Consensual Political Transition in Myanmar and the Rohingya Conundrum
Though international support and pressure are important, the chapter argues that a long-term solution to the Rohingya crisis primarily lies with three actors – the Myanmar military, the elected civilian government, and the general public.
By Nehginpao Kipgen
Though the Rohingya identity in Myanmar is controversial, the fact that many of them had been settled in the country for generations is undeniable. The author J.P. Anand writes that the Rohingyas are descendents of “Arab traders who had settled in Arakan for centuries (from 7th century)” and they are “ethnically of the same group as the people of Chittagong. The refugee crisis had also had its long history. Some Muslims from Myanmar fled across the border (now Bangladesh) as early as 1942 following communal riots in Myanmar. But the flow of movement was relatively insignificant until 1975, when the issue was first raised by the Bangladesh government before the Myanmar authorities following the arrival of 3500 refugees from Myanmar. The exodus continued and in just over two months’ time from May to June in 1978, over 200,000 refugees from Myanmar had crossed over to Bangladesh. Meetings and discussions were held between the two countries for a possible solution but no significant progress had been made. While the Myanmar authorities maintained that the refugees were illegal immigrants who tried to avoid immigration checks the Bangladesh government insisted that they were not their citizens and they should be repatriated to Myanmar. The exodus of refugees was blamed on the liberation movement of the Mujahids within the Rohingya community and other groups in the Muslim dominated areas. In an interview with Dacca Weekly the leader of the Rohingya Muslim Independence Force, Mohammed Zaffir, said that, “the only objective of the movement was to achieve liberation.” The Muslim insurgency movement in the Arakan (now Rakhine region) was the consequence of the Mujahid movement which started as early as 1950.
There may have been movements across the border in subsequent years but there
was no significant movement o incident until June 2012, when violence between the Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists led to the death of at least 80 people and the displacement of about 75,000 people, mostly Rohingyas, after which the local authorities imposed a policy of segregating the two communities. Another wave of violence erupted between the two communities in October of that year, during which the official figure put the number of deaths to 89. Official source said that more than 97 percent of the 36,394 who fled the October violence were Muslims. Four years later in 2016, another violence broke out in Rakhine after Rohingya militants attacked border guard posts and killed nine policemen on October 9.
In response the Myanmar military launched the clearance operations which included the use of helicopter gunships which resulted in the deaths of about 150 to 300 people according to independent sources. While the Rohingyas were attempting to flee across the border, the Bangladeshi authorities prevent ed them from entering their territory. In late August 2017, Another wave of violence broke out when the Muslim militant group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked 30 police posts and an army base in Rakhine state, which the government sources said, resulted in the death of at least 59 insurgents and 12 members of government security forces, one soldier, one immigration officer and ten policemen.
It is estimated that about insurgents took part in the attacks against Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, a much wider area than the 2016 October attack. The overwhelming operation led by the Myanmar military forced out an estimate of nearly 700,000 people from the Rohingya community into neighbouring Bangladesh.
International Attention
Extensive media coverage and pressure from the international community played an important role, especially in two ways – wider global attention and change of Myanmar government’s attitude. The primary objective of ARSA, as stated by its leader Attullah Abu Ammer Jununi is to ‘liberate our people from dehumanized oppression perpetuated by all successive Burmese regimes.” However, it is likely that one unstated objective of the ARSA attack on Myanmar security forces in October 2016 and August 2017 could have been to draw international attention. In fact, the Rohingya issue made several headlines especially in the aftermath of August 2017 attacks on Myanmar security posts. The global attention has been not necessarily due to ARSA attacks but largely because of the mass exodus of refugees as a result of the Myanmar military-led mass clearance operations. Among several others, there are three important developments that have made the Rohingya issue get global attention: the formation of the Kofi Annan commission, the labelling of “ethnic cleansing” y the United Nations and the United States, and the UN Security Council’s visit to Bangladesh and Myanmar.
One development widely covered by the international was the formation of the nine-member state advisory commission on Rakhine, formed by the Myanmar government on 24 August 2016 and chaired by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, which had six Myanmar nationals and three international members. It was an attempt by the Aung San Syu Kyi-led NLD government to find a sustainable solution to the simmering conflicts in Rakhine state. The Commission’s 63-page final report was submitted to the Myanmar government on 23 August 2017, which was an outcome of over 150 consultations and meetings held by the advisory commission. The final report addressed in depth a broad range of structural issues that are an impediment to the peace and prosperity of Rakhine state. Several recommendations specifically focussed on citizenship verification, rights and equality before the law, documentation, the situation of the internally displaced and freedom of movement, which affected the Muslim population disproportionally. The commission proposed a ministerial level appointment to coordinate the effective implementation of the commission’s recommendations. The labelling of “ethnic cleansing” has also brought the Rohingya issue to another level of scrutiny and seriousness. On 11 September 2017, the Chief of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, accused the Myanmar military of committing several human rights violations of international law, including widespread extra judicial killing, rape and other atrocities which he termed “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing”. Since then, the term “ethnic cleansing” has been widely used in media reports. And on 22 November 2017 the United States government officially called the Myanmar military operations against the Rohingya population as “ethnic cleansing” with a threat of an imposition of targeted sanctions against those responsible for the “horrendous atrocities”. The US decision, which was made a week after Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Myanmar, was partly intended to put pressure on both the Myanmar military and the civilian leadership which share power in a hybrid political arrangement. Another significant development was the visit of a UN Security Council delegation to Bangladesh and Myanmar, from 28 April to May, 2018. The delegation visited the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh and interacted with the Rohingya population, and also met several leaders from the Bangladesh government, including Prime Minsiter Sheikh Hasina. In Myanmar the Security Council delegation visited Maungdaw, the epicentre of the August 2017 violence, and also met several leaders, among who were State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and the Military commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. At the end of the visit, the UNSC members urged the Myanmar government to conduct a “proper investigation” into alleged human rights abuses in northern Rakhine, and to speed up the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh with the help of UN agencies. The UK’s permanent representative to the Security Council, Karen Pierce, suggested two ways for proper investigation for alleged human rights abuses – either referring the issue to the International Criminal Court or allowing the Myanmar government to conduct the investigation herself. After several pressures from the international community, the Myanmar government on 31 May 2018 agreed for the text on tripartite Memorandum of Understanding with two UN agencies – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) – to “establish a framework for cooperation aimed at creating the conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable repatriation of Rohingya refugees to their places of origin o of their choosing.”
Ethnic Identity and Citizenship
The 1982 citizenship law groups citizens into three categories – citizen or full citizen, associate citizen, and naturalized citizen. Citizens are descendents of residents who lived in Burma before 1823 or were born to parents who were both citizens. Associate citizens are those who acquired citizenship through the 1948 citizenship act. And naturalized citizens are those who lived in the country before the country’s independence in 1948 and applied for citizenship after 1982. Since Rohingyas are not recognised by the 1982 citizenship law, they are not listed among the 135 national races of the country, and therefore, the people are denied citizenship rights and privileges which other ethnic groups enjoy. What makes the Rohingyas different from the other ethnic minorities of the country is primarily their ethnic identity, which is intertwined with citizenship. While other ethnic minorities are fighting for greater autonomy under a federal system, the Rohingyas are struggling to be recognized as an ethnic group and acquiring citizenship. In January 2018 after the Bangladesh and Myanmar governments reached an agreement on repatriation, the Rohingya refugees made it clear none of them would go back to Myanmar unless their demands were met. The demands included the recognition of Rohingyas as one of Myanmar’s ethnic groups and guarantor of citizenship. Since then, the NLD government has openly said that the Rohingyas living in internally displaced persons camps will have the freedom to travel across the country as long as they accept the National Verification Card (NVC) and fill out an associated immigration form. And anyone who holds the NVC can apply for citizenship and can become a citizen within five months. However, the NLD government’s policy has been strongly objected to by the opposition, including the USDP.
Conclusion
In the beginning I discussed how consensual transition can manifest in two ways. And the transition we see in Myanmar today is the second type of consensual transition where authoritarian leaders actively participate in the process of change, by controlling or limiting the change, which entails some degree of political continuity between authoritarianism and democratic opening. Such a hybrid political arrangement makes it difficult to address the Rohingya conundrum. Though international support and pressure are important, the chapter argues that a long-term solution to the Rohingya crisis primarily lies with three actors – the Myanmar military, the elected civilian government, and the general public. And it also argues that addressing ethnic identity and citizenship is crucial to achieving a sustainable solution to the Rohingya problem.
The Myanmar government not only reserves 25 percent of the seats in the national and state legislatures for the military, but also gives the armed forces control of three important ministries. The constitution also provides the military a majority in the powerful NDSC. Because of the hybrid nature of the power structure, it is tremendously challenging for the civilian government to prevail upon the military and its establishment. Beyond her reiteration of the importance of the rule of law and the formation of the state advisory council to investigate the conflict in Rakhine and another subsequent body to oversee the implementation of Kofi Annan Commission’s recommendations, it is difficult for Syu Kyi to end the violence in Rakhine without the support or cooperation of the powerful military. Considering the special political structure perhaps the most effective and quickest way to end the Rohingya crisis would be dependent on a genuine desire of the military to do so. Another important actor is the civilian government. Though it has no control over the military the NLD government has the mandate of the Myanmar people, which is reflected in both houses of the national parliament where the NLD enjoys a majority. Moreover, the civilian government has the constitutional power to appoint the country’s president who is head of state and government, as well as one of the two vice-presidents and several other cabinet posts. Had there been a strong political will, the NLD government can possibly garner the necessary support – domestically as well as internationally – to help resolve the Rohingya crisis. After strong pressure and scrutiny from the international community, there are signs that the civilian government is gradually exploring possible solutions – such as repatriation and citizenship path – with support from the international community.
Another crucial factor is the role of the general public, including civil society groups. The conditions of the Rohingyas could perhaps have changed for the better had the general public sympathised with their plight. Opinion is divided in Myannmar over how the Rohingya problem should be addressed. Some have a genuine concern and a desire for peacefully resolving the conundrum. Had there been a mass movement or public pressure on the military leadership and the NLD government in support of the Rohingyas, the military and civilian elites could have approached the issue in a more favourable way fo the Rohingyas. Though some think it is difficult or unimaginable to accept the Rohingya population, it is important for the people of Myanmar to understand that without addressing such fundamental issues as ethnic identity and citizenship, any repatriation of refugees from Bangladesh will not solve the issue. The views of a vast majority of the Burman population have been influenced by the military and civilian elites and vice versa. Aung San Suu Kyi who has gradually transformed herself from being an activist and democratic icon to pragmatic politician, remain cognizant of the need to consider the concerns of her electorate. Suu Kyi, who is a Burman, is making diligent moves not to upset the military as well as her NLD party colleagues, and the Burman ethnic group, who make up roughly 68 percent of the country’s population. Had Myanmar been a full democracy where the military operated under civilian control, the situation in which the Rohingyas find themselves could have been different.
Excerpted with author permission from the book by Imtiaz Ahmed (ed) ‘The Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Towards Sustainable Solutions’. Centre for Genocide Studies, Dhaka. 2019
