Decoding the current phase of militancy in Kashmir

By Bashir Assad

The new breed of militants in Kashmir can be encapsulated in the expression of “dead men walking”. They love death like we love life. I believe Kashmiri militants will try to repeat the Pulwama attack as and when they get the opportunity to strike. Kashmiri militants need only expertise from Pakistan for the preparation of explosives. Suicide bombers are available locally.

The harsh fact is that many  Kashmiri militant are  ready to blow  up to inflict mortal wounds on the Indian security agencies.

The question we face is this: What motivates Kashmiri militants to become suicide bombers? Is it the perceived set of grievances against the state? Or is there something more than meets the eye?

I have consistently argued over the last few years that the current phase of violence in Kashmir is beyond the political narratives of azadi and self-determination. It is time to acknowledge this truth.

The current phase of  militancy in Kashmir has reached an advanced stage, courtesy the ideological upbringing of the younger generation. We have a whole generation of indoctrinated youngsters who have gone crazy, and are yearning to embrace death ‘in the glory of Islam’.

Given the historical perspective, we tend to take positions on Kashmir based on old narratives. We tend to discuss Kashmir based on our knowledge or understanding of the historical perspective. I find this the greatest error in understanding the Kashmir conundrum.

The present phase of violence in Kashmir has very little to do with the nature of conflict that history threw before us. This understanding, rather misunderstanding of the issue, exonerates the stakeholders from many crucial responsibilities. Of course the political problem of Kashmir and its dimensions are intact, at least for the sake of argument. However,  the problem we face currently is far more grievous. The  intellectualization of the Kashmir issue has left unattended the transformation and churning which Kashmir has undergone in the recent years.

In the current phase of Kashmir violence, the narrative is not driven by political and social scientists. It is driven by the religious leaders and preachers. Azadi does not have the potential to transform a whole generation of youth. It is the Islamist ideology that is producing the dead men walking in Kashmir who love and seek death the way others love and seek life.

Kashmir is witnessing the second wave of proselytization after Kashmiri Pandits converted to Islam. This is the conversion from mainstream (Sufi) Islam to the Islam peddled by Jamaat- e-Islami, founded by Maududi in 1941.

The  extremist Islamist ideologies were allowed unbridled expansion by political leaders as part of the pact between power-politics and religion. This was most visible in the period from 2002 to 2006. As chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Mufti Muhammad Sayeed allowed extremist islamists to reorganize and strengthen themselves.  The secret pact between PDP and Jamaat-e-Islami was no secret in Kashmir. The Indian deep state was aware of it.

The Jamaat helped Mufti in defeating the National Conference in 2002. Mufti ascended as chief minister and rewarded the Jamaat with complete freedom. Jamaat’s ideology of hate and the “us versus them” doctrine flourished under Mufti. This is not an isolated period of their nexus. The Indian deep state has documented accounts which reveal the nexus between Mufti and the Jamaatis dating back to 1971-72.

The extremist narratives constructed in Kashmir drive Kashmiri youth to seek death. The fresh extremist narrative is of war between dar-al-Islam(house of Islam) and dar-al-harab (house of war, countries not under Islamic rule).

This doctrine provides human resource to the current phase of violence in Kashmir. This pop-Islamism derived from Maududi’s literature is totally in contravention to the mainstream, true Islam.

Pakistan is facing severe terrorism, though it does not have any Kashmir issue. Terrorism has killed thousands of Pakistanis even though it is an independent, self-ruled country.

The theology that glorifies the death and condemns life is here to stay. It will keep  manufacture a new set of grievances to continue with the bloodbath. This is true for Afghanistan. It is true for Kashmir.

Kashmir is in grip of a theology which celebrates death. It is here to stay even if the state honestly and sincerely addresses the present set of grievances. Such a mindset is produced by deep radicalization. It ritualizes violent responses to grievances based on real or perceived social exclusion.

Kashmir does not recognize that social challenges are part of every human society. Alienation, exclusion, discrimination, deprivation, abuse, excesses, torture, denial of rights and so on. What makes Kashmir peculiar in its response to the challenges.

Violent responses are now in the realm of group-thinking in Muslim-majority societies courtesy the unrealistic, illegitimate interpretation of Islamic teachings by Wahabis and Jamaat-e-Islami. Muslims influenced by this theology respond to grievances violently. Such is their collective response.

The larger group, indoctrinated by an illegitimate Islamist theology, celebrates the death of “others”. Why? Because extremist religious groups are fundamentally exclusivists. They seek an ethnically “pure society” as the first step towards ‘redemption’.

In the second step, they build the concept of a state that is puritanical. This is how violent theology sustains. If you address the given set of grievances, they manufacture another set to keep the ball rolling. This resolve and resilience derived from extremist theology gradually influences the fence-sitters.

Two things immediately come into play. One, the stakeholders develop huge vested interests. Second, those in the circle of this ideology are not allowed to assess or question it.

Both things are at play in Kashmir today. The elites within the system who have huge vested interests in the conflict are conveniently pushing the younger generation into the battlefield. A sizeable section of the elites are thriving on the conflict economy. They have presence everywhere. They are in politics, in the levers of administration, in the media – everywhere.

This churning and transformation in Kashmir has alienated mainstream Sufi Islam. Real Islam is not mainstream in Kashmir now. The fringe has replaced it.  The peaceful Kashmir and the peace-loving Kashmiri is an irritant for them. They see to it that the one who disagrees is discredited and physically harmed. Dissent is the first causality in extremism. There is a whole generation of elderly Kashmiris who do not subscribe to these deadly extremist narratives. They are mute because they fear for their life.

It is also disturbing to observe that the majority of Kashmiri Muslims have either lost the faculty to critically assess, or they choose not to exercise it. There is no concrete movement within the society that it should revisit the idea of achieving the desired result through violence. Violence is justified, not condemned. The security forces are condemned in abundance. Rizwan Assad’s death in police custody infuriated the whole valley. People took to streets to protest against the police. Strike calls were given by the separatists and also by trade bodies. Businesses and educational institution were shut. On the same day, an 11-year-old boy, Atif, was held captive by militants in north Kashmir for two days. He was finally killed. There was no one to condemn or mourn his death. A couple of terror apologist journalists blamed the security forces for not allowing the militants to escape so that Atif could be saved.

Such truths emerging from Kashmir horrify non-Muslims, who then become explicit opponents of Islam. They tend to make it an issue of Muslims versus non-Muslims. Kashmiri students and traders had to face abuse in the mainland in the aftermath of the Pulwama terror attack. The abuse they faced made the Kashmir violence seem reactionary – which it is not.

It is essentially Islamist extremism that plays in Kashmir streets. It sustains on many factors. The brute religious response is an important factor that justifies it.

Aditi Bhaduri

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