually held. It remains to be seen as to what priority India is likely to assign to RCEP.
India‘s next focus would be on providing a push to the evolving Indo-Pacific Ocean concept. India’s priorities in the region are reflected in PM Modi’s idea (14th East Asia Summit) of an Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative, which, in short, calls for establishing a free, open and cooperative platform to respond to a range of maritime challenges and needs. These include maritime security; managing the maritime environment; disaster risk mitigation; sustainable use of marine resources, capacity building; and maritime trade and transport. And as announced at the 11th Delhi Dialogue (December 14, 2019) by India’s External Affairs Minister (EAM), India plans to start work on some of the pillars of this initiative in the first few months of 2020. India is also clear that operationally there is no need to set up any new architecture and instead one could rely upon the existing ASEAN led mechanisms especially the East Asia Summit, but also consultative processes such as the ARF, ADMM+ and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF).
In the context of the US President Trump’s call for a “free and open” Indo-Pacific resulting in the revival of a four nation (USA, India, Japan and Australia) Quad to contain China’s expansionist designs, India had initially participated enthusiastically but of late, particularly since the informal Wuhan Summit between PM Modi and President Xi Jinping (April, 2018), India has created an impression of being the weaker link in the Quad. The challenge ahead would be to take a call on whether or not India would go the whole hog or tread with caution. Will India’s Indo-Pacific strategy be inclusive of China or set against it? In all probability, India, while continuing to echo the Quad on the need for a rules-based order characterized by freedom of navigation and settlement of disputes through dialogue, would also balance it out by underlining that its idea of the Indo-Pacific is not about restricting a particular state. Rather PM Modi outlined at the Shangri La Dialogue, Singapore, that “India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members.”
In West Asia/Middle East/Gulf region, India’s likely priority would be to sustain the levels of cordial relations which India has forged with the leading nations of the Islamic world, e.g. Saudi Arabia, UAE; this acquires added significance in the backdrop of certain Muslim countries e.g. Pakistan, Malaysia, Turkey, adopting an anti-India stance, particularly on issues such as abrogation of Article 370, Kashmir situation, and the Citizenship Amendment Act etc. The muted response from the Islamic world to Pakistan’s zealous efforts to internationalise Kashmir issue at the UNGA 2019 reflects the positive outcome of India’s diplomacy, and India would like to ensure that there is no erosion of gains made so far, particularly in view of reports that Saudi Arabia has agreed to Pakistan’s request for an OIC meeting on Kashmir situation in return for Pakistan’s non-participation in Kuala Lumpur Islamic Summit held in December, 2019. The India–Oman–Iran trilateral meet in Muscat in December, 2019 is one of the pointers in that direction.
On the bilateral front, relations between India and Pakistan remain at the lowest ebb and there is no indication of India making a departure from its firmly stated position that “Talks and Terror cannot go together”, until and unless Pakistan undertakes some concrete credible and verifiable steps to curb cross-border terrorism and interference in Kashmir. India will continue to isolate Pakistan at international forums, while lobbying for its inclusion in the Black List of Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
It is abundantly clear that China is not interested in sharing with India the status of a regional power in Asia. China will continue to pose challenges, while offering opportunities; bilateral relations are likely to be guided in the foreseeable future by the “Wuhan spirit” and “Chennai Connect” the essence of which is to build upon the convergences and deal divergences and differences with maturity and through mutual dialogue.
In the case of the USA, the priority would be to sort out the minor irritants caused by trade issues; the focus perhaps would be on concluding a “mini trade agreement” which was expected but did not come through during the Prime Minister’s visit to USA in September, 2019. India would look for ways and means for diversifying areas of cooperation with Russia beyond Defence, Energy and space sectors. Trade and investments sectors remain below desired levels despite no serious obstacles between the two countries.
Amongst the issues of global dimensions, India would continue to raise he issue of terrorism and related issues at all international forums and with all important interlocutors to underline the need for finding global solutions for the global problem. In this context, India is likely to push further its idea of organising a global conference on Terrorism, which finds mention in the BJP’s Election Manifesto 2019 and was spelt out by Prime Minister Modi during his visit to the Maldives in June 2019 soon after his re-election. The idea comes in the backdrop of the lack of progress on Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in UN, moved by India as early as 1996.
India may push up its benign development assistance through outright grants, soft loans, Lines of Credit, capacity building programmes to partly counter China’s “debt trap” policy.
India’s global stature has risen in recent years on account of political stability, sound economic growth, large market for trade and investments, and its endeavours to enhance its military muscles. It remains to be seen as to whether the current signs of decline in GDP growth and political setbacks for the ruling party in some of the provincial elections in India would impact on India’s capacity to influence the global agenda. Hopefully and most likely not.
(The writer is a former Indian diplomat)
